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Prejace 
On many occasions the Russians made it clear that the in­
corporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union is definite 
and that the status of these regions "could no more serve as a 
subject for discussion than, for instance, the status of Cali­
fornia. 
Yet the Baltic question still remains, for the time being, on 
the order of the day of political discussions among the Allies, 
true, only as a conditio sine qua non set forth by the Russians. 
It is not difficult to guess that sooner or later this condition will 
be met by Britain and also by the United States; the situation 
on the fighting fronts, the actual diplomatic line-up and the 
present political relations throughout the Allied world are such 
that the United Nations can be expected shortly to recognize 
the incorporation of the Baltic states within the Soviet federa­
tion. 
After numerous official expressions to the contrary, published 
with generally negative press commentary, recognition of the 
Soviet Baltic republics cannot but come as a shock to an unpre­
pared public opinion, which has heretofore considered only the 
anti-Russian interpretation of the Baltic issue. Already there is 
a marked tendency to represent the expected decision as a form 
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of concession to force. That is what Russia wants, it is said, and 
she has the necessary force behind her; therefore, the concession 
must be made even though it means violation of the rights of 
small and sympathetic peoples. In this manner everything that 
has been said and done up to now is justified and, moreover, 
since the present system of power relations is not permanent, 
the decision remains provisionary in principle. 
The implications of such an interpretation are clear for every­
body and anybody can accordingly understand why those who 
are dreaming of a new war ten to twenty years hence, maintain 
this view with particular emphasis right now. 
The view that if there had been no pressure from the Soviet 
Union there would be no Baltic question, is a misconception 
rooted in prolonged agitation that stems to a great extent from 
the foreign office and war ministry in Germany. For obvious 
reasons, Germany wants the Baltic running sores ever exposed 
and never healed. They hide behind a screen of false pity for 
small peoples, but as it usually happens, the first and foremost 
victims of the uninvited guardians are the small nations them­
selves. For they have always suffered most of all precisely from 
the insecurity of their status and from the consequent instability 
of their economic and political life. Above everything else they 
now want to arrive at a final and organic decision granting them 
a new lease on a free and robust life. 
Fortunately for them and for the world such an opportunity 
now presents itself and, moreover, is such that the interests of 
the Baltic nations coincide with the current trend of interna­
tional affairs. It is only necessary to crack down in time on those 
who still wish to keep the Baltic question open and, while rant­
ing about democratic public conscience, conceal their own dark 
schemes fraught with disaster for all the world's peoples alike, 
not the Baltic nations alone. 
If the facts presented in this book enable the reader to make 
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sense out of the welter of propaganda and misinformation 
spread about the Baltic nations and contribute toward giving 
American public opinion a clear conception of the "Baltic 
Riddle," the purpose of this work will have been fully accom­
plished. 
# # # 
I take this opportunity to express full and grateful acknowl­
edgment to two persons who have been of utmost assistance to 
me in the creation of this volume. They are: Andrew J. Steiger, 
author of Soviet Asia, who has given me invaluable editorial aid 
in the preparation of the English version, and E. Schloss, artist 
on the staff of the Fighting French newspaper France-Amerique, 
a Latvian himself, who has illustrated the basic content with 
excellent maps and charts. 
G. M. 
October 25, 1943 
Contents 
PAGE 
Preface v 
PART I: THE MEDITERRANEAN OF THE NORTH 1 
CHAPTER 
I. The Baltic Area: Where the West and Russia Meet 3 
II. Germandom in the Baltic Area 12 
III. Between Brest-Litovsk and Versailles 32 
PART II: BETWEEN TWO WORLD WARS 51 
IV. The Baltic Lungs 53 
V. The Cordon Sanitaire 72 
VI. The Baltic Vichy Governments 90 
VII. The Baltic in the First Year of World War II 111 
VIII. Finland: Legend and Reality 134 
PART III: TOWARD A NEW LIFE 159 
IX. The Soviet Baltic Republics 161 
X. Ostland: Reichsminister Alfred Rosenberg 182 
XI. The Baltic and the Future 209 
APPENDIX I: SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF BALTIC 
POLITICS 229 
The Vilna Controversy 232 
Memel (Klaipeda) 235 
The Aland Islands 239 
ix 
X Contents 
PACE 
APPENDIX II: STATISTICAL SUMMARY 243 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 245 
Finland 257 
Bibliographical Notes 259 
Recent Publications in English 261 
Index 263 
List of Maps 
PAGE 
1. Political Map of Baltic Area xii 
2. Baltic Communication System 65 
3. German Invasion of the Baltic Area—1941 191 
List of Charts 
1. Population and Area xiii 
2. Decline of Baltic Urban Life 60 
3. Foreign Trade in 1938 88 
OULU 
VAASA 
B O T H N I A  
POR/ 
my* - 7 AIANDJI— TVRKU ' * O H£IAU*K1 KRONStA 
HANeO 
TQCKHOLM ~ o-
"ZPALO/SHi &u-— -
* HA APS ALU Peipu* 
# STARAtA HUSSA 
GOTLAND ^"SvALeA 
VALMHRA 
cesis~>.r &&LF& 
H*A I, / V . 
¥£i.tKt£ LVKt J6LGAVA KRUSTPiLS L9BPA *aeB£ZH j- JQNISKIS W V 
KIAIPCDA V3_/ (M£M£U |U • _ _ / 
" JL V1- 1 T H 17 A N IA // 
_ /' / / J  ^  '  
• V/7ffftJR 
_ TILSIT 
xoN/GsaeoG 
/MST£ReURG- V/Z/VA • ' # V/LKAVtSKlSM ,m* 0 6 ORfSOY 
GR00N0 
^ • ^ BARA»CSV/CZ£ . • 
1) BIALYSTOK ^ . P" i7X7£ FftONTItKi BEFORE 1939 
rnONJIEKS Af ALTCRCD 
eerwetn 1930- tsto 
MAP 1. POLITICAL MAP OF BALTIC AREA 
FINLAND 
nmiii 
ESTONIA 
LATVIA 
Ml 
mi 
LITHUANIA 
mn 
VUA/A « 1 EACH MANNEQUIN ft£P*€S&OG 
HAL? MILLION POPULATION 
BACH BLOCK KEP*£S£*TS 
SOOO SQ.MI. 
CHART 1. POPULATION AND AREA 
P A R T  I  
T H E  M E D I T E R R A N E A N  
O F  T H E  N O R T H  
C H A P T E R  I  
The Baltic Area: Where the West 
and Russia Meet 
Not one of the Baltic countries has a total population much 
larger than that of Brooklyn, which has some two and a half 
million inhabitants. It is quite natural therefore that to the in­
habitants of New York, Chicago, and San Francisco the complex 
national and social problems of the Baltic area cannot but ap­
pear to be a tempest in a teapot. 
Not well versed in geography generally, the public loses orien­
tation completely in the East European border states, with their 
unpronounceable names, unfamiliar political leaders, and un­
known historic traditions. Many are not even clear about the 
geographic location of such small countries as Lithuania, Latvia, 
or Estonia, let alone the maze of entangled diplomatic con­
troversy woven around them. It may not be amiss to begin this 
book on the Baltic states as did the London author Jan Apse, 
who wrote: "Let us make no mistake about it: Lithuania, 
Estonia, and Latvia are not the Balkan but the Baltic States. 
They owe their name to the Baltic Sea. 
The British author decided to begin his book on the Baltic 
states in this curious way because, as a lecturer on the Baltic, he 
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found himself constantly reproached for saying nothing about 
Yugoslavia. When he inquired in public libraries for books on 
the Baltic area he was frequently given volumes on Rumania 
and Bulgaria. The situation here is not much different. Should 
anyone in this country resolve to conduct a Gallup Poll on the 
Baltic problem he would find it expedient to supply an atlas, 
plainly marking the Baltic Sea and its eastern littoral states: 
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland, as the area in question. 
A biographical lexicon of political leaders would also help, 
as would also a concise Baltic history. Even then perhaps, a large 
percentage of the persons queried would answer: "What's all 
this to us, anyway?" or "So what?" 
Yet there is something that does not allow us to dismiss or 
ignore the small Baltic countries. Hardly a day passes that the 
Baltic problem does not crop up in the news. The query, "What 
about the Baltic republics?" stands out like a cliche in editorials 
about the future of the world. Some writers are infuriated at 
what they describe as Bolshevik imperialism and hint that Allied 
military action against Soviet Russia is inevitable unless she re­
nounces Baltic territorial claims. Others, more favorable to the 
Soviets, offer explanation saying that Russia lays claim to the 
eastern Baltic littoral for reasons of security. Compromise solu­
tions are offered in proposed international agreements which 
would eliminate the threat of anti-Soviet aggression in Eastern 
Europe and so obviate Russian interest in territorial guarantees. 
Everything points to the fact that the Baltic issue is bound to 
become one of the most hotly debated of postwar problems— 
and not for the first time. During the Moscow talks held be­
tween Russia, England, and France in the summer of 1939, dis­
cussion persistently revolved around the Baltic countries. The 
Baltic area was also the pivotal center of the Soviet-German pact 
which set the stage for the subsequent course of the present war. 
The dispute over little Finland developed almost into an armed 
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clash between the western democracies and Russia. On the eve 
of the Nazi invasion of Soviet Russia, Hitler and Ribbentrop 
issued a proclamation that was mainly a harangue on the same 
critical issue of the Baltic area. 
The manifestation of intense world-wide interest in the Baltic 
area during every period of decisive political discussion cannot 
be explained alone by the fact that the deep-water Baltic har­
bors have frequently been objects of dispute between contend­
ing naval powers. 
The reason the Baltic states stand out more prominently on 
the European map than either their relatively minor popula­
tion or their inconspicuous geographic areas warrant is that be­
hind the Baltic problem, relatively insignificant per se, there is 
another consideration, fundamental for our time: the Baltic 
area is the place where Russia and the West meet. That is pre­
cisely what brings the Baltic states into the news. 
In a political sense the eastern Baltic area forms the frontier 
line between immense Russia and the Western world. The 
issues do not arise in the Baltic and, with rare exceptions, are 
not decided there. But they always find a clear reflection there. 
The Baltic area can be compared to a political testing ground 
where, as in a chemical process, intricate international relations 
combine in their essential elements and reveal their true color. 
And the reaction is always positive or negative—it is never 
neuter. , 
The territory of the eastern Baltic littoral has never been 
successfully neutralized in the sense that it ceased to be the 
meeting ground of Russia with the West. But attempts to 
isolate the Baltic area have repeatedly been made. Russia tried 
to do so in 1908 and in 1939. England and France sought to 
fence off the Baltic area from the Soviet Union in 1918 and in 
subsequent years. 
Representatives from Russia, Sweden, Denmark, and Ger­
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many, at a conference held in April 1908, passed a "declaration 
and memorandum on the Baltic problem" which aimed to de­
limit all foreign influence in the Baltic basin and exclude non-
Baltic countries. After the war broke out, six years later in 
1914, it became evident that this neutralization of the Baltic 
area was of advantage only to Germany, which held the safety 
catch to the basin. The Allied powers were locked out. 
The Anglo-French attempt, following World War I, to make 
of the Baltic area a barbed-wire entanglement protecting the 
West from Bolshevik Russia had from the outset the most dis­
astrous consequences. The immediate result of this effort, which 
found its clearest expression in Article 12 of the Armistice Con­
vention, was that the Baltic area became Germany's last front, 
and it was so named by German military historians. 
The German Army not only eagerly accepted the Entente's 
cordial invitation to remain in the Baltic and protect it from 
Bolshevism; it turned its military defeat in the West to ad­
vantage by continuing active operations in the East and exer­
cising control over the Baltic area. As a consequence, German 
military influence became very powerful in this part of eastern 
Europe. Ultimately, the Anglo-French creation of the cordon 
sanitaire contributed to complete Fascist control in the Baltic 
area and its conversion into a German fortified outpost. 
The peculiar role of the Baltic area in world affairs was 
demonstrated with almost classic clarity during 1939. The 
Moscow negotiations of that time sought to make the Baltic 
region a common defense zone, where the military forces of 
Britain and France could meet those of Russia to guarantee 
mutual protection. When the negotiations collapsed, the 
U.S.S.R. entered into a pact with Germany, which represented 
the cordon sanitaire in reverse, and which ultimately was also 
doomed to failure. 
Even today many persons cannot understand why the Moscow 
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talks collapsed. Was the Baltic really the banana peel that up­
set the anti-Hitler coalition of the time? The idea seems pre­
posterous. But if the Baltic actually was behind the collapse, 
then which party was to blame? Was it Russia which had de­
signs on an insignificant strip of territory and, to obtain it, en­
tered a pact with her worst enemy? Or was it Chamberlain and 
Daladier who suddenly became stanch supporters of the prin­
ciple of sovereignty and opposed the Russian demands, thereby 
paving the way also for Dunkirk and Sedan? 
Such alternatives are suggested naturally by analysis of the 
political atmosphere at the time of the ill-fated Moscow talks. 
Leon Blum's remarks come to mind. In Le Populaire he reviled 
the Bolsheviks for what was incomprehensible to him, their ap­
parently obstinate desire to swallow the Baltic republics. On 
the other hand, de Kerillis reproached the French and English 
governments for want of political realism and called on them 
to yield Baltic sovereignty. At the same time Alfred Duff-
Cooper, M.P., wrote in the London Evening Standard of June 
1939: 
It appears that the Baltic states constitute the difficulty. These 
states form the frontier of Russia. If they are attacked, the integrity 
of Russia is in danger, and Russia wishes to be assured that her 
allies will come to her assistance. 
The Baltic states—like rabbits in the presence of a boa constric­
tor [Germany] who has promised not to eat them—assure us in 
rather shaky voices that they feel quite safe and do not desire to 
be given any guarantee. The Prime Minister asserts that it is obvi­
ously impossible to guarantee a state against its will. Such an asser­
tion sounds at first convincing, but does it bear closer examination? 
Let us be realistic and face facts. We guarantee the frontiers of 
a country not out of love for its inhabitants, but out of considera­
tion of our own security. If Russia considers that the integrity of 
the Baltic states is essential to her security, we cannot blame her, 
and if we are asking her to undertake to assist us in the case of 
emergency we cannot refuse to give her a reciprocal undertaking. 
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According to the above comments, the tiny Baltic states ap­
pear to have been in 1939 the real stumbling block that tripped 
up a great world-wide anti-Fascist coalition. It is naive,- how­
ever, to infer therefor that the Baltic problem was the reason 
for the collapse of the Moscow talks. The disagreement over 
the Baltic was merely a symptom, a manifestation of what was 
not yet apparent to all, that there was really no foundation for 
collaboration between the U.S.S.R. and Chamberlain's Eng­
land or Daladier's France. 
The Moscow talks were doomed to fail. Their collapse was 
predestined at Munich and before Munich, in Spain. Since post-
Munich Europe lacked the prerequisites for the creation of a 
militant comradeship-in-arms between the western democracies 
and the U.S.S.R., the Baltic problem also found a correspond­
ingly negative solution. Had such premises not been absent, the 
Baltic situation would also have been no less positive in solu­
tion. In other words, collaboration between the U.S.S.R. and the 
West did not collapse in 1939 because of inability to agree on 
the Baltic issue, but simply because there was no basis for col­
laboration in general. If today, with even firmer grounds for 
collaboration, the Baltic issue still remains a problem, one must 
be on the alert for more serious trouble. 
In the spring of 1943, when British Foreign Secretary An­
thony Eden was in Washington to discuss postwar issues—as in 
the summer of 1942, when the Soviet Foreign Commissar, V M. 
Molotov, visited London and Washington to establish the pres­
ent Anglo-Soviet-American accord—the Baltic area suddenly 
became an issue in the world press. The question could be 
raised only in abstract form, since the territory of the Baltic 
republics was under German occupation and quite isolated 
from any of the United Nations. But the Baltic issue was raised 
nevertheless, and it was constantly emphasized that the Baltic 
area does not represent an independent question in world 
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affairs, but is only one aspect of the general problem of Russia. 
Curiously, this is nothing new for Americans. After World 
War I the United States was the only country that officially 
declined to consider the Baltic problem apart from the general 
issue of Russia and rejected the very idea of these Baltic coun­
tries being separated from Russia. The twenty-year existence of 
the small Baltic republics has not altered this fundamental fact. 
The European political frontier of Britain and the United 
States with Russia still crosses the Baltic area, imbuing it with 
a meaning not to be misunderstood and an importance not to 
be underestimated. 
The whole Baltic problem has frequently been distorted. For 
a long time Hitler has been exploiting it, and not without suc­
cess, with the purpose of undermining the world anti-Axis coali­
tion. To do so he employs the old and tested method of realistic 
international intrigue, the creation of frontier incidents to drive 
a wedge between those powers whose union Germany fears. As 
ever, the frontier incidents are mere symptoms of deeper irri­
tations. But at times, if unrestrained, these incidents may de­
velop into large-scale armed conflict. The Russo-Finnish War 
in the winter of 1939-1940 was such an incident, which might 
have become the Sarajevo of 1940 for Russia and the democ­
racies. 
German propaganda employs the Finnish and the Baltic 
question in yet another subtle way, one that is least appreciated 
although it affords Hitlerism an opportunity for close contact 
with democratic circles. Many progressive intellectuals, well-
meaning persons, who can no longer be taken in by the crude 
anti-Bolshevik slogans of Goebbels, continue to nibble at the 
Baltic bait. By cunning maneuvers the wholesome sympathies 
that democratic circles have toward industrious and cultured 
small nations are transformed into violent anti-Soviet prej­
udices. A retinue of antiquated Baltic and Finnish diplomats 
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serve as the transmission belt. The result is that the relations 
between the democracies and the U.S.S.R., the foundation of 
the new world equilibrium, are disturbed to the satisfaction of 
Germany and with invariably disastrous results for the small 
nations. A helpful fool is thrice an enemy. 
Current discussion tends to revolve around abstract formula­
tions. Russia, it is said, would never dare to annex the Baltic 
states, because the native peoples themselves want to be inde­
pendent in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Char­
ter. Again it is argued, that even if the native people wish it, 
the union of the Baltic peoples with the peoples of Soviet Rus­
sia is undesirable, because it would mean an expansion of Bol­
shevism's zone of influence. Posed in this negative form, the 
problem is insoluble. The western democracies and the Soviet 
Union cannot peacefully coexist because of the abstract prin­
ciple of self-determination. Nor can the principle of self-deter­
mination be carried out to its logical conclusion, since that 
would imply an expansion of Soviet influence. In this impasse, 
such a view of self-determination can be of positive advantage 
only to Germany. 
For every honest democrat and advocate of prolonged peace, 
however, the Baltic problem must be a question capable of 
harmonious and, therefore, durable solution. Enemy forces are 
consciously working to prevent such an outcome, and one re­
doubtable weapon in their arsenal is widespread ignorance of 
the essential facts. The factual information presented in this 
book aims to lay the groundwork for a reinterpretation of the 
entire Baltic problem. 
Throughout the heated discussion about the future of the 
Baltic region it is taken for granted that Americans have def­
initely made up their minds on the need to re-establish the 
status quo ante in the Baltic. This is considered an important 
aim of the democracies, worth paying for—even dying for. How­
The Baltic Area: Where the West and Russia Meet 11 
ever, the public actually is confused on the issue. It is not gen­
erally realized that Germans wrote the history books on the 
Baltic area and defined the Baltic problem for Europe and the 
world. They distorted it with scrupulous scientific exactitude, 
as the Germans alone can distort history. After the Versailles 
Treaty many Western writers adopted the German versions of 
this problem, in order to justify the Baltic policy determined 
at Versailles, which many Americans and Europeans thought 
to be irrational. These German-inspired versions now impede 
the search for a solution acceptable alike for the equilibrium 
of Europe and for the future of the Baltic nations. 
To understand the needs and aspirations of the Baltic peo­
ples, it is of prime importance to see clearly the respective roles 
of Germany and Russia in this area. In England and the United 
States much is heard about the age-old hostility of the Baltic 
peoples for the Russians, but we rarely hear about how these 
people feel toward the Germans. Yet the history of the Baltic 
area is a history of German oppression. This region of eastern 
Europe, which seven hundred years ago was overrun by the 
Teutonic knights, has today again witnessed a repetition of that 
historic invasion from the West. 
The German inroads in the eastern Baltic, to which the next 
chapter is devoted, must be comprehended to obtain an un-
distorted view of the Baltic problem in its modern form. 
C H A P T E R  I I  
Germandom in the Baltic Area 
THE BALTIC SEA LITTORAL 
To symbolize for school children the relations among the 
several small nations situated in the Baltic littoral, geography 
teachers sometimes compare the Baltic Sea to a woman kneel­
ing in prayer. With her knees resting on Poland and Germany, 
she has turned her back on Denmark and Sweden, bows her 
head to Finland, and extends clasped hands to Estonia, Latvia, 
and Russia.1 When history teachers use the same simile in les­
sons on the Baltic region, pupils begin to imagine the "Baltic 
woman" as praying for one thing only—for peace. But her 
prayer, alas, has never been heard. 
Ever since the first deep-sea navigators set foot on the wooded, 
marshy shores of the Baltic Sea, there has been a "Baltic prob­
lem." On either or both shores of the sea powerful states arose, 
each in succession fighting for domination and striving to make 
the Baltic their own inland lake. In course of time sanguinary 
wars were waged, and almost invariably the decisive engagements 
were fought in the eastern Baltic area, the territory now oc­
cupied by Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland. In this 
much-disputed area governments changed repeatedly, while the 
native inhabitants, too feeble to decide their own destiny, were 
i Bibliographical notes on p. 359. 
is 
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often victimized by the rivalries of great powers. Irrespective of 
the circumstances or the outcome of war, the natives always had 
to pay a heavy toll in blood. 
For more than seven hundred years the Baltic peoples have 
been subjected to repeated conquests. Prior to the twelfth cen­
tury, except for tribal incursions, the natives were more or less 
masters of their homeland, which extended from the Dvina to 
Lapland and was inhabited by the Finno-Ugrian (Uralo-Altai) 
tribes of Livonians, Kuronians, Estonians, and Finns. These 
tribes had, in the sixth and seventh centuries, been driven north 
and northeast by the Lithuanian-Lettish tribes—Letts, Lat-
gallians, Semigallians, Lithuanians—who like the Borussians to 
the south of the Dvina were of Indo-European stock.* But be­
fore the rudimentary state forms which evolved among these 
tribes could mature, their territory became an object of rivalry 
between the rising German, Scandinavian, and Slavic nations. 
As early as the eleventh century the Swedes, Danes, and Ger­
mans began to penetrate the eastern Baltic for trade and 
plunder. The Baltic was also viewed with interest by the Rus­
sian princes of Polotsk and Pskov, who established the town of 
Yurjev (Dorpat, Tartu) in 1030. These early incursions, how­
ever, were for the most part limited to trading expeditions and 
armed sorties, aimed at the levy of tribute and the erection of 
fortified outposts. 
The first foreign rulers in the Baltic were the Danes, who in 
the twelfth century conquered northern Estonia, but the actual 
subjugation of the people began later with the Teutonic inva­
sions. Following the bloody Crusades to Palestine, Germanic 
• These two races in the Baltic area still preserve many of their distinguishing 
traits today. Only in Latvia have the Letts assimilated the Kuronians and 
Livonians. The stocky, broad-faced Finns and Estonians differ markedly from 
the tall, blond, and gray-eyed Letts. The Estonian language is almost identical 
with the Finnish, but it has no sound in common with the cognate Lettish or 
Lithuanian languages. For mutual intercourse, the Baltic peoples have been 
obliged to employ foreign languages, most frequently Russian or German. 
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feudal princes eager to enlarge their domains, knights-errant 
in quest of booty, monks and merchants swarmed into the 
Baltic region. In 1196 Pope Innocent III proclaimed the first 
Crusade against the Livonians. This ended in disaster when the 
Livonians slew the Crusade commander, Bishop Berthold. In 
reprisal, a second Crusade was proclaimed, marking the advent 
of a dark era in the life of the small Baltic peoples. 
BLACK KNIGHTS IN THE BALTIC REGION 
The Teutonic regime in the Baltic has survived in the folk 
memory as a reign of terror, preserved in plaintive folk songs 
and mournful legends passed on to each generation. In child­
hood every Estonian, every Latvian and Lithuanian learns with 
horror of the "Black Knights" who with fire and sword laid 
waste their free earth, enslaved its liberty-loving tillers of the 
soil and doomed them to age-long suffering, misery, and hu­
miliation. 
The first Prussian inroads into the eastern Baltic were made 
seven hundred years ago. Knights of the Teutonic Order 
formed the spearhead, and they followed what was to become a 
classic invasion route across eastern Prussia to the land between 
the Vistula and Nieman rivers, then inhabited by the Borus-
sians. Struck by this first overwhelming Teutonic blow, the na­
tive Borussians were annihilated. Hardly a trace of them re­
mains today, except in small fishing settlements along the east 
Prussian coast. In this region curious tourists are sometimes 
astonished to find scattered descendants of the blond, gray-eyed 
Borussians, segregated from the stocky Germans and speaking 
almost the same language as the Lithuanians and the Latvians. 
In their expansion to the east and north, however, the Teu­
tonic knights were brought to a halt by the powerful resistance 
of the Lithuanians and Slavs. It was in-these struggles against 
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the Teutonic invaders that the Lithuanians united to found a 
nation. In 1410 Prince Vytautas, one of a famous line of Lith­
uanian princes, dealt the Teutonic knights a decisive defeat 
near Tannenberg, where their eastward advance ended. Allied 
with the Lithuanians in the battle of Tannenberg were power­
ful units of Slavic warriors. With their assistance Great Lithu­
ania not only waged successful warfare against the Teutonic 
Order, but also gained control over much territory inhabited 
by the Slavs, territory on which the Ukrainian and Belorus-
sian nations were later formed. 
Because of the stanch stand made by the combined Lithu­
anian-Slavic forces, the Letts and Estonians were spared the fate 
of the Borussians. Although protected thus against invasion 
overland, they were, however, open to sea-borne assault. 
After the first Crusade against the Livonians failed (1196), 
Bishop Albert mustered in 1200 a new body of avaricious Cru­
saders to invade the eastern Baltic from the sea. They landed 
on the shores of Riga Gulf, where the town of Riga was founded 
in 1201. Through a military-monastic organization known as 
the Livonian Order of Teutonic Knights or Order of the Sword, 
established by Bishop Albert, the conquest of the Baltic was 
undertaken. For one hundred and fifty years the Livonian 
Order waged a relentless struggle against the resistance of the 
unarmed Estonians and Letts, who stubbornly refused to sub­
mit to the master race. 
In their struggle against the Teutonic knights, the Baltic 
peoples were often aided by the Slavs from the neighboring city-
states of Novgorod and Pskov, who were not reconciled to the 
German trade monopoly in the Baltic region. Being very lim­
ited and inconstant, the Slavic assistance was not enough to 
save the Letts and Estonians from subjugation. However, when 
the Livonian Order sought to expand eastward into Slavic 
lands, the attempt proved a complete fiasco. In 1242 a crushing 
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defeat was administered to the Teutonic knights on the ice of 
Lake Peipus by the Russian commander, Prince Alexander 
Nevsky. Although the knights attempted several times there­
after to invade Russian land, they were unsuccessful. 
By the end of the thirteenth century the eastern Baltic had 
been completely subjugated by the Teutons, who divided it 
into five espiscopal districts and monastic estates. These feudal 
domains were united under the secular and clerical authority 
of the Archbishop of Riga, who acted as Papal vicegerent and 
was a vassal of the German emperor. 
The former communal order and patriarchal life of the local 
tribes was wiped out. Feudal society was established. The Ger­
man conquerors formed a ruling class of noblemen landlords. 
Except for the native princes, who became vassals of the Teu­
tonic Order, the native population was a mass of feudal serfs. 
In the struggle for power which ensued between the Livonian 
Order and the Archbishop, the Grand Master of the Order won, 
becoming the actual ruler of the region. In the early sixteenth 
century the Grand Master, many of the noblemen and the rul­
ing circles of Riga, Tartu, Tallinn, all cities of the Hanseatic 
League, espoused Lutheranism. The Catholic clergy was driven 
from the Baltic region. The official church was the Lutheran. 
But having spent its strength in the struggle against the 
Archbishop, the Livonian Order was no longer powerful. The 
coup de grace was delivered by the rising Moscow czar, Ivan 
the Terrible, whose forces invaded Livonia in 1558 and oc­
cupied Riga in 1559. For assistance the knights turned to 
Poland, Sweden, and Denmark. The twenty-five-year Livonian 
War ensued, following which the Russians evacuated the Baltic 
region in 1583. But the Livonian Order, formally dissolved in 
1561, was completely smashed. The swordsmen had become 
"peaceable," if no less avaricious and bloodthirsty feudal land­
lords. From the hazards of war they turned to intrigue, de­
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signed to win support from one or another of the more power­
ful states. The maneuvers of the barons were always favorable 
to the side which might guarantee all their feudal rights, from 
hereditary landholdings to jus primae noctis. 
Life was harsh for the Baltic peoples. Like ravaging storms, 
troops of Poles, Swedes, and Russians alternately swept through 
the towns and settlements. One ruling power displaced the 
other, each in turn victimizing the native population. But no 
matter which state was dominant, the ruthless, intolerable au­
thority of the German barons, degenerate progeny of the erst­
while swordsmen, remained inviolable. Fiercely resisting any 
measures introduced to ameliorate the life of the serfs, the 
barons managed on every occasion to throw the weight of the 
war and devastation onto the backs of the peasants. When a 
ruling state in any way embarrassed the German nobility or 
undermined their privileges, the knights conspired against it, 
seeking new patrons. 
In 1561, after the Livonian Order was dissolved, Livonia 
with Riga and Latgale were ceded to Poland. Kurland was con­
verted into a duchy under Polish protection. But peasant life 
remained intolerably burdensome, the feudal dukes and barons 
appropriating peasant lands and monopolizing flour milling, 
hunting, fishing, and trading. 
The Baltic map was again altered by the Polish-Swedish War 
of 1598-1621. Livonia and Estonia were ceded to Sweden. For 
the native people Swedish rule in Latvia and Estonia was a 
golden era. In need of grain and revenue the government of 
burghers in Sweden was strict with the arrogant German barons 
and lenient to the industrious serfs. The Swedes banned trading 
in serfs and encouraged public enlightenment. Under Swedish 
rule the Bible was, for the first time, translated into the native 
languages. Natives were instructed in rudiments of reading and 
writing. 
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As a counterstroke the German noblemen engaged in a com­
plicated intrigue, which fell in neatly with the ambitions of the 
Russian czar, Peter the Great, who sought an outlet to the sea 
for Russia. In the great Northern War of 1700-1721 which 
broke out between Sweden and Russia, the German barons did 
their utmost to defeat Sweden.* The war ended with the com­
plete downfall of the Swedish empire. In accord with the 
Nystadt Peace of 1721, Livonia and Estonia were ceded to Rus­
sia. The Russian era which then began in the Baltic region led 
to three significant developments. 
First, the power and influence of the German noblemen were 
consolidated in the Baltic region and made to be felt in Russia 
itself. 
Second, under the general protection of the Russian empire 
a political union of the Baltic area was achieved. According 
to the terms of the Nystadt Peace, Livonia and Estonia were 
annexed to Russia. Latgale was annexed by Russia after the 
first partitioning of Poland in 1772, and Kurland after the third 
partitioning in 1795. During the same period, Russia also an­
nexed Lithuania, whose earlier history had followed quite a 
different course from that of the other Baltic nations.f 
Third, with the annexation of the Baltic areas by Russia, the 
native peoples came to participate in the mighty emancipation 
movement which arose in the vast Russian empire. Thus, the 
foundation was also laid for the rise of the Baltic national lib­
eration movements. 
• Throughout the period, Baron Patkull resided at the court of Peter the 
Great as the envoy of the Baltic noblemen, advising Russia in her war against 
Sweden. The Swedes offered a reward for his capture. 
f After uniting in the face of the Teutonic invasion, the Lithuanian tribes 
created a powerful state which extended from the Vistula to the Dnieper. In the 
fourteenth century the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland 
concluded a union, opening an era of Polonization in Lithuania; a movement 
which was restricted, however, chiefly to the upper classes. The Lithuanian 
people, having accepted Catholicism, retained both their national culture and 
their native language. 
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USSIA IN THE BALTIC REGION 
Like all previous eras in the Baltic, the Russian reign began 
L the "traditional manner," with bloodshed. 
"God Almighty and the Most Holy Mother of God have ac-
jmplished Thy will! There is nothing left of that hostile land 
> ravage, the whole country has been laid waste and ruined, 
[arienburg and Narva, yes Reval and Riga, alone remain. 
That is what the commander in chief, Sheremetiev, wrote to 
is superior, the young Russian czar, Peter, after Russian troops 
jllowing the route of the Swedes swept like a whirlwind across 
le Baltic region, devastating the countryside, towns, feudal 
states, and ancient castles. 
The ravages of war were almost insufferable for the native 
eople, accustomed though they were to hardship. Most detri-
lental from the Lettish and Estonian viewpoint were the agree-
lents which the German barons contrived to negotiate with 
ie Russian authorities. The barons avowedly sought to pre-
?rve the "German spirit" in this "German" land and actually 
ecame still more autocratic masters of the entire country, 
Dvereigns alike of the spirit and the flesh of the serfs. 
As usual, the Baltic barons were rewarded for their customary 
cts of treachery and gained the signature of Sheremetiev to 
/hat is called the "capitulation," * which nullified none of 
tieir rights and preserved all of their prerogatives. In accord 
rith this agreement (more truly there were two—in 1710 and 
721) no Russian could become a free citizen of Riga or any 
ther town. So it happened that citizens of the "ruling" nation 
sttled in the suburbs outside the city walls. The dreariest 
uburb of Riga, called the Moscow Forstadt, thereafter came 
* No one has ever seen the original of the "capitulation" document; it was 
«t. But the Baltic Germans found a torn "copy" of this document in Riga 
•chives. It is supposed to begin: "The German nation and its descendants in 
lis land and this land for the German nation and its descendants " 
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to be inhabited chiefly by Russians and Jews. Today, under 
Nazi occupation it has become a ghetto for Russian Jews. 
While restricting the "Russian spirit" to the confines of these 
peculiar ghettos in Baltic German cities, the German barons 
themselves hastened, not without success, to reside at the Rus­
sian imperial court. The Baltic barons rapidly rose to prom­
inence. To the Russian autocracy eager to Europeanize the 
court, they appeared to be most desirable "servants of the 
throne" and, moreover, such as would not hesitate to carry out 
the least honorable missions. The Duchy of Kurland became 
notorious as the spawning ground for ambitious barons, who 
developed into infamous governors general, police supervisors, 
or chiefs of the gendarme corps. Their sorry fame spread 
throughout all the Russias, even to far-off Siberia, where at one 
time the bloodthirsty Meller-Zakomelsky, who won his spurs 
as governor general of Kurland, did his hangman's duty. 
The name of the Baltic German, General in chief Benken-
dorff, has always been associated with the czarist "Gestapo" 
gendarmes which he founded and nurtured. German names 
were common in the roster of the highest Russian czarist ad­
ministrators. The German party at the imperial court was for 
many years most influential.* But the czarist "magnates" of 
Baltic stock never pulled up their Kurland roots. While ad­
vancing the destiny of the Great Russian empire, they did not 
forget to secure their own privileges in the Baltic region. To 
exclude the Russians and the "Russian spirit" from the Baltic 
remained one of their main concerns. 
Under the czarist regime the Baltic barons were able to re­
store all the manorial rights and prerogatives which had been 
abolished under the rule of the Swedish burgher government. 
They were enabled to set up a closed corporation of less than 
• Of this fact Bismarck remarked, "The Baltic noble stock is really the full-
blooded sire of Russian generals and diplomats." 
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wo hundred families, who alone had the right to possess land. 
Administration of the region was put in the hands of the Land-
ags of the noblesse. Conditions were insufferable for the Lat-
/ian and Estonian serfs, who toiled six days a week at corvee. 
Serfs were bought and sold like cattle. Taxes and assessments 
iespoiled the peasant economy. From 1765 to 1804 one peasant 
uprising after another broke out in the Baltic region, only to 
be suppressed by the German barons, who were assisted by 
:zarist troops and police. 
The barons proved to have stronger nerves than the czarist 
government, which in 1804 and 1809, seeking to ameliorate the 
peasants' lot and ease the rising pressure, forbade the sale of 
serfs without land. But the German barons met this reform with 
irms in hand. They gained the "agrarian reforms" of 1817-
1819, which formally proclaimed the peasants to be "free," but 
without the right to migrate. At the same time the land passed 
more completely into the possession of the barons. Czarist and 
baronial historians mark this date as the first "emancipation of 
serfs in the Russian empire." This "bird's freedom," as the serfs 
called it, only provoked fresh desperate uprisings. These were 
even more brutally suppressed. 
The incessant peasant uprisings forced the czarist govern­
ment from time to time to intervene in the Baltic agrarian 
problem. But every time even modest efforts to relieve the 
peasant hardships and to allay the rising spirit of rebellion met 
with stone-wall resistance on the part of the barons. The 
czarist government gave in. 
During the entire era of Russian dominance, the Baltic 
region remained under the power of the Muiza, the baronial 
estates. The Russian governors general were loyal servants of 
:he German nobility. Every newly appointed higher official, 
jven before opening his office door, would invariably begin his 
idministration by paying his respects to the mighty 
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landowner, Count Manteuffel. Moreover, Russian officials 
usually held limited authority, and as a rule were ranked not 
higher than a police supervisor or tax collector. The highest 
officials were Germans. The civil laws,* landholdings, regime, 
and customs were their own—German. The churches, schools, 
and newspapers were in German hands, and woe to him who 
tried to Russify them. Feeling themselves masters of the Baltic 
region, the barons did not hesitate in their press to abuse ex­
ponents of Russification, even those of high rank, calling them 
"incompetent loafers," "connivers in revolution," et cetera. In 
such instances influential hands also pulled strings at the court, 
and the ill-starred Russian official was usually kicked out of 
office with a demotion. 
The native population suffered under a single yoke, that of 
the landholding barons. Since the representatives of Russian 
authority—the police, Cossacks, and officials—were subject to 
orders from the same barons and functioned also through the 
Muiza, the people came to regard them as merely proteges 
of their own oppressors, the German barons. Therefore, when 
their lot became grievous beyond endurance, the Latvian and 
Estonian peasants sought liberation from the baronial yoke un­
der the wing of Russia, even czarist Russia. 
THE RISE OF EMANCIPATION MOVEMENTS 
When one uprising after another was drowned in bloodshed, 
the Latvian and Estonian peasants sought relief by flight. In 
the 1840's the peasants began to flock into the Russian Ortho­
dox Church and then to migrate into the interior of Russia. But 
the barons and the Protestant clergy soon put an end to this 
• The Baltic guberniyas of Russia were not governed according to the com­
mon Russian civil laws. They were governed in accordance with a code of civil 
statutes, which was a combination of pure Roman law and German customary 
law. 
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"rebellion" advocated by Russian priests. The migration of 
peasants to South Russian regions was declared an "insurrec­
tion," and as such was suppressed with military force. The peas­
ants were soon convinced that changing their religion to the 
"czarist faith" was no way to find salvation from the heavy hand 
of the German baron. 
A more serious threat to the "German spirit" in the Baltic 
region arose in the 1880's, with the ascendancy of the Slavophil 
movement. A number of newspapers, particularly Den (The 
Day), edited by Ivan Aksakov and Yuri Samarin, waged a gen­
eral campaign against Germanism in Russia, exposing the op­
pression of the Latvians and Estonians. For a long time before 
the anti-German wave reached an impressive crest in connec­
tion with the Berlin Treaty (1878), which was most humiliat­
ing to Russians, Den (in No. 50, 1862 wrote): "We would con­
sider ourselves happy if we could in any way contribute to the 
emancipation of the Latvian people from German domina­
tion." Subsequently, the paper launched a more vigorous at­
tack, and its editors, Aksakov and Samarin, tried to make con­
tacts with the Latvian and Estonian nationalists. 
The press campaign against the Baltic barons reached such 
a pitch that Czar Alexander II thought it necessary to plead for 
the "Czar's Mamelukes," as the Baltic barons were called in 
Russia. Speaking in French to appear impartial, he declared 
to representatives of the Baltic noblemen: "Je comprends par-
faitement que vous soyez blesses par les menses de la presse. 
Aussi ai-je toujours blame, moi, cette presse infame, qui, au lieu 
de nous unir, tache de nous desunir. Je crache sur cette presse. 
J'estime votre nationality et j'en serais fier comme vous." * 2 
A direct result of the Slavophil support given to the native 
* "I understand very well that you are painfully offended by the attacks of 
the press. Even I myself have always condemned this odious press, which is 
trying to divide us instead of uniting us. I spit on this press. I respect your 
nationality and would be as proud of it as you are." 
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nationalists was the rise of a nationalist press in the Lettish and 
the Estonian languages. It was necessary, however, to issue these 
papers in Russia, far from the oversight of the barons. Thus Kris-
janis Valdemars, venerable father of the Latvian nationalist 
movement, founded the Peterburgas Avtzes (St. Petersburg 
Gazette) in 1862. It was published in the Lettish language in 
St. Petersburg, from which city it was distributed to the Baltic. 
The governor general of Kurland, at the insistence of the 
barons and after repeated protests that the newspaper was slip­
ping through with censorious articles, ultimately obtained cen­
sorship rights over the Lettish-language press. 
The friendship of the Slavophils with the Latvian and Es­
tonian nationalists was short-lived, however. On the one hand 
the Slavophils lost ground after the Polish insurrection, while 
on the other the "Young Lett" and "Young Estonian" move­
ments, at first progressive, later degenerated and acquired the 
reactionary character of chauvinistic nationalism. Neither 
movement offered any solution to the oppressive social prob­
lems of the Latvian and Estonian peoples. 
Moreover, the peculiarity of the Baltic situation lay in the 
predominant position held by the autocratic German nobility. 
The line of cleavage in the nationalist movement coincided 
with that of the social movement. All Estonians and Latvians 
were alike oppressed, whether they belonged to the peas­
ants and workers, who formed ninety per cent of the popula­
tion, or to the thin crust of well-to-do natives. Both nationally 
and socially they were polar opposites to the monolithic group 
of German barons, with their serving personnel of supervisors, 
priests, barristers, engineers, bankers, and merchants. Latvian 
and Estonian signified serf, bondsman. German meant baron, 
master. 
For this reason the blend of Estonian and Latvian national­
ism was peculiar, and its explosive scope was magnified tenfold. 
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This was noted with contrition after the 1905 revolution by 
the German historian, Professor T. Schiemann. He wrote: 
"The casual circumstance that the social problem is at the same 
time a national one lends the movement its singular coloring, 
the most desirable possible for demagogues. The nationalist 
movement enflamed the slumbering passions and covetous in­
stincts of the people to the utmost violence. The artfully incited 
hatred against the German oppressors, the nationalist egoism 
which reached morbid proportions, the antagonism to the 
church—all these were factors that rendered excellent service 
to the Social Democrats." 3 
In Latvia and Estonia the profoundly social character of the 
national emancipation movement also predicated the course of 
its development. The efforts made by Slavophils to align this 
nationalist movement with official or semiofficial institutions 
in Russia, was doomed to failure because the Czarist govern­
ment was itself a landocracy. Exponents of Russification were 
perforce limited to half measures. In any question involving 
landholding or labor relations the czarist officials invariably 
lined up with the German barons. That is what happened to the 
famous commission under the chairmanship of Senator Mana-
sein, which investigated, in 1882, landholdings in the Baltic 
region. After completing its survey, the Manasein commission 
submitted modest proposals aimed at correcting some of the 
many injustices suffered by the peasants. The baronial press 
hooted down the proposals, and the barons finally gained an 
imperial injunction that restrained anyone from interfering in 
any way with Baltic agrarian relations. Peasants who had dared 
to voice complaints before the commission were flogged to 
death. 
The Baltic peasants were thus driven into the same camp as 
the industrial workers, and together with them they waged a 
common struggle against both the German barons and the Rus­
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sian autocrats. This became the slogan of what was called 
"Jauna Strava" (New Movement), which arose first among in­
tellectuals at the end of the nineteenth century, but gradually 
gained wide influence among the mass of the workers and 
peasants. A powerful labor movement came into being, headed 
in 1904 by the Social Democratic Workers Party. 
From the start Jauna Strava, which in Latvia was led by the 
Great Baltic poet, Janis Rainis, cultivated relations with those 
elements of the Russian population that conspired to over­
throw the autocratic czarist landocracy. Strong ties were formed 
between the Russian proletarian movement and the working-
men of the rising Baltic industries at Riga, Tallinn, Liepaja, 
and Ventspils. Accordingly, when the national liberation strug­
gle of the Latvian and Estonian peoples reached a culminating 
point in the 1905 revolution, it was organically associated with 
the general Russian revolution. 
THE 1905 REVOLUTIONS IN RUSSIA AND THE BALTIC 
When the Baltic barons regained composure, after being al­
most frightened to death in 1905, they set about with German 
thoroughness to investigate the causes and the culprits that had 
brought them so near to disaster. The fruit of their labor was 
Die Lettische Revolution, a collection of documents and re­
ports about the 1905 revolution in the Baltic, published by the 
Baltic noblemen in Berlin in 1907. This compilation sought to 
incriminate exponents of Russification, radical Russian intel­
lectuals, petty officials who encouraged Latvian and Estonian 
nationalists, even orthodox priests, who "deprived Latvian and 
Estonian peasants of religion, the basis of their morals." The 
work of Professor Schiemann, this book aimed to prove that 
"just as a fashion—such as the thoughtless policy of the Slavo­
phils demoralized the youth and drove them into the arms 
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of the Social Democrats and anarchists—Russification paved the 
way for the revolution." 4 
In their own way the Baltic Germans were correct. There was 
an indisputable connection between the Baltic uprising and 
the Russian revolution. But the revolutionary fervor was most 
certainly not imported into the Baltic by orthodox priests and 
Russian officials, as the barons assumed. This becomes clear 
when the role of the Russifiers is examined. 
The early Russification campaign led to the rise of the na­
tionalist Lettish and Estonian press. Moreover, early in the 
1880's, when Slavophils permeated the administration, several 
Latvians and Estonians were appointed to subordinate posts in 
the Baltic guberniyas, to the consternation of the Germans, who 
complained that an ignorant clerk, the Estonian Neu, a rustic 
without even a rural-school education, was being allowed to 
run gubernatorial affairs. Naturally, the situation was highly 
exaggerated, yet a certain breach had been opened in the armor 
of German domination. 
As for the Russifiers engaged by the czarist government, they 
sometimes exhibited unexpected loyalties. At a stormy congress 
of Russian public-school teachers held in Riga, November 14, 
1905, the Russian teacher Zelenko declared: "They spent six 
years making a Russifier out of me, but picked the wrong per­
son. My mind and sympathies pulled me in the opposite direc­
tion. For a long time I sought for the truth and finally joined 
up with the Latvian Social Democrats. Now I am happy." 
In the Baltic revolution an active role was also played by the 
students—Latvians, Estonians, Russians, and Jews alike—of the 
Riga Polytechnic School and the Dorpat (Tartu) University. 
Of them we read: "The Latvian, Jewish, and Russian students 
in the university and polytechnic school were particularly ac­
tive. The German pupils of the city high school who declined 
were publicly branded German 'hooligans.' In Dorpat there 
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were wild demonstrations staged chiefly by the numerous so­
cialist Jewish and Russian students." 5 
But all these were mere trickles in the broad stream of the 
Latvian and Estonian national liberation movement bedded in 
the unified mass of peasants and workers. A movement as old 
as their grievances, it had burst into repeated desperate up­
risings only to be as often crushed by the German barons and 
czarist administrators. But in 1905 the dam burst, to the sur­
prise of the ruthless rulers. The Baltic region, seething with 
unrest, experienced a much more violent revolution than Rus­
sia itself. However, there was a close association throughout 
with the Russian revolution. 
When the guards at the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg 
opened fire on unarmed workers bearing icons and marching 
in a peaceful demonstration on January 9, 1905, their shots 
evoked a menacing echo in Riga and other Baltic cities. On 
January 13, a mammoth protest meeting was held at Riga. 
Flaming leaflets were distributed, with the slogan: "QUIT WORK-
JOIN IN THE PETERSBURG GENERAL STRIKE." At the Riga railway 
bridge the police fired into a crowd of demonstrators; fifty per­
sons were killed and hundreds wounded.* 
This served as a signal for a general strike, which spread to 
the villages and rapidly flamed into revolution. Everywhere 
czarist officials were overthrown, and power passed into the 
hands of leaders elected from among the peasants. The people's 
rule lasted for several months in the Baltic region, but collapsed 
with the failure of the Russian revolution. 
A terrible reaction ensued in the Baltic region. The in­
furiated barons hastened to call out troops—disposing them on 
• This marked the rise of the Latvian liberation struggle, and to commemo­
rate it during the democratic period the street in Riga near the bridge was 
renamed "January 13 Street." Under the Ulmanis Fascist regime it was renamed 
"Karlis Street," not to honor King Karl of Sweden, but after Karlis Ulmanii 
himself. 
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their estates, riding vengefully with them through the country­
side—and directed a reign of terror. Their methods were like 
a rehearsal of those employed by today's Heydrichs and Himm-
lers. They burned down villages, shot scores of hostages from 
among the peasantry, hung teachers in the presence of their 
students. 
The peasants fled to the forests, where they organized groups 
of "forest brothers," the forerunners of today's guerrillas. Then 
as now, the loyalty of the "forest brothers," their hopes of venge­
ance, reposed in Russia, in the hope that united with the great 
Russian people they could win through to mutual liberation 
from common oppression. 
SPECIAL CONDITIONS IN LITHUANIA AND FINLAND 
In Latvia and Estonia the Russian administration was always 
on the sidelines. The immediate struggle was waged between 
two national-social groups: the Latvians and Estonians against 
the Germans. Russians were to be found on both sides. The 
czarist officials who ran errands for the barons were in the 
enemy camp—the German. But there were also Russian indus­
trial workers who lived in such places as the Moscow Forstadt in 
Riga, under even worse conditions than those endured by the 
long-suffering Latvians or Estonians. There were Russian peas­
ants who inhabited gubernatorial borderlands and were more 
poverty-stricken than their Latvian or Estonian neighbors. 
These groups and their representatives in the centralized Rus­
sian revolutionary party with which the Baltic organizations 
were affiliated, were all in the Latvian and Estonian camp. The 
situation was clear to everyone, even "den dummsten Bauer," as 
Professor Schiemann expressed it. 
But the picture was more confused in Lithuania and Fin­
land, where there were native ruling groups: the Lithuanian-
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Polish gentry and the Swedish-Finnish landowners, respec­
tively. Here efforts at Russification ran counter not to the 
Germans but to the indigenous population. Moreover, the po­
lice terror and policy of oppression were under the immediate 
supervision of czarist officials and police inspectors. National 
enmity toward the Russians had more occasion to flourish than 
it had in Estonia or Latvia, where the public ill-will was di­
rected against the German barons. 
Following the annexation of Finland to Russia in 1809, the 
local privileged classes became accomplices of czarist power and 
conductors of its policy. From the beginning this was sensed by 
the Finnish peasantry, who rose in protest against the annexa­
tion. During the disorders which flared up in 1809, they burned 
down the mansions of local landowners who had connived with 
the czarist government. 
Soon both the Finns and the Lithuanians became convinced 
that their czarist enemies were also enemies of the Russian peo­
ple. Consequently, collaboration with the Russian people's 
movement was inevitable, with the result that the liberation 
movements in Finland and Lithuania became synchronized 
with revolutionary turns in Russia. The 1905 revolution in 
Finland was expressed in a general strike of Finnish workers, 
who presented far-reaching demands for national autonomy 
and self-government. Being united with the general Russian 
revolution in timing and organization, the strike forced con­
cessions from the czarist government, which was obliged to 
restore to Finland the autonomous rights taken from her. 
Revolutionary events in Russia also led to enlarged oppor­
tunities for the national liberation movement in Lithuania, 
where the czarist government was compelled to annul its pro­
hibition of the use of the Latin alphabet. In 1905 the Lithu­
anian people's councils began to dislodge the local administra­
tion. Likewise, when the revolution in Russia was suppressed 
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in 1906, a period of black reaction started in Lithuania and 
Finland, as elsewhere in the Baltic region. 
It became increasingly evident that the Russians, Latvians, 
Estonians, Lithuanians, and Finns were waging an interrelated 
struggle for "our and your freedom." The ebb and flow of the 
Baltic liberation movements depended largely on the success 
or failure of the general Russian emancipation movement, 
without which the future held no real prospects for the small 
Baltic peoples. For these people, who have been subjected to 
so many conquests and who have a strong sense of their own 
weakness when faced by powerful neighbors, freedom becomes 
something real and enduring only if it can find substantial sup­
port and protection. Therefore, without exception, the com­
mon aim of all the popular liberation movements in Latvia, 
Lithuania, Estonia, and even Finland (where, for historic rea­
sons, the aspiration for complete independence was stronger 
than in other Baltic states) was the free autonomy of their own 
countries within a free Russia. 
This was the slogan under which the people in all the small 
Baltic countries fought for national liberation during the early 
twentieth century, up to and through the period of World 
War I. Under the same banner they passed through the stormy 
days of 1917-1918. The world political situation, however, 
proved to be such that it was not the Baltic peoples themselves, 
but outside forces that determined the fate of the Baltic. The 
post-Versailles world saw the rise of Baltic states which, though 
pulsing with youthful unutilized energy, were stifled in the 
stuffy atmosphere of a semicolonial economy and of a "Balkani­
zation" policy carried to the extreme. 
C H A P T E R  I  I  I  
Between Brest-Litovsk and Versailles 
THE GERMAN ARMY IN THE BALTIC AREA 
The outbreak of war in 1914 found the Baltic area wholly 
in the hands of the local German landed gentry. Thoroughly 
alarmed by the violent Latvian revolution of 1905, the czarist 
government had completely abandoned the idea of Russifica­
tion. Czar ism's mainstay in the Baltic had once again become 
the Baltic Germans, who took full advantage of the cultural-
administrative hegemony afforded them to promote Germaniza-
tion and prepared gradually for incorporation of the Baltic area 
in the Reich. The idea of settling Germans in the Baltic was 
advanced, an idea which has found embodiment today in Nazi 
policy toward their occupied Eastern territories (Ostland). 
But the idea of German colonization in the Baltic arose even 
before World War I. A project to settle Germans in Livonia, 
Kurland, and even Belorussia was elaborated in Otto Tannen-
berg's book, Grossdeutschland, published in Berlin in 1911 
with the approval of official institutions. With an eye to the 
future, enterprising Kurland barons like the Broederich 
brothers and Count Manteuffel brought in German colonists 
from the Volga region for settlement on their estates along the 
Baltic frontiers nearest Germany. These Baltic barons were 
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preparing for the day when the German Army would appear in 
the Baltic area. That day arrived during the World War I. 
The outbreak of the war obliged the czarist government to 
revise its policy in the Baltic area. Aware of the violent anti-
German feeling of the local population, the Russian command 
did not hesitate to create special Baltic units, composed of na­
tive soldiers either recruited as volunteers or singled out from 
troops mobilized in general with the Russian Army. The Latvian 
rifle corps, consisting of two divisions, or eight regiments, espe­
cially distinguished itself. These Latvian and Estonian soldiers 
had previously participated in the offensive against eastern 
Prussia and had proven very militant fighters. United in na­
tional military units commanded by their own native officers, 
they fought for more than two years in the ranks of the Rus­
sian Army, from the Mitau (Jelgava) battles in July 1915 to the 
heroic defense of Riga in September 1917 against von Luden-
dorff's powerful push. 
After the battle of Tannenberg the German armies advanced 
eastward, rolling up to the Dvina. In the autumn of 1915 they 
occupied Lithuania and Kurland, areas which remained under 
German occupation for almost four years. For one year only 
were the Germans masters in Estonia, Livonia, and in the city 
of Riga, areas occupied only after the Russian revolution broke 
out and the eastern front collapsed. 
By that time the conduct of the German occupants resembled 
closely the infamous behavior of the present-day Stulpnagels 
and Terbovens. Punitive expeditions swept through the vil­
lages, hostages were seized and shot, thousands were thrown into 
concentration camps. Civil property was unceremoniously 
plundered. Transports full of stolen goods passed daily into 
Germany. The looting zeal of the German occupation author­
ities is well illustrated by the fact that in Lithuania they hewed 
down and despoiled a fourth of the nation's forests. 
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But a still greater danger threatened the Baltic area in those 
days: that of either complete absorption or, like the original 
inhabitants of eastern Prussia, extermination. Encouraged by 
the presence of soldiers, the local Baltic Germans raised loud 
voices demanding that the area be annexed by Germany. Peti­
tions and resolutions were sent by the hundreds to Berlin. The 
German reactionary press began to clamor, growing literally 
ecstatic about the profits Germany would derive from incor­
poration of this "altes deutsches Siedlungsland" (old German 
colony).* 
The plan envisaged was organized colonization of the Baltic 
areas by German soldier-farmers who, with arms ready, would 
stand against the "Slavic wave" and bring German Kultur to 
the local population. Although during seven hundred years 
they had failed to Teutonize the Latvians and Estonians, the 
Baltic barons were resolved to correct their historical error. 
The Baltic nations were to disappear from the face of the earth, 
as the Borussians had vanished in eastern Prussia. 
The president of the Kurland Landrat (Regional Council), 
Rudolf von Horner-Ihlen, clearly formulated these plans in the 
conclusion of his program pamphlet published in Berlin in 
1917: Baltische Zukunftsgedanke (Ideas on the Baltic Future). 
He expressed the hope that the Latvians and Estonians will 
finally themselves understand that "the great turn in their 
fortunes signifies for them nothing other than the transition to 
a higher culture, whose base they already bear in themselves, 
and which represents the only possible and natural advance 
also of their higher development in a spiritual, moral, and eco­
nomic sense. They will become Germans of a special type, but 
this need not diminish their worth for the German nationality 
as a whole." 
* Expression of Ton der Goltz, commander of the German armed forces in the 
Baltic and Finland ("The present independent states of Latvia and Estonia arc 
an old German colony") in A Is Politischer General im Osten. 
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"The Lettish and Estonian tribes will but fulfill their his­
toric destiny when German influence shall blossom among 
them." 
The very existence of the Baltic nations was at stake. If 
Baltic Germans faced the clear alternatives of either incorpora­
tion in the mighty German Empire or departure forever from 
the Baltic where they had been for seven hundred years, the 
Latvians, Estonians, and Lithuanians saw with equal clarity 
that annexation of the Baltic area to Germany meant the end 
of their national existence. After age-old trials and adversities 
these small peoples had become aware of their helplessness 
when face to face with the great powers and their military 
forces. Yet the experience of the successful revolution of 1905 
had taught them that their national aspirations could be re­
alized if they joined up with the more powerful Russian libera­
tion movement. 
With the slogan "A free Latvia in a free Russia" on their lips, 
Latvian insurgents had gone to the scaffold in 1906, the year of 
reaction. The same slogans uttered in 1911 and subsequent 
years again served to inflame the smoldering fires of the na­
tional and social liberation movement. 
The Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian peoples were again 
moved by the same feelings in the period following the Rus­
sian February revolution of 1917, when not a single person or 
public organization throughout the Baltic territory would have 
advanced the slogan of complete separation from Russia. Of 
this disposition we have the reliable witness of the leader 
of the extremely nationalist Latvian Social Democrats, Fricis 
Menders, a man of singular prominence during the Latvian 
parliamentary period. Menders said, "The leading circles of the 
Baltic peoples found complete satisfaction of their national 
aspirations in an autonomy or federation with Russia." 1 
This view is confirmed also by the Information Department 
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of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London: "In 
the spring of 1917, none of the Baltic provinces contemplated 
or desired complete detachment from Russia, although they 
certainly seized the opportunity of making a bid for a measure 
of autonomy and for much-needed reforms." 2 
To be sure, the ill-fated Russian "Provisional Government" 
took a hostile attitude to the idea of autonomy for the Baltic 
peoples, adding another blunder to its ledger of errors great 
and small. But this could not radically alter public opinion 
among the Baltic peoples, who were well aware of widespread 
public support in Russia. They became more insistent in their 
demands, taking an increasingly active part in Russia s turbu­
lent political life. In Petrograd the "Latvian Refugee Commit­
tee" was formed by Latvian deputies to the Duma (Represent­
ative State Assembly of Russia). Lithuanian deputies likewise 
formed their national committee in Petrograd, presenting de­
mands for Lithuania s political autonomy within the frontiers 
of Russia. The Latvian and Estonian regiments, which had 
carried out a fighting retreat into the interior of Russia, took 
an active part in the general Russian revolution. Half of Kur-
land's population were refugees in Russia. For the Baltic peo­
ples, as well as for the Russians, it was clear at the time that the 
fate of the entire region would be jointly decided. 
The seizure of power by the Bolsheviks led to a division of 
opinion among the well-to-do circles, who by that time were 
fairly influential in town and country. Even before the war 
these circles waged a sharp controversy against the political 
ideas held by the majority of the Latvian, Estonian, and Lithu­
anian populations, which were pre-eminently industrial work­
ers or peasants and had actively participated in the Russian 
liberation movement. The Latvian liberation movement, 
Jauna Strava, for example, had launched its political career 
with bitter ideological attacks on the unsound fictitious na­
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tionalism of these circles, which were disposed to compromise 
with either the German or the Russian czarist administration. 
This conflict now flared up with renewed energy, rapidly as­
suming the proportions of a civil war among the Baltic peoples, 
who shared, in this way also, the fate of all the other peoples 
in the Russian empire. After more than three years of World 
War I, they too were plunged into civil war. 
The respective strength of the forces arrayed in the Baltic 
was quite evident. The "Reds" were overwhelmingly superior 
to the small groups who raised the banner of social conserva­
tism. Had the Latvians, Estonians, and Lithuanians been left 
to themselves, victory would have undoubtedly been won by 
the "Reds," backed as they were by the popular majority and 
by the only armed forces, the rifle corps. 
But by this time the Baltic area was completely under Ger­
man occupation. Until 1917 the Russian troops, in whose ranks 
the Latvians and Estonians fought, had held the Germans on 
the Daugavpils-Riga-Baranovichi line. After the eastern front 
collapsed, the Germans advanced. On September 3, 1917, von 
Ludendorff captured Riga, and by February 1918, following 
the break-off of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, the Germans 
occupied Livonia and Estonia. The fate of the Baltic area was 
decided primarily by German officers who were under orders to 
master these provinces for colonization. 
The defeat of Germany on the western front slightly com­
plicated the situation. The Allied Commission appeared on the 
scene first under the English general, Sir Hubert Gough, later 
under the French general, Henri Albert Niessel, injecting a 
new force, which sought with one hand to oust the Germans 
and with the other to retain them in the Baltic area until the 
Bolshevik menace was eliminated. The point was that the Allies 
did not and could not have any military forces, with the 
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exception of a few warships. They were obliged to ask the Ger­
mans to "defend" the Baltic area from the Bolsheviks. Thus 
Article 12 of the Armistice Convention made its debut, pro­
viding that the Germans must evacuate all the territories for­
merly belonging to the Russian empire, but only "as soon as 
the Allies shall consider this desirable, having regard to the 
interior conditions of these territories." 
In this connection the findings of the Royal Institute of In­
ternational Affairs state: "It was the intention of the Allies that 
the German forces should do their utmost to stem the Bolshevik 
advances, and that, when their services were not longer needed, 
they should withdraw from the Baltic Provinces without reap­
ing any political reward for their efforts." 
"This was too much to expect," justly remarks the Royal 
Institute. The Germans, of course, employed the opportunity 
presented them to further the military tasks assigned the 
German Army in the East. 
The head of the Allied Commission in the Baltic area, Gen­
eral Niessel,3 relates how the German Admiral Hopmann, with 
whom he had an official talk in Berlin on November 8, 1919, 
while en route to Liepaja, insistently stressed that "The Ger­
man troops in the Baltic countries are convinced they are fight­
ing against the Bolsheviks. Their conviction has only been 
strengthened because the Entente until May has demanded that 
they remain in the Baltic area. I am certain that as soon as the 
Germans leave this area Bolshevism will rise again." 
In this case it must be noted that the danger in question was 
not from Russian Bolshevism. After Brest-Litovsk the remnants 
of Russian troops were withdrawn from the Baltic, while the 
general situation was such that the Soviet leaders could not 
even have thought of revenge. The Bolsheviks had abandoned 
the Finnish, Latvian, Estonian, and Lithuanian socialists of the 
Leninist school, to whom they were attached with thousands 
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of organizational and ideological ties. They had done so with 
grave misgivings. For those who realized that without indus­
trialization socialist Russia could not hold out, it was not easy 
to wave aside the best coastal industrial centers of Russia. But 
the Bolsheviks did so because there was no other way to defend 
and save the revolution in Russia. The revolution could not 
migrate from Russia to the Baltic area. But it could rise again, 
as Admiral Hopmann said, from the bosom of the native pop­
ulation, the revolutionary workers and peasants of Lithuania, 
Latvia, Estonia, and Finland. The German admiral had every 
reason to frighten General Niessel with the prospect that an in­
ternal revolution would break out in the Baltic area as soon as 
the Germans left. 
What took place was downright intervention in the internal 
socio-political struggle raging among the Baltic people^. The 
Allies' plan to have the Germans drive out the Bolsheviks and 
then get out themselves came to naught. By smashing the na­
tional movements in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and raising 
to high office corrupt politicians rescued from obscurity, the 
Germans wrecked the future of all these countries. Their ac­
tivity was fraught with consequences for the entire subsequent 
life of the Baltic states. It was the same in Finland, where Man-
nerheim's employment of German troops to win out in the 
early civil strife ultimately led to the complete downfall of 
Finnish democracy. 
GERMAN INTRIGUE 
Flushed with the victories of 1915, the Germans in the Baltic 
area were not inclined to make deals with any local political 
forces whatever, except the Baltic barons. The territory was to 
be German and its population to be converted into Germans of 
a special type (the term used today would be Volksdeutsche, or 
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low-caste Germans), who would be subordinated to the soldier-
farmer imported from the Reich. 
But the year 1917 and the upset political situation in Europe 
compelled the Germans to employ more flexible means to the 
same ends. They suddenly realized that this Baltic territory, 
where the Germans never numbered above two per cent, was 
not so much German as Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian, after 
all. The setting up of at least the semblance of a local public 
administration had become an urgent necessity. 
During the Brest-Litovsk negotiations and later, the Germans 
repeatedly laid out as a trump card their plan to create a Ger­
man military government based on the local Landrats, which 
had passed countless resolutions on separation from Russia, an­
nexation to Germany, the establishment of a Baltic monarchy, 
having personal bonds to the Prussian crown, et cetera. How­
ever, even then everyone knew the Landrats were only com­
mittees of the local barons, to which a limited number of chosen 
Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians were appointed. Only 
tried and trusted reprobates were admitted, and even these out­
cast natives sought to avoid voting in the Landrats, often do­
ing so only under duress. 
The first such Landrat was convened in Kurland, Septem­
ber 21, 1917. The Lithuanian Landrat assembled on the same 
day; the Livonian, on April 8, 1918; the Estonian, on April 9, 
1918; and, finally, on April 12, 1918, the united Landrats of 
Estonia, Livonia, Osel Island, and city of Riga convened, pass­
ing a decree that begged Wilhelm to accept the crown of the 
"Baltic Kingdom." The Kaiser at once benevolently gave his 
consent on April 21, following which von Hindenburg issued 
an order on the establishment in Berlin of the Kurland Coloni­
zation Company, with a capital of fifty million marks, to engage 
in the recruitment of colonists for the Baltic area. Another von 
Hindenburg order issued on June 17, 1918, obligated all Ger­
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man landlords in the Baltic to sell not less than a third of their 
land to the colonization company. The Lebensraum (living 
space) was to be further expanded by the first contingent of 
colonists, who would themselves oust native peasants. 
The German plans appeared near to fruition especially after 
Brest-Litovsk, when the Russians were obliged to concede to 
the Germans all the territory to the west of the Riga-Daugavpils-
Lida-Pruzhany line and consent to the presence of German po­
lice forces in Livonia and Estonia. 
After the Germans were defeated in the West, however, they 
were obliged to adopt a very subtle policy of almost incredible 
duplicity. One of the most talented generals of the German 
Army, Count Rudiger von der Goltz, was dispatched to Liepaja 
on a mission more political than military. He was charged with 
the task of preserving German influence in the Baltic countries 
despite the collapse of the German armies, the victory of the 
Allies, the local national liberation movements, and the con­
tagion of Bolshevism. In all fairness to this "political general," 
as he styled himself, it must be said that he accomplished his 
mission brilliantly. 
Having already taken advantage of the weakened German 
pressure in December 1918, revolutionary Bolshevik organiza­
tions had seized power in Riga and Tallinn to establish Latvian 
and Estonian soviet republics whose power extended through­
out Estonia, Livonia, Riga, Daugavpils and Kurland to 
Ventspils, embracing also a large part of Lithuania. On Feb­
ruary 1, 1919, when von der Goltz arrived from Finland at 
Liepaja, headquarters of the German military forces in the 
Baltic area, he found little to encourage and much to dis­
hearten him. The November events in Germany had demor­
alized the German soldiers in the Baltic, who wanted most of 
all to return home. 
At the moment of von der Goltz s arrival, "the Bolsheviks 
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stood in a great ring around Libau [Liepaja], on the Windau 
[Venta River] with the front to the west and thence south of 
Goldingen [Kuldiga] with the front to the south." 4 
Besieged in this manner from three sides, Liepaja was also 
unsafe within. Von der Goltz feared the Liepaja workers, not 
less than six thousand of whom were armed. Of the forces un­
der German command, the only reliable troops were the "Iron 
Division," composed of soldiers who were not subordinated to 
the Liepaja Soldatenrat, and the Landeswehr units under Col­
onel Fletscher, composed of local Baltic Germans. Also joined 
to the Landeswehr were small detachments under the Latvian 
colonel, later general, Karlis Balodis, and the Russian White 
guard detachment of Prince Lieven. 
However, von der Goltz was able to win a series of victories 
over the Red troops less through his own strength than through 
the weakness and inexperience of his adversaries. Moreover, by 
this time the Red government of Latvia, ruled by unimagina­
tive urban industrial workers and soldiers, had antagonized the 
peasantry through complete disregard and underestimation of 
agrarian problems. The way was thus opened for the pro-
German Balodis and other conservative leaders to recruit small 
military bands among the peasants for the anti-Bolshevik cam­
paign. 
But the main blows were delivered by the Germans. They 
drove the Bolsheviks eastward, occupied Ventspils, then Riga, 
and forced the Red Latvian rifle corps to retreat into the in­
terior of Russia, where they were rapidly shifted to other fronts 
in the civil war raging there. The Bolsheviks were driven from 
the north by Estonian units, to whom the Allies gave ample 
material assistance and the able support of Admiral Sinclair's 
British naval forces. 
Previously, von der Goltz had occupied Finland, landing on 
Hango to rescue the half-beaten White detachments of Manner-
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heim. The Germans had every reason to believe that they had 
accomplished the task assigned them. Yet, as though with a 
catch in his voice, von der Goltz later admitted, "Only a few 
comprehended and silently tolerated the 'adventurous' policy 
of Count von der Goltz, for which I hiad waged a desperate 
struggle from March to October, 1919." 
The local population, according to the count, consisted either 
of Bolsheviks in hiding, or at least of people who preferred the 
Bolsheviks to the Germans. After the Moor had done his work, 
had driven out the Bolsheviks, the Entente was anxious to get 
him off the stage. The Entente acted directly through the 
"Allied Commission" and the puppet "national" governments 
who, seeing their German card was trumped, had hurriedly 
beaten a retreat to the Allied camp. The Latvian government 
of Ulmanis, for instance, was quartered on board an English 
ship anchored in Liepaja harbor. 
Von der Goltz tried to face the Allies with an accomplished 
fact. On April 16, with the assistance of local Germans, he 
carried out a "state revolution." The otherwise powerless Ul­
manis was formally deposed, and to complete the delusion a 
new "national" government was proclaimed, with Pastor Niedra 
at the head. 
The German troops were supposed to disappear. Therefore, 
in September 1919, von der Goltz obligingly handed over the 
command to the comic-opera General Bermondt, who some­
times posed as Prince Avalov. A muster of German officers de­
cided to merge von der Goltz's army into Bermondt's "Russian 
army." From the German, Colonel Fletscher, an English officer 
took over command of the German Landeswehr. The famous 
von der Goltz-Bermondt adventure was launched with the pur­
pose of using the Baltic area as a springboard for a big campaign 
against Russia. Thereby the Germans hoped to gain at least the 
tolerance, if not the co-operation, of the Allies and also to 
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establish closer connections with the White guard detachments 
of Yudenich and others then operating in northwestern Russia. 
A special Baltic mission headed by von Rosenberg, a cavalry 
captain, arrived, bringing along detachments of White guards 
recruited from among Russian war prisoners. These were 
merged into Bermondt's army, in the detachments of Sobolev-
sky, Virgolich, and others. 
But what the Baltic Germans needed was a German Baltic, 
their own estates and a docile peasantry. They bothered the 
German commander, imploring him to establish order even 
before the larger undertakings were launched. In this atmos­
phere the idea of the Bermondt Putsch was born, an attempt to 
seize Riga from the Latvians. Von der Goltz explains that he 
began open warfare against the Latvians and Estonians, who 
were allied to the Entente, because it was the only way to face 
the Allies with an accomplished fact and compel them to con­
sent to the German colonization of the Baltic area. 
Bermondt's adventure failed. His forces were smashed by the 
Latvian-Estonian regiments and by the gunfire from English 
warships in Riga. The Germans were obliged to evacuate com­
pletely, which they did in December 1919, greatly disheartened 
but resolved to return. At the first opportunity they began to 
prepare for retaliation. With pride von der Goltz writes that 
the Baltic Germans were the first military men whom Hitler 
was able to recruit. 
"Thus the Baltic fighters are not only those of the last front 
and the last to remain with the enemy. They are almost the very 
first soldier fighters for the new Germany, the Third Reich." 
Von der Goltz's activity in the Baltic was not without conse­
quence. He did not fail to leave his mark on the future Baltic 
republics, since he installed unprincipled politicians who dur­
ing both the World and the civil wars rushed about between 
the Germans and the Allies, a policy of dissimulation they later 
Between Brest-Litovsk and Versailles 45 
continued to pursue. During the momentous months of 1938-
1939 the Baltic republics were headed by unbridled dictators. 
Although chiefs of state, they were still the same petty poli­
ticians who, at the cradle of these republics, had traded the na­
tional interests by wholesale and retail. They could not do 
otherwise than mislead their countries into the Fascist bog. 
How THE "NATIONAL FUHRERS" ROSE TO PROMINENCE 
The role of these statesmen during the stormy months of 
the German occupation and the civil war is worthy of close 
attention. During those days Antanas Smetona,* not without 
notoriety today, first rose to prominence in Lithuania. 
The country had been governed by German occupation au­
thorities from 1915. At first the Germans would not con­
descend to negotiate with representatives of the lower Lithu­
anian race. But after the 1917 events in Russia, it became 
impossible to restrain the population by military terrorism 
alone. German "political" generals began to search for support 
in the local reactionary circles. With their co-operation the so-
called Taryba (Lithuanian National Council), was set up. At 
the insistence of the German command not a single progressive 
statesman was admitted. In September 1917 the Taryba issued 
its first public statement, formally called the "declaration on 
the independence of the Lithuanian state." But the "independ­
ence" was of a special kind, for in the same declaration the 
Taryba appealed to the German empire for aid, asking that it 
be honored with a military, economic, and customs union! 
At that time the president of the Taryba and the author of 
* He is now in America, having come here from Germany. After the change in 
government in Lithuania in 1940, Smetona fled to his friends in Berlin. With 
their blessing he set out on the long voyage to America shortly before the out­
break of the Russo-German War. In this country he poses as a representative 
of democratic Lithuania. 
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the declaration was Antanas Smetona. On March 23, 1918, 
Smetona was handed the mandate of the Kaiser, who declared 
himself pleased to sanction Lithuanian "independence" on the 
basis of the Taryba resolution. 
Influenced by news of the course of the Brest-Litovsk nego­
tiations, a section of the Taryba revolted against the leadership 
and even passed by majority vote a resolution on the necessity 
to convene a constituent assembly. Then the German general 
staff resorted to a new ruse, launching the idea of a Lithuanian 
monarchy joined in personal union with one of the German 
states. Rising to the occasion, the adroit politicians, Smetona 
and Voldemaras, at once caught up the idea, and on June 14, 
1918, against a majority opposition in the Taryba, invited the 
Wiirttemberg duke, Wilhelm von Urach, to the Lithuanian 
throne. To sugar-coat the pill for the Lithuanians, Smetona dug 
up a certain relative of Duke Wilhelm, whose royal lineage 
supposedly traced from the original Lithuanian King Mindau-
gas himself. Everything seemed in perfect order. 
But the throne toppled and fell in Germany itself. Smetona 
had to make his way without a scion of the Lithuanian royal 
family. In November 1918 he declared himself ruler jointly 
with two collaborators—Staugaitis and Silingas—and commis­
sioned Voldemaras to form a cabinet. 
Such was the origin of Lithuanian democracy. During a few 
subsequent years liberal circles were able to oust Smetona and 
Voldemaras, who, however, again seized power in 1926 and led 
their country rapidly without deviation to a new capitulation 
before their old patrons, the German militarists. 
In Latvia the pattern of forces which led the state from a 
corrupt democracy to complete Fascism was also shaped in the 
troubled years of 1918-1919. Here, likewise, the German com­
mand, after failing to establish a formal basis for incorporation 
in the Reich through Landrat resolutions, searched for sup­
Between Brest-Litovsk and Versailles 47 
port in local circles. The need for native support became espe­
cially urgent after the German defeat of the West. 
The German representative in Riga at that time was a cun­
ning diplomat, August Winnig, who although a member of the 
Social Democratic party, zealously looked after German plans 
for conquest. On November 18, 1918, and with his benediction, 
the "national" government headed by Ulmanis was set up in 
Riga. A week later Winnig presented Ulmanis with the formal 
recognition of the German government. Then, after a second 
week passed, on December 2, Winnig and Ulmanis signed an 
agreement providing for the establishment of the German 
Landeswehr on the territory of Latvia. Ulmanis undertook the 
obligation of granting land to forty thousand German soldiers 
and accepting them as Latvian citizens, in this manner giving 
official sanction to long-cherished German dreams for coloniz­
ing the Baltic area with soldiers. 
The future "Ftihrer of the Latvian people" thus emerged on 
the political arena. His devotees abroad in later years con­
veniently forgot this page of his biography, emphasizing in­
stead that Ulmanis studied farming somewhere in the state of 
Nebraska. But the Germans did not forget his promissory 
note, and during 1936-1939 demanded payment in full. Nor 
did the Latvian peasantry forget, defeating their "beloved 
Fiihrer" at elections until, after becoming dictator, he no 
longer cared about elections. He used to obtain a seat in the 
Saeijma (Diet) only because of party discipline in his "Peasants' 
Union," several of whose candidates declined mandates in his 
favor. 
In Latvia the Landeswehr (home defense) came to be known 
as the Landeszvers (home beasts), because instead of protecting 
the native population the Landeswehr perpetrated brutal out­
rages against it. It was a military tool of the German landed 
gentry and was used on April 16, 1919, to carry out a coup 
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d'etat, seating in the presidential chair Pastor Niedra, whom 
the Latvians declared a national traitor. In this way the Ger­
man barons countered the Ulmanis intrigue with the Entente. 
At that time Ulmanis sought refuge on an English warship 
anchored in Liepaja harbor. Seeing, however, that power was 
on the side of the Landeswehr and von der Goltz, this worthy 
national statesman immediately decided to betray his English 
patrons. Ulmanis opened negotiations with von der Goltz, who 
has written as follows about this malodorous episode: "Ulmanis 
was to have entered the government and his adherents were to 
receive seven-twelfths of the ministerial chairs. Niedra was to 
have been sacrificed." 5 
The general rejected this proposal, suspecting intrigue on 
the part of the Allies. But he recognized later that he had been 
mistaken: "The later development has shown that both the 
Baltic Germans and the Right Latvians with energetic and 
skillful action could perhaps have been able to work tolerably 
with the very clever Herr Ulmanis, had he been separated from 
his evil ministerial colleagues." 
No less adroit than Ulmanis in recommending himself to the 
Germans was his future war minister and accomplice in the or­
ganizing of a Fascist Putsch, General Karlis Balodis. He came to 
prominence in December 1918 as commander of a Latvian de­
tachment under the German Landeswehr commanded by 
Fletscher and later, under the general command of von der 
Goltz. Second in command of the Latvian detachment was 
Colonel Kalpaks, who was, however, in German disfavor for 
being too independent. Since fate usually serves those who can 
master it, this officer was "accidentally" killed by Landeswehr 
soldiers. According to the von der Goltz version, the men of the 
Landeswehr, unable in the darkness to distinguish between 
friend and foe, opened fire on Kalpaks' detachment and man­
aged by chance to kill the ill-favored commander. 
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But Balodis had ingratiated himself with the German com­
mand. He served them to the utmost of his ability. He even 
took part in preparation of the Putsch carried out by the 
Landeswehr on April 16, informing the Germans about the 
weak spots in Ulmanis's government. However, at the last mo­
ment this brave soldier ran for cover and took no part in the 
overthrow. Yet he continued to collaborate with the new gov­
ernment set up by von der Goltz.6 
Although the situation in Estonia at the time was less repre­
hensible, the persons in power were devoid of public support 
and maintained themselves chiefly through the courtesy of the 
local Allied commanders. Their faithful service to the Anglo-
French control commission, however, gave them a flair lor in­
ternational intrigue. Later, when Hitler became master in the 
Baltic, they served him with equal zeal. In passing, the iecord 
of Pats, who became dictator of Estonia, is recalled. H also 
connived with the Germans. In 1918, when he feared in ernal 
disorder in Estonia, Pats sent a delegation to the German com­
mander of Saaremaa (Osel) Island, asking for armed assiance. 
On February 24, 1918, the troops of General von Seckendorff 
occupied Tallinn. 
With characters such as Smetona, Ulmanis, and Pats playing 
decisive roles in their parliamentary regimes, the Baltic na­
tions were naturally led into many disastrous pitfalls. B jt when 
subsequently, and coincident with the Nazi intrigue directed to 
prepare for Hitler's conquests, they became the actual dic­
tators of the Baltic countries, the fatal die was cast. 
A measure of responsibility also lies with certain Allied poli­
ticians, who, to erect a wall against Bolshevism, prolonged the 
German occupation in the Baltic area. This gave von der Goltz 
an opportunity to seat in power the pro-German politicians who 
later misled the nascent Baltic democracies into the camp of 
reaction and potential Fascism. 
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RECOGNITION OF THE BALTIC STATES BY THE GREAT POWERS 
Early in 1920 neither German soldiers nor armed Bolshe­
viks remained in the Baltic area. In December 1919 the last 
echelon of German troops to depart was escorted by the mixed 
Allied Commission under General Henri Niessel; in January 
1920 the Latvian Bolsheviks were driven by the Polish army 
from Latgale, the last district held by the Reds in southern 
Latvia. 
The "national" governments, now the sole local power, had 
clarified their affiliations. With the Germans removed, both 
Ulmanis and Smetona definitely leaned for support on the 
Allies. But the great powers still wavered in recognizing the 
Baltic republics de jure.* 
The reason was that neither in Europe nor in America did 
anyone then question Russia's need for an outlet on the Baltic 
Sea. Detachment of the Baltic provinces from the former em­
pire was thought tantamount to asphyxiation of Russia by 
carving out her lungs. This was just what some influential cir­
cles wanted. But there were others who, for various reason*, ob­
jected to the strangulation of Russia. 
• The Baltic republics had been granted de facto recognition by the Allied 
powers at varied dates during igi8-igig. 
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The hope that the Bolsheviks would be deposed and czarism 
restored in Russia inspired one group of those who opposed 
recognizing the independence of the Baltic states. Therefore, 
they were anxious to preserve the territorial integrity of Rus­
sia. Other, more fair-minded, opponents of recognition were 
simply unreconciled to the idea of creating lifeless microscopic 
state formations at the expense of Russia, who had been a 
belligerent ally and had sacrificed much in the common strug­
gle. This was evidently the viewpoint of President Wilson, and 
for a long time the United States Department of State de­
fended the idea that it was undesirable to create independent 
Baltic states. 
In 1919 Secretary of State Robert Lansing declared, regard­
ing the Baltic situation: "The Baltic Provinces of Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia shall be autonomous States of a Russian 
Confederation." 1 
The same views were repeatedly expressed in statements of 
other American officials. It should be noted that the corre­
sponding chapter in the official Papers Relating to the Foreign 
Relations of the United States (for the year 1920) is entitled: 
"Baltic Provinces: Continued Refusal by the United States to 
Recognize the Governments in the Baltic Provinces." 
Norman H. Davis, Acting Secretary of State, answering a 
letter from the Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. 
Vileisis, said: "The American people sympathize with the de­
sire of the non-Russian people along the border for the largest 
possible measure of self-government, but it believes that any 
attempt to reach a permanent settlement of the complex prob­
lems involved without the consultation and cordial consent of 
a government generally recognized as representing the great 
Russian people will be futile." 2 
When, in July 1922, the American government finally 
yielded to pressure and decided to recognize the Baltic re­
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publics, it was emphasized that the United States took notice 
of the actual existence of these governments and nothing more. 
Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes made it clear on July 
25, 1922, pointing out: "The United States has consistently 
maintained that the disturbed conditions of Russian affairs may 
not be made the occasion for the alienation of Russian terri­
tories, and this principle is not deemed to be infringed by the 
recognition at this time of the governments of Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania which have been set up and maintained by in­
digenous population." 3 
"At this time" was the limit of obligations of the United 
States government. By no means was it implied that the situa­
tion was permanent and that the United States guaranteed its 
immutability. On the contrary, the report of Evan Young, 
American High Commissioner in Riga, published together 
with the declaration of the Department of State, plainly indi­
cated that leading men in the Baltic region were under no illu­
sions as to the future relations of these states to Russia and 
realized that with an orderly, well-established government in 
Russia, the Baltic provinces would again become part of Rus­
sia. Young further reported to his government: "It is not im­
probable that through the operation of fundamental economic 
laws these countries will become a part of a federated Russia 
or will retain autonomous powers but will be linked with 
the Russian government through close economic and political 
treaties and agreements." 4 
American statesmen simply did not believe that workable 
state and economic systems could be reconstituted from frag­
ments of the Russian empire. Later events proved how right 
they were and how much more farsighted than contemporary 
English and French statesmen. 
Even the European powers were not enthusiastic about rec­
ognition of the Baltic states. In a surprising turn of history, 
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their recognition was actually hastened by none other than 
Russia. The Soviet government was the first state to recognize 
them de jure: Estonia on February 2, 1920, Lithuania on July 
12, and Latvia on August 11. This recognition was granted in 
the form of peace treaties signed with each of the Baltic states: 
with Estonia in Tartu, with Lithuania in Moscow, and with 
Latvia in Riga. 
These peace treaties regulated disputes about mutual fron­
tiers, reparations, repatriation of refugees, demobilization of 
White detachments then operating in the territory of the Baltic 
states, et cetera. The Soviet-Lithuanian treaty provided also 
that the frontier between Poland and Lithuania must be estab­
lished by mutual agreement of the Polish and Lithuanian 
states. Inasmuch as Poland had gained Vilna by aggressive 
seizure, neither the Soviet nor the Lithuanian governments ever 
subsequently recognized the Polish occupation of Vilna. 
In concluding those treaties the Soviet government acted 
like an accomplished journeyman who with his finger caught 
in a machine, cut it off to save his hand. 
For hard-pressed Russia the treaties with the Baltic states 
meant the removal of at least one front and a small breach in 
the Allied blockade. The Soviet treaty with Estonia was the 
first general agreement to be concluded between the Soviet 
Union and a bourgeois state. 
After this, the great powers could do nothing else but rec­
ognize the Baltic states themselves, the more so because the 
"northwest" army of Yudenich had by this time been defeated. 
England and France recognized Estonia and Latvia de jure on 
January 26, 1921, while at the end of the same year both were 
accepted into the League of Nations. But Lithuania was able 
to gain recognition only in December 1921, because the great 
powers could not make up their minds about the Vilna con­
troversy between Lithuania and Poland. 
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In this manner the great powers sanctioned an accomplished 
fact. After the Bolsheviks had recognized the Baltic countries, 
further wavering of England and France could only drive these 
new states into Russia's embrace, and that was quite undesir­
able. 
NASCENT POPULAR MOVEMENTS AND ELEMENTS, OF DECAY 
From the beginning, the course of independent state develop­
ment in the Baltic countries was marked by two conflicting 
trends, at times interwoven, at others mutually obstructive, with 
the result that the general situation became extremely com­
plicated. 
One trend was represented in the pressure exerted by the 
newly liberated native peoples in Lithuania, Latvia, and Es­
tonia. With youthful zeal the Latvians, Estonians, and Lithu­
anians energetically applied themselves to the restoration of 
their ravaged countries. Astonishing results were achieved in 
education, public welfare, and the arts. 
The political ideas of the Baltic peoples were inspired with 
the militant democratic spirit of their long struggle for na­
tional and social rights. After going through the school of two 
revolutionary uprisings, the Baltic working class had become 
politically mature. 
The emancipated peasantry were immensely enthusiastic and, 
after radical agrarian reforms had distributed among them land 
of the baronial estates, they wielded vast influence on the eco­
nomic life. 
Opposing this upsurge of forward-looking public spirit were 
other forces bearing the seeds of decay and ruin. The equivocal 
policy of the Versailles statesmen gave the German occupation 
authorities enough leeway for them to dismember the political 
forces whose program was a direct succession of the prolonged 
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liberation struggle waged by the Baltic peoples. All four Baltic 
states, Finland and Latvia in particular, inherited from von 
der Goltz corrupt government cliques which converted their 
countries into colonies and followed an economic policy of 
maximum dependence at first on England, later on Germany. 
As is customary in colonial or semicolonial countries, the 
economy itself was subordinated to politics. Economic measures 
were accepted or rejected on considerations of foreign policy on 
the approval or disapproval expressed by the current master 
power. 
This was illustrated vividly in the conflict between the two 
main trends of public economy in the eastern Baltic: the op­
position between agrarian and industrial life. 
AGRARIANISM VERSUS INDUSTRIALIZATION 
Before World War I the Baltic provinces within the Russian 
empire were largely industrial areas. The industrialization of 
Latvia and Estonia and the development of an extensive rail­
way system began at the end of the nineteenth century. Before 
the outbreak of war in 1914 the country had metal, rubber, 
textile, shipbuilding, and canning plants developed around big 
industrial centers like Riga, Tallinn, and Liepaja. Riga, for 
example, had about 90,000 industrial workers in a total popula­
tion of half a million (482,000 in 1913). 
In the prewar Baltic, industrial expansion was extremely 
rapid. The following table illustrates this growth in Latvia.5 
Number of Number of 
Year plants workers 
1874. 150 13,000 
1900. .520 65,000 
1910. .650 93,000 
i9!4. .810 113,000 
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In Estonia industrial workers numbered more than 50,000 
by 1914. ' 
Baltic manufacture was to a large degree concentrated in 
heavy industry, such as machine building, metal fabrication, 
and chemical production. It operated on imported raw mate­
rials and produced largely for export. 
The Baltic area in general played an important part in the 
foreign trade of Russia; not less than a third of the total pre­
war foreign commerce of Russia was transshipped through 
Baltic ports. During the period from 1909 to 1913 the distribu­
tion of Russian foreign trade according to border points was 
as follows: 
Percentage of 
Border points total turnover 
White Sea i.s 
Baltic Sea 32.0 
Western overland 31.1 
German border 24.3 
Finnish border 3.5 
Asiatic outlets 7.9 
After World War I the situation was radically changed. 
There was, first of all, vast devastation caused by the world 
conflict, the civil war, and the German occupation. Industrial 
machines and workers had been evacuated from the Baltic. 
The organic connection with the mighty hinterland of Russia, 
which had provided raw materials and the best markets, was 
broken. The whole industrial structure had to be reconstructed. 
From the very beginning a conflict rose between two economic 
trends. The Baltic area stood at an economic crossroads, facing 
the question of either industrialization or agrarianism. 
Industrialization meant concentration of public effort on the 
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restoration of industry to the prewar level and progressive in­
dustrial expansion thereafter. The social and political conse­
quences of this course were clear: the number of industrial 
workers would increase with a resulting proportional growth of 
radical and socialist political views; economic ties with the 
Soviet Union would be strengthened, because otherwise the 
Baltic factories would be unable either to dispose of their 
products or to obtain the necessary raw materials for produc­
tion. 
The path of industrialization was fervently advocated by 
progressive circles whose members argued that a strong indus­
try would stabilize the agrarian economy by providing it with a 
home market among the urban workers and thus make native 
agriculture less dependent on the fluctuations of the world 
market for farm products. This course, it was shown, would 
provide the best foundation both for national welfare and for 
politico-economic independence. 
But the path of agrarianism was chosen instead. The choice 
was made under the influence of Baltic chiefs of state who en­
joyed the powerful support of England and played on the 
primitive aspirations born of the agrarian reforms. 
Not only were these statesmen reconciled to the ruin of 
Baltic industry; they declared it was "good fortune." In Es­
tonia it even became extremely popular in 1922 to shout the 
silly slogan "Away with Heavy Industry." 
All measures were taken to retard the development of heavy 
industry to strengthen the position of agriculture in the eco­
nomic life of the Baltic states. Behind this policy stood a po­
litical grouping, acting in close collaboration with the master 
foreign power and finding support at home among what were 
called the "gray barons," or newly rich peasants. The "im­
plications" of this policy were that the peasantry—or, more pre­
cisely, its most active and conscious segment, the rich peasants 
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—had become the backbone of the country, and the workers 
were doomed to vegetate in various service industries or in un­
dersized factories producing for the tiny local market. In for­
eign policy it meant orientation on that great power which 
purchased the farm products; concretely, on England or Ger­
many. Moreover, this meant the absence of local capital re­
sources, with consequent dependence on banks abroad. 
The Baltic states chose this course only because of pressure 
from outside and because their leading statesmen wanted to 
fence them off from Russia. Had the native people been left 
to themselves they would, no doubt, have sought a way out of 
the impasse into which the policy of semiforced agrarianism had 
driven them. For this agrarian policy created in the Baltic area 
a morbid atmosphere of desolate despair. 
The flourishing industrial cities for which the Baltic was 
celebrated before the war withered away. Vacant factory build­
ings were mute testimony in the once busy centers of Riga, 
Tallinn, Parnu, Liepaja. There, amid dust-covered heaps of 
scrap metal and dilapidated equipment, could be seen off in 
some adjoining corner, what became the customary tiny artisan 
machine shop, sometimes still exhibiting to passers-by the once 
proud name of the former industrial establishment. 
Some fifteen to twenty years after the end of the civil war, 
when industry in Russia was making giant strides ahead, the 
factories of Latvia and Estonia still resembled such sad re­
minders of the "industrial establishment" of 1918-1920, when, 
finding a spot in the corner of a former factory building, work­
ers produced cigarette lighters by hand. 
Vacated in Tallinn were the Russo-Baltic shipbuilding docks, 
which before the war employed 5,000 workers, and the Dvigatel 
car-building works, where 15,000 workers were once engaged, 
was closed down in Riga. The Becker wire-drawing mill in 
Liepaja, which once had 10,000 workers, gave part-time em­
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ployment to less than a thousand. The huge Krenholm textile 
mills in Narva, which in 1914 had 12,000 workers, was reduced 
to 2,000. 
Whereas the manufacture of the Baltic provinces within the 
old Russian empire concentrated chiefly on heavy industry 
for export—machine building, metal fabrication, and chemical 
production—that which was developed in independent Latvia, 
for instance, confined itself to those branches producing con­
sumer goods for the home market. In 1937, of the total indus­
trial output in Latvia, about twenty-seven per cent was food­
stuffs, nineteen per cent textiles and fifteen to eighteen per 
cent for other branches of light industry. Machine building, 
metal fabrication, and chemical production did not reach even 
a quarter of the prewar output. 
Huge establishments had marked the earlier industrial de­
velopment in the Russian Baltic, where the number of workers 
employed in three or four plants of the rubber, car-building, 
and metal fabrication industries, with 10,000 to 15,000 workers 
each, comprised about fifty per cent of the total number of 
industrial workers. In the new Baltic republics industry was 
confined wholly to small plants. In Latvia, for example, about 
ninety per cent of all enterprises employed less than twenty 
workers each. 
The same was true also in Estonia, where, in comparison with 
the period before 1914, the number of workers employed in the 
metal industry was reduced from 17,000 to 4,000, in the textile 
industry from 19,000 to 9,000. 
The one-time busy Baltic ports were even more desolate and 
neglected. In the port of Riga rare English, German, and small 
local merchant vessels would drop anchor from time to time, but 
what a comedown from the glory of the past, when a third of 
the Russian empire's foreign trade passed through the Baltic 
ports. Ships hardly ever called at the ports of Liepaja, Ventspils, 
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or Tallinn, although they had port installations scaled to han­
dle entire fleets. 
Just prior to World War I the Liepaja roadstead had been 
enlarged to provide anchorage for the entire Russian Baltic 
fleet. After the war huge traveling cranes stood motionless on 
the deserted docks and grain elevators were unused—a sad com­
mentary on the general hopeless outlook. 
Tracks on the railways were rusty and empty warehouses 
showed disrepair. The decay of transit railways bore perhaps most 
striking witness to the tragic fate of the Baltic countries, which 
were cut off from the organism that had nourished them. All 
the railways in the Baltic area were essentially terminal spurs of 
lines driven out from Russia. Riga, Dvinsk (Daugavpils), and 
Kaunas were railway junctions where wide-gauge Russian lines 
ended and standard-gauge European lines began. Here, before 
the war, all outbound and inbound transit freight was reloaded 
for shipment, either on standard-gauge cars to Europe or on 
wide-gauge ones to Russia. Into the port centers railways had 
been driven to connect central and even Asiatic Russia with 
the "window on Europe." When this transit freight was dis­
continued or greatly reduced, the railway junctions of Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Estonia became ghost towns. Young people 
sought escape by going to the capital cities, which had an influx 
of officials and tourists, because of the central state institutions, 
and lived a life apart from the general depression. 
But even the capitals of the Baltic states, Riga and Tallinn, 
ignoring the small town of Kaunas, which had been converted 
into a capital, never did recover their former flourishing status. 
Riga remained also less densely populated than before the war. 
With reduced populations these fine, well-built cities of the 
best European architecture were an oppressive burden on the 
people of the tiny Baltic nations, whose "heads" had grown too 
big. 
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THE PERMANENT CRISIS OF AGRICULTURE 
The aftermath of these interwoven political and economic 
policies was that the Baltic countries became almost exclusively 
agrarian lands, in which agriculture had so outgrown the 
neglected urban economy that it could thrive only on the ex­
port of farm products. The chiefs of the Baltic states had "vol­
untarily" created a situation such as Hitler is now achieving in 
Rumania, Bulgaria, and other Balkan countries and, to some 
degree, also in France. Under Nazi control local industry in 
these countries is verboten, either being destroyed where it al­
ready exists or being given no chance to develop, while local 
agriculture is promoted to convert these countries into bread 
baskets for the Reich. The Nazi policy is, however, only par­
tially successful. The industry of conquered countries has been 
thoroughly ruined, except for war plants which produce for 
Germany; but somehow agriculture has not gained thereby, for 
it is no less retarded than is industry. 
The results were the same in the Baltic area. Since local agri­
culture was dependent on the foreign market, its development 
was subject to constantly changing price levels on the world 
farm products market and to alterations of the political situa­
tion. The opportunity for normal development was absent, 
and during all these interwar years the structure of Baltic econ­
omy continued to rock on this unstable foundation, more shift­
ing than the sand dunes on the Baltic shores. The curve of agri­
cultural growth in the Baltic countries is not a rising one, as 
should be expected from states which have made a "peasant 
policy" their watchword. The curve goes from crisis to crisis, 
with sweeping drops between, and following each drop it be­
gins again the slow painful climb upward to the next crisis. 
In 1928, before the big depression, former Minister of 
Finances in Latvia, J. Blumbergs, speaking at a conference of 
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the Latvijas Lauksaimnieku Centrala Savienlba (Central Asso­
ciation of Latvian Farmers), complained: "The agricultural 
crisis which began several years ago is becoming ever more 
acute. The situation in the countryside goes from bad to worse. 
It is no longer a question merely of a crisis, but of the very 
existence of agriculture as such." 
During the following years the situation did not improve, 
while from 1930 onward it became catastrophic, giving rise to 
strong Fascist tendencies and the baffling "rope dancer" eco­
nomic policy carried out by the dictator governments. 
The development of agriculture in the Baltic states during 
the interim between the two World Wars can be broken down 
into three characteristic historical phases. 
The first phase was the institution of agrarian reforms. As a 
result of the Russian revolution, and under its influence, ex­
tremely radical reallotments of land were carried out in all 
these Baltic countries. The land was taken away from the 
landed gentry, who, for the most part, were the Baltic German 
barons in Estonia and Latvia, and the Polish, Lithuanian, and 
Russian noblemen in Lithuania. In Latvia and Estonia the for­
mer landowners received no reparation, while in Lithuania 
they were given nominal compensation in ostmarks, which 
rapidly became valueless. 
Until 1919 about sixty per cent of the land area in Estonia 
was in the hands of landowners holding about twelve hundred 
estates, with an average acreage of more than 2,000 hectares 
(5,000 acres). The agrarian reform was designed to redistribute 
this land among landless and poor peasants. However, a large 
part of the expropriated land fell into the hands of rich peas­
ants, political leaders, military men. This is shown most clearly 
by the findings of the agricultural census, according to which, 
in 1929, there were in Estonia 46,000 farms of less than ten 
hectares (half being less than five hectares), 28,000 farms of 
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from thirty to one hundred hectares, and five hundred land­
owner estates of more than one hundred hectares. The number 
of hirelings had reached 66,500. 
The reform of 1920 in Latvia affected more than forty-eight 
per cent of the total land domain, which until the war had 
been in the hands of big landowners. Each Kurland baronial 
estate had on the average about 2,000 desiatins (5,400 acres), 
much larger, in fact, than the Russian landed estates which 
averaged from five hundred to six hundred desiatins. This land­
owning stratum was eliminated by the agrarian reform. How­
ever, political corruption and a patronizing attitude to rich 
peasants contributed to keep low the standards of the average 
peasants. Out of the total of 225,000 farms, 160,000 had plots 
of less than twenty hectares (two-thirds of these were less than 
ten hectares), and 50,000 had farmsteads exceeding the quota of 
twenty-seven hectares per farm set by the agrarian reform law. 
Of these latter farms 18,000 had plots of from fifty to one hun­
dred hectares, and 2,000 farmsteads had above one hundred 
hectares. One entire Latvian southern district, Latgale, con­
sisted mainly of landless and poor peasants who became a 
source of cheap labor for the well-to-do farms of Livonia and 
Kurland. 
The agrarian reform led to similar results in Lithuania, 
where in 1931 there were 132,000 farms of less than ten hec­
tares, and 93,000 farms of from ten to twenty hectares. 
Although the Baltic agrarian reforms eliminated in this way 
the power of the old landed gentry, they laid the basis, how­
ever, for a new class struggle among the peasants in the Baltic 
countries. The peasants became much more differentiated in 
rank than they had ever been before, when the lot of all peas­
ants, oppressed by a small landowner class, was equally miser­
able. 
As time went on, this differentiation became increasingly 
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marked. The small farmers could never get out of debt to the 
state for agricultural machines, for timber which had become 
generally state property, for land even, since in Estonia land 
was "leased" by the state. They also became indebted to banks 
and rich peasants. For a time public auctions of bankrupt farms 
were a common sight. Every period of crisis, with rising de­
mands for funds to withstand rapidly falling prices, brought its 
crop of ruined farmers, who sold out under the auctioneer's 
hammer. Moreover, the economic policy of all the Baltic gov­
ernments, whether under democratic or dictator control, was 
guided by the interests of the "gray barons." Consequently, 
support was generally given to those branches of agriculture in 
which the small farmer was at a disadvantage. Moreover, since 
the "gray barons" needed farm labor, the elimination of small 
farms was to some extent carried out by design. 
Following the reforms then, the second phase of agrarian de­
velopment was marked by an increasing differentiation in rank 
among the peasants and by the reorientation of agriculture in 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. The sown area under rye, oats, 
barley, and flax expanded slowly, scarcely reaching the prewar 
level. Only the acreage under wheat was greatly expanded to 
compensate for the loss of wheat formerly imported from the 
Ukraine. The Ukrainian supply was now cut off because a guid­
ing aim of the new orientation was to erect a wall isolating the 
Baltic states from Russia. 
While grain farms developed unevenly, dairy and livestock 
farms were liberally encouraged. Compared to prewar output 
the production of butter and bacon was immensely increased 
in Latvia, Estonia, and in Lithuania, particularly. 
This enlarged output was not intended, however, for the 
more or less stable home market; it was exclusively for export 
and, therefore, susceptible to price fluctuations and competi­
tion on the market abroad. The result was that when prices 
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plunged disastrously in 1930 and competition sharpened ac­
cordingly, the small Baltic states lacked resources to meet such 
powerful competitors as the Soviet Union and Denmark. 
Competition with stronger nations constantly imperiled two 
other export branches of national economy in the Baltic states: 
the production of flax and mast timber. Here, as generally in 
Baltic foreign commerce, much depended on finding foreign 
financiers to subsidize the export trade. Indeed, there were al­
most no local capital resources. 
The crisis of 1931 marked the beginning of the third phase 
in the development of the Baltic national economy, a phase 
in which its semicolonial character and hopeless condition be­
came most clearly evident. 
On the world market prices took a catastrophic drop. All 
countries began to introduce quotas restricting the import of 
farm produce. An era of economic isolation began. In, the Baltic 
states the economic system knocked together for better or 
worse simply collapsed. 
The resultant depression and unemployment culminated in 
the political disturbances of 1932-1933, when Fascist regimes 
were set up. At their heads, especially in Latvia, were arrant 
gamblers who regarded the public economy as their own private 
concern and, with misappropriated public funds, plunged into 
an orgy of speculation. In Latvia alone about forty new joint 
stock companies sprang up, all of them associated in some way 
with the name of Ulmanis and his proteges. The clear profits 
of these companies rose from six million lats in 1933 to eighteen 
million in 1937, and meanwhile the rate of profit had increased 
from 3.4 to 8.3 per cent.6 
The Ulmanis-sponsored joint stock companies engaged in all 
kinds of shady business transactions, from the construction of 
the Kegums power station, where no power was required, to 
the erection of the fashionable health resort in Kenmeri for 
The Baltic Lungs 71 
rich tourists who never came. They also put up fine buildings 
to house the government, which was in turn, by cunning 
schemes, made to foot the bill for everything. They speculated 
on the stock exchange with the investments of small depositors 
in savings banks and even with postal savings, despoiled the 
state timber reserves, and saddled the countries \yith foreign 
debts. The public-tax press was screwed down to the limit, and 
finally the lats exchange rate was devaluated by forty per cent. 
An impression of economic activity was thus created. But 
the motions were not those of a healthy organism. Rather they 
resembled the convulsions of a dead frog galvanized into ac­
tion. The electric charge remained export trade, or what was 
left of it. For out of sheer political considerations—the fear of 
losing control in the Baltic area—England and Germany had 
established for Baltic products quotas relatively favorable, but 
offering little prospect for expansion. 
The economic position of the Baltic countries in 1938 was 
summed up by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 
London as follows: " the economic prosperity of the Baltic 
states depends largely on their export trade, and this, in turn, 
depends largely upon the United Kingdom. Provided, there­
fore, that they can maintain the commercial relations they have 
built up with that country since 1934, and that agricultural 
prices do not fall substantially below present levels, the stabil­
ity of their present economic existence should be assured so 
long as the respective governments can avoid the dangers of 
State capitalism. But this means little more, in the last resort, 
than that the current income of the economic system will 
roughly suffice to cover current outgoings, and that the stand­
ard of living will remain at or around its present level. If re­
serves are to be accumulated, whether to endure against a 
future depression or to finance the development needed to raise 
the standard of living, foreign capital will be indispensable." 7 
C H A P T E R  V  
The Cordon Sanitaire 
The political philosophy animating Europe's rulers in 1918 
has been expressed without ambiguity by Lord Bertie, then 
British Ambassador to France, who wrote in his diary: "Bol­
shevism is a contagious disease. The Entente must estab­
lish an old-fashioned quarantine to guard against infection.. "1 
To do so, the English diplomat deemed the following steps 
necessary. "If," he wrote, "we can achieve the independence of 
the buffer states, that is, Finland, Poland, Estonia, the Ukraine, 
et cetera, and whatever others we can fabricate, then in my 
opinion let the rest be damned and stew in its own juice." 2 
The power policy pursued by the victor nations in 1918 was 
patently designed for wider objectives than the solution of 
UTgent socio-economic problems within the "fabricated" 
quarantine zone. For the Entente, the Baltic states in them­
selves had little significance. The Baltic states were erected as 
a political tool for negotiation with Germany and pressure on 
Soviet Russia, as a link in the "policy of barbed-wire entangle­
ment from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea," as Clemenceau 
aptly expressed it. 
If this was true in 1918, it remained so during two subse­
quent decades. As late as 1938 British official circles estimated 
the international significance of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithu-
72 
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ania thus, in a report of the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs: "Together with Poland, they form a buffer between two 
first-class modern powers, the Third German Reich and the 
Soviet Union." 3 
The report proceeded: "If either Russia or Germany were to 
take possession of these countries, the Baltic Sea would be in 
danger of becoming little more than a private lake." 
The British policy in the eastern Baltic area, pursued con­
sistently from 1918 to 1938 and especially during the Moscow 
talks, therefore aimed to keep both Germany and Russia out. 
To the conservative mind of the Tory governments, the Baltic 
countries represented a double-faced imperial rampart on the 
continent, one face turned against Russia, the other against 
Germany. However, as with many other such ramparts, it was 
strong only in appearance, and caved in when assaulted. 
After 1933 England steadily yielded her Baltic bastion to 
Hitlerite Germany, which reaped the benefits of prolonged 
Tory intrigue. The complete bankruptcy of Downing Street's 
antiquated policy was revealed most strikingly when Germany, 
in accord with the dictates of Hochpolitik, was obliged to sub­
mit to Soviet pressure and evacuate the Baltic area. When the 
Soviet Union took over control of Baltic destiny, she had to 
deal with Germany alone. Without even being fully aware of 
it, Britain had long since yielded hegemony in the Baltic to 
Germany. 
But until German military might had been restored, the 
Baltic countries were political vassals and semicolonies of 
Great Britain. The result was that the Baltic nations were 
driven into an economic impasse which, according to English 
economists, rendered hopeless any efforts to improve their liv­
ing standards or to develop local productive forces, except 
through ever-increasing dependence on foreign finance capital. 
Politically the Baltic capitals became hotbeds of interna­
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tional intrigue, wherein the Baltic states themselves were 
merely small change to bargain with. The sponsors neither 
sought for nor encouraged as collaborators genuine native lead­
ers held in high public esteem. They preferred to deal with less 
scrupulous but more compliant politicians. Over a period of 
years Baltic diplomacy grew accustomed to being kept by some­
one. No sooner had Nazi Germany's stocks risen on the world 
exchange than the Baltic diplomats fluttered into Hitler's em­
brace. 
Orientation on Hitlerite Germany, from 1934 to 1939, did 
not signify for the Baltic states a lapse in their customary po­
litical or diplomatic morals. Subordination of foreign policy 
to one or another powerful patron state had become habitual 
for the postwar state leaders, who kept a weather eye on world 
politics to see "which way the wind was blowing." They always 
found some big power to shelter them in a storm. 
The record of Baltic diplomacy since 1918 can be divided 
into four main stages: 
First, until 1920 the tone was set by the Entente, whose 
fleet arrived in Baltic waters in December 1918. England then 
granted commercial credits and supplied essential war mate­
rials to the armies of the Baltic states. 
Second, the period from 1920 to 1925 was marked by intensi­
fied French influence, reflected through increased efforts to 
establish Polish hegemony within the framework of the anti-
Soviet Baltic union. 
Third, after 1925 Britain again assumed wardship over the 
Baltic, which was an important link in her policy of the en­
circlement of Russia. Poland remained the conductor of this 
policy, now acting as an agent of Britain. 
Fourth, with Hitler's rise to power in Germany, the British 
influence in the Baltic became gradually interwoven with the 
German, until toward the end of 1938 and the beginning of 
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1939, Hitlerism had gained complete control of the entire 
eastern Baltic from Petsamo to Konigsberg. 
POLISH INTRIGUES IN THE BALTIC AREA 
In the formation of Baltic policy Poland played a tragi­
comic role. Here more than anywhere else the spotlight was 
thrown on the fantastic blend of servility and megalomania in­
herent in Polish foreign policy from 1920 to 1939. 
According to the design of the master minds at Versailles, 
Poland was to be only a conductor for bringing her sponsor's 
policy to fruition in the Baltic area. She was to have been the 
strongest link in the cordon sanitaire, to play the "elder sister" 
to the Baltic border states and to cement them into a military-
political union pointed against the U.S.S.R. 
Polish foreign ministers zealously attempted to accomplish 
this task. However, as had often happened with the Polish 
gentry, their greed outdid them, and Poland in the Baltic area 
began to resemble the retriever hound which instead of re­
trieving the game for its master, slunk off into the bush to 
devour it. 
The dream of a great Polish empire "ot morza do morza," 
(from sea to sea)—from the Baltic to the Black Sea basin—always 
remained a fixed idea behind Polish policy, making it both 
fruitless and dangerous, primarily to Poland herself! Imperi­
alistic designs of great powers are a danger to weaker neighbors, 
but when weak states catch this "sickness of the rich" it can 
result only in their own doom. 
The Polish gentry regarded the Baltic as a "channel of ex­
pansion for the Polish state," as Colonel Baginsky, official 
spokesman of the Polish general staff, once said. Therefore, 
they behaved like a gang of thieves and spoiled every chance they 
had of ever becoming really influential in the Baltic area. 
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After Polish troops, commanded by General Smigly-Rydz, 
had aided the White Latvians to drive the Red Latvian rifle 
corps from Latgale in 1920, the Poles remained there suspi­
ciously long. It was soon disclosed that the "good neighbors" of 
the Latvians had "historical claims" to Latgale, which had at 
one time, as the Principality of Inflantia, belonged to the Polish 
state, before being annexed to Russia. With much embarrass­
ment the Latvians finally got rid of their unwelcome guests, who 
would most likely have remained but for British disapproval. 
Only under pressure from London did the Polish empire seek­
ers depart. 
Following this came the famous Vilna coup. Under the pre­
text that it was Pilsudski's birthplace, the capital of young 
Lithuania was occupied at midnight, October 8, 1920, by mili­
tary forces under the Polish General Zeligovsky. At the mo­
ment this act of open violence passed with impunity. Lithuania 
had not yet been recognized by the great powers, and her pro­
test did not count. Of her neighbors only Russia expressed dis­
pleasure at the Polish rape of Lithuania, but Russia was then 
licking her own wounds, and her protest was merely platonic. 
Later, however, Vilna stuck in the throat of Polish politicians 
more than once when, in their repeated attempts to gain con­
trol over Baltic policy, they met with the unbending resistance 
of Lithuania. 
In international diplomatic circles Polish intrigues in the 
Baltic area were known under the honorable name of "the idea 
of a big Baltic bloc." The essence of this idea was that the three 
small Baltic states would conclude a military and political 
union with Poland, to which Finland and Rumania would also 
be attached, and, so constituted, this bloc would then sit down 
for round-table talks with Russia. 
Behind this scheme loomed the distinct contours of an anti-
Soviet bloc under Polish hegemony—ot morza do morza—for 
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the Poles never abandoned their dream of gaining control over 
the whole Baltic area as well as the Niemen and Dnieper basins 
to the Black Sea. Naturally, the Soviets were strongly opposed 
to such an arrangement in the Baltic. 
In his time Maxim Litvinov declared: "We are ready to con­
clude guarantee pacts with the Baltic states, with each sep­
arately, all collectively, or some of them. Unfortunately, all 
our efforts are disrupted by the attempts of Poland to manage 
the foreign policy of the Baltic states. Poland talks incessantly 
in the name of the Baltic states, which, as we know, have not 
yet commissioned her to do so." 4 
But the persistent work of the Polish diplomats and mili­
tarists was not altogether fruitless. In early 1925 the Polish in­
trigues almost succeeded. Following the failure of the Com­
munist uprising in Tallinn, extreme reactionary elements came 
to the fore in Estonia. The Estonian government supported 
Poland, which was enabled to assemble a conference of the 
northeast states in Helsingfors. Lithuania took part in that con­
ference only as an observer. On September 7, 1925, a general 
convention was concluded and hailed in the world press as a 
"barrier in defense of European civilization against the Asiatic 
barbarism." 
As a political curiosity it should be observed that this at­
tempt to establish Polish dominance over the Baltic states, failed 
chiefly because of Finland, and it was the most reactionary 
circles in the Finnish Diet which defeated the motion to ratify 
the convention. The motives of the Finnish reactionaries, 
though somewhat surprising for the uninitiated, were com­
prehensible to everyone who knew what was brewing in the 
Baltic. After the Mannerheim episode, Finland had established 
intimate connections with the German militarists and their 
general staff. Since the Germans were violently opposed to 
Poland at the time, because of Danzig and the Polish Corridor, 
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the Finnish clients of the Reichswehr were instructed to defeat 
the Polish combination. 
The revelations of Anton Birk, Estonian envoy to Moscow, 
who quit his post and exposed in the Moscow press the machina­
tions of the Polish general staff with Baltic diplomats, also 
served to bring the Baltic countries, Lithuania and Latvia in 
particular, to their senses. 
However, during 1926-1927 events took place in the Baltic 
area which throw the spotlight on the very substance of the 
Baltic problem, revealing the fundamental nature of relations 
with the former parent state, Russia. 
RUSSIA AND THE BALTIC 
The very rise of the Baltic states, their role in the post-
Versailles system, and their own economic problems could not 
but make their relations with Russia the pivot of all Baltic 
politics and diplomacy. 
These relations are marked by an extremely important fea­
ture. The driving forces which have determined the course of 
mutual relations between the Baltic countries and the U.S.S.R. 
have been political repellers and economic attractors. While 
political differences tended to keep them apart, common eco­
nomic needs drew them together. Those Baltic circles which 
worked to establish and maintain friendly relations with the 
U.S.S.R. did so primarily because therein lay the basis for the 
normal economic development of the Baltic area. The op­
ponents of a pro-Russian orientation, on the contrary, argued 
from purely political considerations. In reality they had to 
cripple the area s whole economic life to create the premises for 
a pro-English or pro-German orientation against the Soviet 
Union. 
The opposing trends of this politico-economic conflict have 
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marked every phase of political history in the Baltic states dur­
ing the past twenty years. The mainspring of mutual relations 
between the Baltic states and their great eastern neighbor is 
most clearly seen in two political events: the Lithuanian-Soviet 
guarantee pact of 1926 and the Latvian-Soviet trade agree­
ment of 1927. The bitter controversy waged around both agree­
ments brought into focus the motives and trends of every single 
political party in the Baltic countries, as well as of forces op­
erating behind the scenes. 
Because of her dispute with Poland about Vilna, Lithuania 
held a special position. To counteract Polish predominance in 
the Baltic, she was always more inclined than Estonia or Latvia 
to establish friendly relations with the U.S.S.R. This tendency 
was further strengthened in May 1926, when the Left govern­
ment of Sliezevicius came to power. The new premier, also be­
ing foreign minister, undertook a special journey to Moscow, 
where he signed the Lithuanian-Soviet guarantee pact on Sep­
tember 28, 1926. In brief this pact provided: both parties shall 
refrain from any aggressive action whatever directed against the 
other; in case a third power attacks one of the parties to the 
pact, the other is obliged not to support the attacking third 
power; both parties obligate themselves not to participate in an 
economic or financial boycott directed against either of them; 
disputes must be settled by a conciliation commission; both 
parties are obligated to respect the sovereignty, territorial integ­
rity, and inviolability of each other. The pact was concluded 
for five years. 
After the pact was signed, Sliezevicius and Soviet Foreign 
Commissar Chicherin exchanged notes. In his note, Chicherin 
especially emphasized that the Soviet government did not recog­
nize the seizure of Vilna by Poland. 
What appears to be such a normal act of state as establish­
ing more or less good-neighbor relations between two peaceful 
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countries aroused, however, a veritable tempest in European 
diplomatic circles. Poland, in particular, was alarmed, sending 
an indignant note of protest to Moscow. British financiers at 
once subjected Lithuania to a credit blockade. The entire 
London city press rose in arms against the Lithuanians, with 
intermittent attacks, "friendly directions," and "warnings." But 
despite all this diplomatic excitement, the Lithuanian Diet 
ratified the pact. Thereby was signed its own death warrant. In 
December 1926 the Left government was deposed by a Fascist 
clique which gradually, under a screen of anti-Polish verbiage, 
led Lithuania back into the camp of the anti-Soviet bloc. 
Still more illustrative of the situation in the Baltic countries 
was the fate of the Latvian-Soviet trade agreement. 
Toward the end of 1926 the opinion prevailed in the Latvian 
public mind that expansion of trade relations with Russia was 
essential to prevent national bankruptcy. Despite the endeavors 
of the "agrarian" government, agriculture had found no way 
out of its permanent crisis. Factories were shut down. The 
otherwise -excessive unemployment increased. Trade was at a 
standstill. One commercial concern after the other went into 
bankruptcy, following which banks began to suspend pay­
ments. The foreign trade balance became increasingly passive. 
When, during 1926-1927, the Social Democratic and Bour­
geois Democratic parties in Latvia were for the first time able 
to form a Left coalition government, one of its first steps was 
to initiate negotiations relative to a Latvian-Soviet trade agree­
ment. The negotiations lasted only a month, and the agreement 
was signed on June 2, 1927. This agreement provided for a 
manifold expansion of the trade exchange between the two 
countries, offering great advantages to Latvia, which was thus 
given an opportunity to export to Russia leather, glass, hard­
ware, agricultural machines, railway cars, knitted fabrics, canned 
fish, et cetera, in accord not only with the usual most-favored-
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nation principle, but also with the exclusive-rights privilege* 
which no third party could demand for itself. (Exceptions were 
made on the Latvian side for the benefit of Estonia, Lithuania, 
and Finland; on the U.S.S.R. side for the benefit of Estonia, 
Lithuania, Finland, and the continental countries of Asia on 
the other borders of the U.S.S.R.) The U.S.S.R. obligated itself 
greatly to increase its shipments through Baltic harbors, thereby 
opening the way for expansion of Latvian railways and port 
facilities. 
Although this agreement was very advantageous to Latvia 
and had no strings attached to complicate internal affairs, since 
Russia neither asked for nor received any kind of indulgence 
and the Communist party as before remained illegal, it was 
viciously attacked at home, but chiefly outside Latvia. Both 
assaults evidently stemmed from one source. 
Despite worthy traditions of tactful diplomacy, British Am­
bassador Vaughan at Riga interfered in the political con­
troversy waged over the ratification of the Latvian-Soviet trade 
agreement. An influential local newspaper printed an inter­
view granted by him in which he artlessly said that "the rumors 
about England supposedly having no objections to the Latvian-
Soviet trade agreement are untrue." 5 
Opponents employed both "truncheons and bribes" against 
the agreement. In secrecy, behind closed doors, deals were made 
with insurgents to overthrow the recalcitrant government. 
Lacking confidence in the state secret police, which had reac­
tionary connections, the Left government set up its own agency 
for surveillance of suspicious characters. They were able to 
uncover in time and suppress the officers' Putsch, known as the 
Olin affair, in Cesis. All clues in the conspiracy led to an em­
bassy mansion. 
Other methods employed are suggested by an article which 
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appeared in the leading paper of Ulmanis's party at the time. 
The article reads: "We cannot fail to take into account that 
England will watch closely the conduct of the Baltic states. 
Recently an English capitalist combine proposed to enlarge 
considerably its investments in local industry. Representatives 
of certain Latvian firms have even been invited to London for 
negotiations. It is evident that the situation with regard to ob­
taining large English credits is now more favorable than ever 
before. By entering the sphere of Russian influence we risk the 
loss of this opportunity." 6 
The bitter struggle against "insubordinate" Latvia was 
not only an internal dispute. Estonia, in particular, exerted 
vigorous pressure. In August 1927 Estonian Foreign Minister 
Akkel made a special trip to Riga to persuade Latvia not to 
launch a policy that threatened a collision with England. This 
was not an empty threat. British Tories were actually exasper­
ated by the "effrontery" of little Latvia, which had dared 
to open a breach in the blockade that the United Kingdom then 
sought to erect around Russia. All this was also coincident with 
the raid on the Arcos Soviet trading concern in London. 
Further evidence of English annoyance has been related by 
Emile Vandervelde, leader of the Belgian Socialists and at that 
time Foreign Minister of Belgium. In Geneva Vandervelde 
approached Austen Chamberlain to introduce him to the 
young Latvian foreign minister, Felix Cielens, who had just 
delivered a stirring speech at a session of the League Council. 
The British Tory turned away, saying he did not wish to see 
"that Communist." 
The crime of Cielens, a Social Democrat of very moderate 
views, was that he had concluded the most ordinary kind of 
trade agreement and customs convention with a big neighbor­
ing country that agreed to purchase from Latvia all she was able 
to produce. But Latvia had to be within the English system of 
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the cordon sanitaire. Hence, the effort to open trade relations 
with Russia was a grievous transgression. 
Later, when the Latvian Left government began to negotiate 
with the U.S.S.R. for a guarantee pact, analogous to that con­
cluded by the Soviet Union and Lithuania in 1926, the clamor 
raised can well be imagined. Since the draft of the guarantee 
pact was drawn up with the greatest clarity for one purpose 
only—to neutralize the Baltic—its opponents were obliged to 
employ the least ambiguous arguments. 
At the time Arvids Bergs, a clever but cynical politician and 
leader of the reactionary wing in the Diet, wrote with undis­
guised frankness: "England will not tolerate the policy of a 
bridge between the U.S.S.R. and Europe. If Cielens wants to 
try this policy, he can do so only against the will of England. 
To speak of any kind of neutrality for Latvia in a conflict 
between England and Russia, is childishness. 
Anticipating by ten to twelve years the coming Chamberlain 
deal, this reactionary politician of vision then wrote: "For 
Latvia there is now only one way, to reach an accord with 
England and her future ally, Germany." 7 
These clear-cut ideas express in essence the guiding maxims 
held during the entire period between the two world wars. 
The brief episodes of the Lithuanian-Soviet and the Latvian-
Soviet agreements were almost the only efforts made by the 
Baltic governments to conduct their own independent policy. 
They were duly spanked, and the Baltic area again settled down 
where it belonged in the post-Versailles Europe, remaining a 
cordon sanitaire against Bolshevism, a center of espionage, a 
potential springboard for attack on the U.S.S.R., and a semi-
colony for any current leader of the anti-Soviet bloc. Neverthe­
less, the U.S.S.R. continued her efforts to neutralize the Baltic 
area. She did not dare then to dream of more. 
Soviet policy in the Baltic area has long been associated with 
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the name of Maxim Litvinov, recently Soviet Ambassador to 
the United States. In June 1922, under his signature, identical 
notes were sent to Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and Finland, later 
in November, also to Lithuania, inviting them to a conference 
on disarmament in Moscow. Because of opposition from Poland 
and the Baltic states, the conference dispersed without achiev­
ing any results. Shortly before this, the desperate resistance of 
Finland had wrecked Litvinov's attempt, on March 30, 1922, 
to have interested countries sign a protocol "reaffirming the 
sanctity of the treaties, agreeing to the establishment of neutral 
zones, and renewing trade relations with the U.S.S.R." 
The Soviet attempts to conclude economic agreements and 
guarantee pacts with separate Baltic states were equally unsuc­
cessful. These endeavors encountered the stone-wall resistance 
of great powers, which were then patrons of the Baltic. 
At the end of 1928 and early in 1929 Litvinov was able to 
record a measure of success. After prolonged negotiations, the 
U.S.S.R., Latvia, Estonia, Poland, and Lithuania in turn signed 
what was called the "Litvinov protocol," which extended to 
this part of Europe the "Pact of Paris for the Renunciation of 
War" (Kellogg-Briand Pact), signed August 27, 1928. Finland, 
however, declined to sign this pact. 
The last attempt to secure the safety of eastern Europe and 
thus balance the entire system of collective security was made 
by Litvinov in conjunction with French Foreign Minister 
Bar thou. 
The history of this endeavor merits detailed examination, for 
it exposes most lucidly those concealed forces which later 
pushed Europe and the world into the abyss of World War II. 
According to the report of the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, events developed as follows: 
On May 18 [1934] M. Litvinov visited Geneva and discussed with 
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M. Barthou the possibility of resuscitating the project for an Eastern 
Locarno, first put forward by M. Briand in 1925 at the time of the 
Locarno Treaty negotiations. The Quai d'Orsay proceeded to draft 
a project for an eastern European pact of security and mutual as­
sistance. It was proposed to invite the Governments of the 
U.S.S.R., Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Finland, and the Baltic 
States to enter into a pact binding them, not only to refrain from 
supporting any signatory committing an act of aggression against 
one of their number, but also to consult and concert measures in 
support of any signatory who should be the victim of such an act. 
Simultaneously with the conclusion of this pact, it was suggested, 
France and the U.S.S.R. should adhere in the capacity of additional 
guarantors to the Eastern Pact and the Locarno Pact respectively. 
Germany and Poland were opposed to the pact on the 
ground that the security of eastern Europe was already sufficiently 
guaranteed by the existing bilateral treaties. Poland's change of 
front in this respect is probably explained by the signature of the 
pact of "understanding" with Germany in the previous January. 
It was difficult for Germany to reconcile a pact with the U.S.S.R. 
with the tenet that the Reich constituted the chief bulwark of 
Europe against Bolshevism. 
The Baltic States themselves maintained a noncommittal atti­
tude, while Finland appeared to be definitely opposed to it. Official 
visits paid by the Polish Foreign Minister Colonel Beck, to Tallinn 
and Riga in July, with a view to discouraging Estonia and Latvia 
from supporting the pact, resulted in a cautious statement that the 
governments of Estonia, Latvia and Poland were agreed that they 
must await further information.8 
After this, negotiations about an Eastern Locarno were lit­
erally swamped in scores of notes and counternotes, secret and 
open talks, petty intrigues and big events, until the Italo-
Abyssinian War thrust this project into the background. 
The rupture of collective security in the East was the first 
major setback for Litvinov's policy. It paved the way for the 
catastrophe of June 1939. The Litvinov policy was destined to 
become political reality again only after the sanguinary trials 
of nearly two years of World War II. 
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THE END OF ENGLISH INFLUENCE IN THE BALTIC AREA 
At the time when the Polish version of a big Baltic bloc 
collapsed, the idea was advanced of a "minor Baltic entente," 
that is, a military-economic union of Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Estonia alone. Neither in European diplomatic circles nor in 
the Baltic states themselves could anybody be found naive 
enough to believe such a union might have independent sig­
nificance. Everyone realized that since not one of the Baltic 
states had or could have a foreign policy of its own, combining 
their policies would result only in a new subordination of the 
foreign policy of all the Baltic countries to the control of that 
particular great power which was then master in the Baltic 
area. 
The foreign ministers of the Baltic states meanwhile had 
given themselves away completely by asserting maximum "re­
alism" at its worst. At the time when Lithuania was invited to 
enter a union with Latvia and Estonia, the Estonian foreign 
minister explained to uneasy diplomats in Warsaw that "Es­
tonia and Latvia made their offer conditional. They had not 
obligated themselves in any way to side with Lithuania in case 
she became involved in conflict with Poland and Germany." 
The implication was more than clear. The union was de­
signed only against the U.S.S.R. 
But as already suggested, there were few persons naive 
enough to believe in the possibility of an independent policy 
for the Baltic states, whether separately or united. The idea of 
a Baltic entente met with approval in the West, because it was 
taken to signify a strengthening of British influence. Losing 
confidence in Poland as an instrument for organizing the Baltic 
area, England wanted to take control of this affair into her own 
hands. To do so it was essential that the three small countries 
be welded into one unit. It was too much trouble to deal with 
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each one separately. England, for example, assigned only one 
ambassador to the Baltic area. From the embassy in Riga, he 
also served Tallinn and Kaunas. But events soon revealed that 
the basic policy of the Baltic statesmen, the very men whom von 
der Goltz had in his time lifted from obscurity, was not merely 
"sympathy with Western ideas" nor orientation on England, as 
many still think today. 
Despite economic and other ties, the Baltic states turned 
their backs on England as soon as Great Britain ceased to be 
the spearhead of the anti-Russian policy in Europe. Despite 
public revulsion to Fascism at home, these states entered the 
orbit of Hitlerite Germany as soon as Hitler undertook to or­
ganize the crusade against the U.S.S.R. 
When the minor Baltic entente came into being during 
1934~1935» Germany was virtual master of the Baltic situation. 
Therefore, in time this union became a mere appendage of 
Ribbentrop's cunning diplomacy. 
To their amazement, Baltic observers came to realize that 
England, which for so many years had been in complete control 
of Baltic financial and economic life and had skillfully manip­
ulated the mainsprings of Baltic government, was losing grip. 
It is true she continued to exercise vast influence to counteract 
any combination beneficial to the Soviets. But once Britain her­
self entered into negotiations with the U.S.S.R., the Baltic 
chiefs of state began to fly to Berlin or to get their instructions 
from German envoys. 
Meanwhile, England continued as before to dominate the 
economy of the Baltic countries. In the year from 1937 to 1938 
her share in the total Baltic foreign trade still remained be­
tween a third and a half. The Estonian banking system was 
under the thumb of English financiers. British capital invest­
ments in local industry were still at a high level. But econom-
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ically Germany, as well, was gradually forcing the United King­
dom out of the Baltic area. 
The German share in Baltic foreign trade was an obviously 
rising curve. In Estonia, from 1933 to 1937, Germany's share 
in exports increased from twenty-one to thirty-one per cent, in 
imports from twenty-two to twenty-six per cent. It was the same 
in Latvia, where, from 1933 to 1937, Germany's share in total 
exports rose from twenty-six to thirty-five per dent, and in total 
imports from twenty-four to twenty-seven per cent. After the 
catastrophic drop in German-Lithuanian foreign trade in 1935, 
Germany's position steadily improved in Lithuania also. 
But Germany gained her greatest triumph in the political 
arena. The Anglo-German naval covenant of 1935, on the con­
cord of naval fleet tonnage, virtually gave the Baltic basin to 
Nazi Germany. Meanwhile, her successful "internal aggression," 
or the conquest from within through local Fascists, served Ger­
many better than any army of occupation in her work of "mas­
tering" the Baltic area. 
C H A P T E R  V I  
The Baltic Vichy Governments 
I 
FASCISM WINS IN LITHUANIA, ESTONIA, AND LATVIA 
At the time when the anti-Hitler forces in Europe gained a 
certain power through the Popular Front in France and Spain, 
Fascism won a rapid and noiseless victory in the Baltic area 
of eastern Europe. The 1934 coup d'etats in Estonia and Latvia 
completed the liquidation of the young Baltic democracy, a 
process begun with the smashing of the democratic regime in 
Lithuania in 1926. A narrow-minded clique of pro-Fascist 
and pro-German politicians rose to power, setting up regimes 
that differed from the Nazi state only in the absence of the 
executioner's block and open pogroms, and differed from the 
Italian Fascist or corporate state in the want of mass Fascist 
parties and from Austrian Fascism in being a great deal more 
totalitarian. 
Only now in the wake of many recent developments has our 
political terminology been given a new conception embodied 
in the word Vichy, which defines without ambiguity the char­
acter of the Baltic dictator regimes. For in essence these regimes 
were merely political screens behind which militarized Ger­
many could accomplish its work. The rise of the Baltic Fascist 
regimes was the first bloodless victory of Hitlerite Germany. 
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However, Baltic Fascism had native roots, and its rise was 
not simply a direct extension of German influence. The ascend­
ancy of Smetona and Valdemaras in Lithuania, of Ulmanis in 
Latvia, and of Pats in Estonia, was favored by abnormal po­
litico-economic developments and specific social divisions in 
the Baltic, making their triumphs relatively easy. Hitler simply 
took able and skillful advantage of a convenient situation to 
initiate the era of what is called "internal aggression" in the 
Baltic region. 
The deformed economy of the Baltic countries could not 
but have political consequences, which in turn influenced both 
foreign and domestic policy and prevented a return to normalcy 
in Baltic economic life. By disclaiming economic collaboration 
with the U.S.S.R., the only natural market for the Baltic region, 
the heads of the Baltic states doomed their industry to stagna­
tion. The center of gravity necessarily shifted to agriculture, 
and that too was hampered by marketing difficulties. The peas­
ants, who cultivated the small and medium farms created 
through the agrarian reforms of 1918-1920, eked out a mere 
existence on the land. A few of them became just well enough 
off to break loose from the political influence of Social Democ­
racy, a movement formerly solidly supported by the mass of 
peasants. But independent farming on a small scale had no 
prospects. Only those landowners who could secure large gov­
ernment subsidies, export premiums, and other favors were 
able to prosper and make money. It stands to reason that the 
lion's share of these government subsidies was granted to the 
big farmers, the so-called "gray barons," who were proficient 
in trading, especially in export operations, and had binding ties 
with the government offices. What is more, as is usual in small 
"provincial" areas, the system sometimes worked even more 
simply. The main subsidies were voted to those farms whose 
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owners directly or indirectly held government seats and were 
present when the fiscal pie was cut. 
The few hundred subsidized farms prospered overnight. 
Flushed with new wealth, their owners felt restricted in the 
country and hastened to the city. But there the anti-industrial 
policy of their own government thwarted the expansion of new 
industry. To establish themselves, they had to clear out old, 
chiefly Jewish, industrial concerns of long standing. To do so 
they required still more state funds, a limitless drain on the 
state treasury to finance new enterprises, to speculate on the 
stock exchange, to rescue themselves from pecuniary embarrass­
ment. 
This class of nouveau riche politicians did not want to risk, 
and could not rely on, the hazards of parliamentary action. To 
them the short-lived but profoundly consequential periods of 
Left coalition governments in Lithuania (1926), in Latvia 
(1927), and in Estonia (1928) were as nightmares, terrible to 
recall. Then the governments, consisting of Bourgeois Demo­
crats and moderate Social Democrats, fell short of "revolution," 
striving primarily to cut the umbilical cord which nourished the 
sham "national" enterprises with public funds. The conse­
quences were immediate, and for certain statesmen who had 
become seriously embroiled in speculative ventures as a side­
line, they were extremely unpleasant. For instance, in Latvia a 
few months during 1927 under the Left government, with the 
Social Democrat Bastjanis as finance minister, sufficed to bank­
rupt several concerns, whose directors happened to be Karlis 
Ulmanis, General Balodis, and their intimates—the very men 
who later established Fascism. 
These men felt that they must be insured against a repeti­
tion of such parliamentary action. They desired also to put 
an end to the kind of government that needed the support of 
minority bourgeois groups, which at the same time represented 
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the very industries that the "national" parvenus had to clear 
away. Thus, the democratic regime was sentenced to death. It 
was necessary to await only propitious circumstances to accom­
plish the coup. 
The success of the Putsch was insured by three circumstances. 
First, the democratic institutions in the Baltic countries were 
young and had no stable, deep-rooted traditions. They were all 
anemic following the bloodshed of the civil war, during which, 
in one way or another, the finest and most active progressive 
democratic elements either perished or passed into political 
oblivion. Having risen out of World War I and the civil strug­
gle, the Baltic republics were under excessive militarist influ­
ence. Their body of generals had too much influence on policy 
for democracy to become stabilized. 
Second, the Baltic democratic regime was lacking in public 
confidence, because its ruling circles failed to cope with eco­
nomic hardships and the permanent depression. The public 
also viewed with disgust the corruption and extortion which 
were rife under the aegis of grasping rulers. As is often the case 
in such circumstances, the very circles which were responsible 
for all the misery of the population and whose policy and be­
havior had disgraced democracy were the first to shout "stop 
thief" and to vilify the democratic regime they themselves had 
befouled and which they now wished to be rid of, since it no 
longer left them in peace. 
Third, through their foreign and economic policies the 
Baltic states maneuvered into the fringe of anti-Soviet interna­
tional intrigue and became politico-economic dependencies 
of stronger powers, which used them to attain ulterior ends. 
Within the small Baltic countries internal policy was semi-
colonial, because that native government which acted counter 
to its protecting power never could hope to remain in power. 
Experience proved that a democratic regime does not guar­
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antee complete "docility." The experience of the Left govern­
ments of Sliezevicius, the Lithuanian prime minister who con­
cluded a guarantee pact with the U.S.S.R., and of the Latvian 
Foreign Minister Cielens, who concluded the Latvian-Soviet 
trade agreement, proved that the unexpected may happen un­
der a democratic procedure. It is a great deal simpler to have 
dealings with "authoritarian" regimes. Such was the opinion 
both of Pilsudski's Poland and Tory England, when they had 
decisive influence in the foreign policy of the Baltic states. 
When Hitlerite Germany gained the hegemony in the Baltic 
capitals, it naturally preferred to do business with tractable 
dictators. 
The above interrelated factors, in conjunction with the lack 
of a will to struggle common to all supine democratic forces, 
paved the way for an easy victory of Fascism in all three Baltic 
countries. 
In Lithuania democracy was crushed on the night of Decem­
ber 17, 1926. A few months earlier Pilsudski came to power in 
Poland. This inspired two ambitious politicians, An tanas 
Smetona and Augustin Voldemaras, who had been in disrepute 
from the first days of the republic and held no public office. In 
conspiracy with a group of high officers—General Ladyga, 
Colonel Skorupskis, Generals Plechavicius and Grigaliunas— 
they overthrew the coalition government of Slezevicius, formed 
by the Populists (Liaudininkai) and the Social Democrats. All 
the prominent democratic leaders were arrested. The Lithu­
anian Diet (Sejmas) in which Smetona's party had only three 
out of seventy-eight deputies, nevertheless did not surrender 
and dared to vote no confidence in the new "leaders." Ap­
pointing himself premier, Voldemaras dissolved the Diet in 
April 1927. After this, Smetona appointed himself president, 
replacing Dr. Grinius, who had been chosen by democratic 
election. A drastic purge was conducted throughout the coun­
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try, with the result that all former democratic organizations 
and parties were decimated. 
All political power was concentrated in the Smetona group, 
Tautininkai, and the Catholic clerical party of so-called 
"Christian Democrats" who were favorable to the dissolution 
of the Diet. In September 1929 Smetona succeeded in expell­
ing Voldemaras, who had become too ambitious. Before the 
expulsion "somebody" sent an assassin to remove Voldemaras, 
who managed to escape the attempt. Then Voldemaras began 
to plot his own Putsch. But Smetona learned of it, and Volde­
maras fled to Germany. 
In Latvia and Estonia the democratic regimes lasted until 
1934, when Hitler's triumph in Germany put an end to them. 
The Estonian Putsch was carried through by Konstantin Pats, 
the chief of state, as a formal countermeasure against the in­
fluential pro-Hitler party of Vabs, who called themselves "Lib­
erators." Modeled after the Nazi party, this organization within 
a few months grew into a movement which, though not as 
powerful, was fully as aggressive and active as the Hitlerites 
were. By means of a referendum in October 1933 the Vabs 
secured the introduction of a new constitution that seriously 
undercut the democratic order. Then Pats took advantage of 
the new constitution to establish his personal power. Aided 
by the army commander, General Laidoner, he struck a blow at 
the Vabs on March 12, 1934, dissolved the organization. But 
in passing he also smashed the democratic and labor (Social 
Democratic) parties, rendering the Diet powerless. 
Although formally under a ban, the Vabs suffered little from 
the extremely mild "repressions" of Pats and continued to 
exert an influence on the life of the country. The dictatorship 
swung all its oppressive weight against the democratic and 
labor organizations, which Pats pretended to defend against the 
Vabs. The situation became so aggravated that four of the most 
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prominent democratic figures—former chiefs of state, Tonnis-
son, Piip, Kukk, and Teemant—issued a manifesto to the Es­
tonian people protesting against the antidemocratic Fascist dic­
tatorship of Pats. However, the army command backed up Pats, 
and he gained the political support of Germany, which quickly 
appraised the situation, lent him a hand in his prospering busi­
ness, and left the ill-starred Vabs to its fate. 
In Latvia the Fascist overthrow had from the start the active 
collaboration of German Hitlerites. The Putsch was carried 
out by a narrow clique of the most disreputable politicians 
from the wealthy Peasants' Union, assisted by the bankrupt 
General Karlis Balodis and several officers of Fascist leanings. 
Shortly before the coup the leader of the clique, Karlis Ul-
manis, went to Germany for instructions. He was granted an 
audience by Alfred Rosenberg, the Nazi specialist on Baltic 
affairs. On his return, by cunning parliamentary maneuvers, 
Ulmanis forced the government to resign, as a move to elim­
inate the Jaunsaimineki, or new Peasant Party, which repre­
sented the small farmers who had received land through the 
1920 reforms. He became premier of a bourgeois coalition gov­
ernment, including the Peasants' Union, the Fascist National 
Society, and the minority bourgeois representatives of Jews, 
Germans, Poles, Russian monarchists. His first step was to con­
trol the police authorities. Fascists were appointed to every key 
police post. Alarmed at the rising dictatorship, the Diet 
(Saejma) put up a fight. Early in May the Diet passed an ordi­
nance dismissing all Nazi and Fascists from state and municipal 
service. This was a signal for Ulmanis and his Nazi clique. 
During the night of May 16, 1934, mass arrests were carried 
out by detachments of police and Aizsargi (a semiofficial Fascist 
organization similar to the Finnish Civil Guards) especially 
brought in from the villages. All the Left deputies, municipal 
leaders, unreliable officers, writers, and such others were placed 
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in a concentration camp at Liepaja. Ulmanis became the 
"Fiihrer of the People," a title which he officially bestowed on 
himself. The German Junkers plane which had been waiting 
for him near Riga in case of emergency took off without any 
passengers. The operation had been successful. 
The Ulmanis regime found it unnecessary to hide behind a 
democratic screen such as Pats had used in Estonia. The new 
order in Latvia was openly proclaimed to be a Fascist, corporate 
state based on the leadership principle. Elections were abol­
ished, the Diet dissolved, and municipal self-governments ban­
ished. Fiihrers were appointed in all organizations ranging from 
dissolved political parties to sports societies. Only the diplo­
mats who accepted service under Ulmanis were commissioned 
to observe, when abroad, the illusion of democracy in Latvia. 
Latvia itself became a thoroughly Fascist state with the Hitler 
greeting, a uniform centralized press, corporate councils, Aiz-
sargi (an equivalent of the Nazi S.S.), police terror, and all the 
flimflam of Hitlerite stage play. 
MONARCHS FOR A DAY 
The rise of Fascism in Latvia, which in a political sense is 
the key Baltic state, marked the beginning of Nazi Germany's 
successful penetration into the Baltic region. This penetration 
was accomplished through what is termed "internal aggression" 
under the guise of a feigned independence policy carried out by 
authoritarian regimes. The method of internal aggression con­
tributed not only to the establishment of Ulmanis's avowed 
pro-Hitler government; it also aided Pats and Smetona to set 
up regimes that publicly disclaimed any contact with Germany 
and the Nazis. Several objective conditions dictated this policy. 
After smashing the democratic order, Pats, Smetona, and 
Ulmanis alike naturally sought for some other ideological sup­
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port. They found it in the Hitler theory of dictatorship, all-
embracing nationalism, the corporate state, and anti-Semitism. 
Moreover, in foreign policy Germany had become the cham­
pion of anti-Sovietism in Europe. The social sympathies and 
political aspirations of all reactionary circles drew them to the 
Nazi "defender against Bolshevism." Besides, the Baltic coun­
tries became increasingly dependent economically on Germany 
which competed with success in the Baltic against England. 
Finally the dictators themselves were personally very favor­
ably oriented to Germany. All of them had past records of col­
laboration with the Germans. In 1918, the Lithuanian Sme­
tona, then president of the Taryba, had turned to Germany 
with a proposal to collaborate in the investment of the Wiirt-
temberg duke, Wilhelm von Urach, on the throne of the 
"Lithuanian principality." In 1918 Ulmanis had concluded an 
agreement with the German Landeswehr and had undertaken 
the obligation of providing land for colonization in Latvia to 
all Landeswehr soldiers. 
These political opportunists, who had decided to hold onto 
their power no matter what happened, since its loss would also 
entail the financial collapse of their swollen enterprises, nat­
urally had neither the desire nor the strength to oppose the Hit­
lerite aggression carried into the Baltic region, both along dip­
lomatic and military lines as well as through native fifth 
columns. On the contrary, these wretched Baltic puppets, who 
trembled before their own people and were frightened at their 
own shadows, almost dreamed of what seemed to them a peace­
ful existence under the protecting wings of Nazi Germany. 
The ambition to get rich quick was manifest in all the gov­
ernment measures of the Baltic dictators, especially in Latvia, 
where the regime was most totalitarian. The economic meas­
ures were literally plunderous. With apprehension the whole 
country observed how timber, for instance, the green gold of 
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public wealth, was despoiled. But more, all the national re­
sources were squandered. The Baltic Fascists employed a trick 
which had worked in Nazi Germany. Private concerns and in­
dustrial subsidiaries, which were financially embarrassed or 
belonged to "aliens," were nationalized, then subsidized by 
huge government investments, and finally "denationalized" by 
being transferred to new private owners. 
The resultant artificial boom, being without economic pros­
pects and serving only to make a few concerns rich, was detri­
mental to the whole national economy. Reserve funds which 
had been accumulated to tide through depression were wasted. 
The savings of small investors in co-operative and postal sav­
ings banks were shamelessly seized and put into speculative 
ventures. Feeling the ground quaking beneath them, the Baltic 
rulers acted like "monarchs for a day" and burned the candle 
of public wealth at both ends. Meanwhile, without let-up they 
talked incessantly about "Great Lithuania" (or Latvia or Es­
tonia) that was to survive unto "eternity." 
At the same time, the international situation grew more 
strained and the small nations became increasingly alarmed at 
German aggression. The mounting public fears were met by 
Ulmanis, Pats, and Smetona with a crescendo of hysterical 
clamor; louder and louder they shouted to the population, "Be 
calm, there is no invasion threat, except from the East." 
GERMAN INTERNAL AGGRESSION 
Behind their smokescreen of double-talk which lulled both 
the native population in the Baltic countries and the diplomats 
in European capitals, the Nazis carried out some hasty, never­
theless methodical and accurate, work. Quietly, without risking 
an open clash of arms, Germany surreptitiously sapped the ap­
proaches to Russia and Scandinavia. As the Reichswehr was 
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still unprepared for military action, it was necessary to operate 
under cover of the Baltic Vichy men. It is significant that a pe­
culiar "demarcation line" was drawn in the Baltic region. In 
Estonia and Latvia a local "Doriot" and "de Brinon" were in 
power, and Germany dealt with them directly. Lithuania was 
the "P£tain" zone, which was obliged only to yield gracefully. 
On both sides of the "demarcation line" Hitler's machine 
worked with equal success. 
Under the protection of the dictator governments, "ideas" of 
German manufacture were peddled wholesale to the native 
population. In the Baltic as elsewhere yeoman s service to the 
Nazis was rendered by that "socialism of fools," anti-Semitism. 
Teachers in schools, priests in churches, officials in institutions, 
the police, all were obliged to instill in the population a hatred 
of the Jews, a consciousness of "superior" race. 
A bloodless massacre was carried out. Jews were neither 
slaughtered nor confined in concentration camps. They were 
strangled in business life. The gates of factories and offices were 
closed to Jewish workers and clerks. Artisan Jews were pro­
hibited as shoemaker, tailor, or turner, unless they passed an 
examination in Lettish or Lithuanian grammar of college 
grade. For Jews of professional training virtually all doors were 
closed. The specter of complete ostracism began to stalk the 
Jewish masses in Latvia and Lithuania. In Estonia the "Jewish 
problem" was raised only artificially by Eenpalu-Einbund, 
Minister of Propaganda, who was a pocket edition of Goeb-
bels. There were only 5,000 Jews. But in Lithuania the Jews 
numbered about 150,000; in Latvia, about 90,000. Jewish fac­
tory owners and tradesmen were crushed by taxes, discontin­
uance of bank credits, refusal of licenses and export and import 
permits. In this way the businessmen of the dictators' clique 
quietly, "painlessly," and for practically nothing obtained con­
trol of almost all the so-called alien concerns. 
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Along with anti-Semitic measures went another routine line 
of pro-Hitler propaganda—defeatism combined with anti-Soviet 
lies. The propaganda offices of the Baltic Fascist governments 
zealously spread such ideas as the following: small states can­
not withstand the approaching world conflict; the Baltic coun­
tries have two neighbors—U.S.S.R. in the East and Germany 
in the West—and since the Baltic area belongs to the sphere of 
"Western civilization" it cannot have anything in common with 
Eastern barbarism; therefore, the Baltic countries are obliged 
to lean toward Germany. 
This viewpoint was expounded by the Latvian Minister of 
Propaganda Alfreds BIrzins in 1939 at an anniversary muster 
of the Fifth Regiment of Aizsargi held in Riga. The assembled 
officers were charged with the duty of propagating this idea 
among the people. 
During the summer of the same year the "society women" in 
Reval and Riga gathered signatures to a petition in which they 
implored the governments "not to permit needless bloodshed 
and not to resist almighty Germany." It is known on good au­
thority that the delegation, which handed this petition to the 
Latvian Fiihrer, Karlis Ulmanis, was headed by the wife of 
Wilhelm Munters, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Among the 
delegation were also the wives of some generals, as, for instance, 
the wife of General Balodis, a German woman. 
The new policy was demonstrated in other characteristic ac­
tions. The memorial day previously celebrated annually to 
mark the liberation of Riga from the Germans was stricken 
from the calendar of holidays. Instead, the residents of the 
Baltic capitals witnessed a celebration arranged to honor Gen­
eral Fletscher, a former commander of the Baltic German 
Landeswehr, noted for inordinate brutality. Together with Let­
tish and Estonian Fascists, General Fletscher took the salute at 
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parades of troops held in Riga and Tallinn on the anniversary 
marking the victory over the Bolsheviks. 
The appearance of German "brown shirts" parading through 
the streets in semimilitary dress, with the white stockings that 
distinguished the Baltic storm troopers, was not reassuring to 
the population of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. It was all the 
more alarming, because disquieting news was being spread by 
those who read East Prussian editions of the German papers. 
These papers reported that in Marienburg (East Prussia), a 
special Fiihrer's course had been founded for Baltic Germans. 
When German conspirators were caught from time to time in 
subversive acts that were too obvious to be ignored, they were 
handled with leniency by the government and the courts. Mild 
sentences were handed out to put away members of the Bal-
tische Bruderschaft, which had branches in Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Estonia and aimed to Germanize the Baltic region. The 
German smugglers who inundated Lithuania with appeals for 
the nonpayment of revenue were likewise let off easily, as were 
the Estonian Nazis, the Vabs, whose connection with Germany 
was an open secret, known to everyone. At the same time, with 
unceremonious harshness, the dictator governments trampled 
underfoot all non-German organizations of democratic or so­
cialist tendency and cracked down on any Lithuanian, Estonian, 
or Latvian caught in anti-Fascist activity by sentences of six, 
eight, even ten years at convict labor. 
When the entire Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian press 
was "normalized" and converted into official or semiofficial 
organs, the German newspapers Rigasche Rundschau and 
Revalsche Bote, became openly Hitlerite sheets. All the German 
organizations without exception, from the Sports Union to the 
Volkshilfe and the Jugendbund, came under the control of the 
Nazi party and its agents especially dispatched from East Prus­
sia. Inasmuch as all local organizations were placed under the 
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control of the dictator governments, the German Vereine were 
in reality the only "independent" organizations in the Baltic 
region. They did not hesitate to conduct civil-war maneuvers, 
undergo training in street warfare, travel to Germany for in­
struction, and entertain German Nazi officials. 
The governments of Smetona, Ulmanis, and Pats not only 
tolerated this disruptive activity, but also became themselves 
very much dependent on the German envoys, who began to 
assume the functions of Gauleiters. In Lithuania this took the 
form of yielding to the threats and blackmail of the Germans. 
In Estonia, and particularly in Latvia, it was done voluntarily 
and with evident satisfaction. Naturally so, since the Germans, 
Wilhelm Munters and Karl Selter, had become heads of the 
foreign ministries. These two statesmen, distinguished for ex­
traordinary activity, held the course of Baltic policy sternly 
oriented on Germany, but at the same time they ably pretended 
an attachment for the West. Munters even made his mark in 
the Council of the League of Nations and was chairman of one 
of its last sessions. He did not fail to use the Geneva tribune for 
pro-German propaganda, declaring in the summer of 1939 that 
a third of the population of Latvia spoke German. In this way 
the soil was cultivated for "peaceful" annexation. 
In May 1939 the Briviba (Freedom), organ of the Latvian 
Socialist party, wrote with alarm about the German occupa­
tion of Memel: "The greater part of our [Latvian] army as be­
fore is disposed along the frontiers with the U.S.S.R. and Po­
land, while only one division is garrisoned in Liepaja and 
Ventspils. No fortifications are being erected along the southern 
frontier of Latvia, although the German troops are now only 
twenty miles from the Latvian border. The first thing the Ger­
mans did was to build a highway from Klaipeda [Memel] to 
Palanga. Now their motorized units can, in a few hours, be at 
Liepaja. In case of a sudden German attack it will be impossi­
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ble to transfer our troops from Latgale to Vidzeme [Livonia]; 
while if Kurzeme [Kurland] is occupied general mobilization 
will be rendered impossible. Since Ulmanis does not concen­
trate our whole army in Kurzeme and Zemgale [Southern Kur­
land], the officers interpret this as a sign that the government 
does not intend to oppose the Germans. The officers also ask 
why the Seventh Siguldas and the Ninth Rezeknes infantry 
regiments are disposed at the very border of the U.S.S.R. Does 
this not mean they will be used to bar the way for the units of 
the Red Army that will hasten to the aid of Lithuania in case 
Germany attacks her?" 
On the days when Memel was being occupied, the com­
mander of the Latvian Army, General Berkis, together with 
the chief of staff, General Hartmanis, abandoned their posts 
and went off to Finland for maneuvers. A more demonstrative 
illustration of the course pursued by the Latvian army is the 
fact that during the Memel days the commander of the Liepaja 
garrison, which is the nearest frontier post to Germany, went 
off to Berlin, accepting Hitler's personal invitation to attend 
his birthday party. This officer, General Dankers, was pro­
moted to the rank of Quisling when the German troops occu­
pied Riga. It is obvious that the Germans had their henchmen 
hand-picked a long time in advance and were keeping them in 
storage. 
Very revealing was the conduct of the Latvian and Estonian 
governments during the Lithuanian crises of 1938-1939 when 
Poland and Germany in succession issued ultimatums demand­
ing territorial concessions from Lithuania. It became evident 
that when faced with the blunt coercion of neighboring Lithu­
ania, the Estonian and Latvian Fascist rulers had one concern 
only: to keep the people quiet, to prevent them from awaken­
ing to the magnitude of the danger, and to remove from their 
minds any idea of the need for the support of anti-Hitler forces. 
The Baltic Vichy Governments 105 
As the European crisis deepened, it became increasingly evi­
dent that the Baltic Fascist regimes had changed their pro­
tectors. Instead of England and Poland, Hitler had become 
their master. During the Moscow talks between England, 
France, and Russia, the U.S.S.R. demanded international guar­
antees for the Baltic countries against German aggression, 
whether internal or external. The Baltic governments fiercely 
opposed any such guarantees. At first sight it seemed inex­
plicable, for the issue was vital to the interests of England, 
whose influence in the Baltic after Versailles was incredibly 
great. It was also a matter of life or death for Poland, with 
whom the Baltic countries had had close political ties for many 
years. 
It turned out, however, that Ulmanis, Pats, and Smetona 
were on the inside track with Downing Street only as long 
as there was hostility toward Russia. During the Anglo-Russian 
talks these puppet governments suddenly conducted an "inde­
pendent" policy. The strings were pulled in Berlin, and perhaps 
by the Munichites in London. For many years Beck's Poland 
had been an "elder sister" in the Baltic capitals, and Polish 
militarists had taken the young armies of Latvia and Estonia 
under their wings. But no sooner was Poland in the position of 
seeking aid from Russia, than Polish influence abruptly ceased 
in Riga and Tallinn. The visit of Marshal Smigly-Rydz to Riga, 
planned for shortly before the war, did not come off, because 
Ulmanis opposed it. 
When the Moscow talks were at their height, Munters and 
Selter flew to Berlin and hastened to conclude an agreement 
with Germany (June 7, 1939), thus hurling an impudent chal­
lenge at the three great powers—U.S.S.R., England, and France. 
The Baltic diplomats played "va banc," and the card on which 
they bet was a Hitler victory. 
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OPPOSITION AND LAST EFFORTS AT SALVATION 
The Baltic region became essentially a German province. 
Everything was done to convert it into a military base for Ger­
man plans of aggression. From the Latvian, Lithuanian, and 
Estonian armies officers were purged if they were suspected of 
anti-German or pro-Russian sympathies. Fortifications were 
erected along the eastern frontiers, and German officers, in­
cluding General Haider, chief of the German general staff, 
arrived to inspect them. A huge field, Spilves Plava, near Riga 
was converted into an airdrome, ten times larger than was 
necessary for the paltry Latvian air force. German specialists 
supervised the work. 
With horror the population expected what appeared to be 
inevitable. Peasants could already hear the crack of the baron s 
whip. Officials, intellectuals, officers, all had a premonition that 
they would be reduced to the status of an outcast lower race. 
The workers sensed a life of convict labor driven by German 
overlords. Jews awaited pogroms and banishment with trepida­
tion. 
Opposition circles of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia made 
desperate efforts to keep the country from plunging into the 
abyss. The strength and organization of the opposition varied 
in all three countries. 
In Estonia the opposition centered in a small group of So­
cialist deputies, headed by Nigol Andresen, a group also in di­
rect contact with workers, nationalist intellectuals, and stu­
dents. Strong ties were developed with the best forces in the 
trade-union movement, with university circles, and with Left 
social workers like the writer Dr. Vares-Barbarus. Among them 
at this time were also certain bourgeois politicians, as, for in­
stance, the former chief of state, Professor Piip. 
In Latvia the opposition was more active and militant. The 
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people's front against Fascism had been formed by a fusion of 
three important forces: the Communist party, which, though 
illegal, had a firmly knit skeleton organization, the Socialist 
peasant-labor party, embracing those active elements which 
illegally kept alive the remnants of Social Democracy after its 
suppression in 1934, and finally individual Bourgeois Demo­
cratic intellectuals, technicians, and radical officials. 
These forces formed a coalition at a conference in Stock­
holm early in 1939 and formulated a political program, one 
platform of which was: "The only way for the Baltic countries 
to preserve their independence is to conduct a common strug­
gle against the Fascist aggressors, hand in hand with the peo­
ples of the U.S.S.R. The Red Army is the only real force 
capable of waging a successful struggle against the imperialist 
aggressions of Germany in eastern Europe. Under these cir­
cumstances only conscious traitors to their country can re­
nounce this sole and natural way of self-defense. An immediate 
guarantee pact with the U.S.S.R. on the joint defense of the 
frontiers of the Baltic states is mandatory." 1 
This position so clearly enunciated by the Latvian anti-
Fascist opposition was more or less the platform also of the op­
position circles in the other Baltic countries. But the forces of 
resistance were strong only potentially. In a determined effort 
to take the fate of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into their 
own hands, they might have upset the top-heavy dictator re­
gimes. However, the time granted the Baltic countries was 
running out. With dismay the opposition groups realized that 
they were losing the race against time. 
A momentary ray of hope flashed in Lithuania. Although 
democratic and labor opposition was weak and unorganized, 
outraged national feelings known as the "Memel and Vilna 
complex" were very powerful political factors. The people and 
the army felt a grievance against the dictator Smetona and 
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Premier Mironas for their capitulation to Hitler, who had de­
manded and had obtained Memel. 
For a long time before March 22, 1939, the Lithuanian gov­
ernment knew that Germany was preparing to deliver an ulti­
matum, and it resolved to yield without resistance. There­
fore, the population was informed about the cession of Memel 
only after the government had capitulated. 
During the decisive days alarming rumors circulated in 
Kaunas, but the press and radio were forbidden to report the 
events. The question of Memel was decided by the government 
at secret sessions to which even the higher officers and officials 
were not admitted. In this surreptitious manner the "national" 
dictatorship of Smetona, which had, in March 1938, capitulated 
to Poland, handed over to Hitler on a silver platter its only 
harbor into which 150,000,000 litas of public funds had been 
sunk and where not less than 70,000 Lithuanians resided. 
The situation created in Lithuania was analogous to that 
which developed later in Yugoslavia after the treachery of 
Stoiadinovich. The opposition parties, supported by the gen­
eral staff, compelled the Smetona government of Mironas to 
resign. It was replaced by a coalition government formed by 
General Cernius, chief of the general staff, and consisting of 
two generals, two deputies of the Populist party, the Liaudinin-
kai (party of the former premier Sliezevi£ius), two Christian 
Democrats, and two non-party officials. 
The new government emphatically declared its intention to 
oppose any further German claims and formally announced it* 
friendship with the U.S.S.R. The reform of the regime was, 
however, only half-hearted. A court revolution had taken place. 
Smetona remained as the president. Representatives from the 
pro-Fascist Christian Democrats, but none from the labor 
parties, entered the new government, which refused either to 
grant complete democratic freedom to the people or to mobilize 
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the citizens for the desperate struggle against Fascism. On the 
contrary, it sought to escape disaster through diplomatic dodges 
and compromise. 
Moreover, the development of a strong Baltic democratic 
opposition was also hampered, because in Latvia and Estonia 
the Fascist regimes survived, although their abject cajolery to 
wheedle German favors, even after neighboring Lithuania had 
been violated, cost them their last adherents among patriotic 
circles. 
The moment of decision was wanting in those forces which 
could have converted the Baltic countries into small demo­
cratic bastions supporting Russia and the Western democracies 
in their struggle against German Fascism. Power was in the 
hands of local dictators who were to become Quislings. The 
stanch Estonian democrat, Nigol Andresen, was banished to a 
desert island. A number of progressive Estonian deputies were 
arrested. In Latvia the political police made frequent raids on 
the illegal labor organizations, most of whose leaders were 
either arrested or driven abroad. Among those arrested were 
the former deputy, K. Lorencs, a well-known co-operative 
leader, together with many active young members of the move­
ment. Former Foreign Minister Cielens, leader of the Social 
Democrats; Rudevics, vice chairman of the Social Democratic 
faction in the Diet; Bruno Kalnins, chief of the anti-Fascist 
military organization, were exiled. The anti-German officers, 
Generals Robert Klavins and Robert Dambltis, Colonel Liel-
biksis, and others were dismissed. 
On April 29, 1939, the Paris paper, Le Temps, reported that 
the Soviet government had given a warning to the Baltic gov­
ernments, asking them to bear in mind that the independence 
of the Baltic states was essential to the vital interests of Russia. 
If the Baltic governments were to conclude agreements which 
nullify their independence, the U.S.S.R. would feel justified 
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in protecting her interests with every means at her disposal. 
In reply to this, when the Moscow talks were in full swing, on 
June 7, 1939, Munters and Selter concluded agreements with 
Germany. Chamberlain s England, which still held not a few 
commanding posts in the Baltic region, did not raise a finger 
to curb the impudent puppets. On the contrary, London used 
this ("it is impossible to guarantee a state against its will") as 
a pretext to reject the Soviet demands for guarantees to the 
Baltic states. The catastrophe developed normally. 
With a crash that reverberated for a long time afterward 
throughout uneasy Europe, the Moscow talks collapsed, having 
slipped on the banana peel of the "Baltic problem." Trailing a 
hearse bearing off the deceased collective security, a war chariot 
entered the scene, marking the advent of power policy, of which 
Frederick Schuman wrote: 
This familiar game has often been played for centuries. The 
rules are simple. Each player strives to increase his power and to en­
hance his 'prestige' which is nothing more than reputation for 
power. Since there is no central authority in the unruly family of 
nations to enforce justice and keep the peace, no rules save the 
'international law' of custom and treaty, and no police or courts 
to compel obedience to law, the players of necessity play against 
one another under the law (or lack of law) of anarchy. Hence force 
is the most effective tool of sovereignties in bending other sovereign­
ties to their will. The measure of power becomes the measure of a 
state's capacity to win its case in trial by battle. " 2 
We suggest an epitaph for the tombstone of the Fascist re­
gimes of Smetona, Ulmanis, and Pats: "The denouement of 
the great world drama which was performed during the Moscow 
talks in the summer of 1939 did not, of course, depend on these 
three puppets of Hitler. But within their means they did the 
best they could to help in the ruin of their own countries and 
of all Europe!" 
C H A P T E R  V I I  
The Baltic in the First Year 
of World War II 
THE GERMAN BREST-LITOVSK 
In 1927, twelve years before Soviet forces appeared in Baltic 
ports, the Latvian Foreign Minister Felix Cielens, a brilliant 
young Baltic diplomat, warned his compatriots: 
"If we permit any state hostile to Russia to establish its po­
litical influence in our territory, we can with mathematical cer­
tainty forecast political pressure from the East. If we permit 
such places as the terminals of Russian sea-bound railways, the 
harbors of Riga, Ventspils, Liepaja and the strategic islands of 
Osel and Dago to become bases for operations hostile to Rus­
sia, I say emphatically that under such circumstances counter-
operations from the East are inevitable. Russia will strive to 
eliminate influence hostile to herself and seek to establish her 
own political hegempny." 1 
After 1934 the Baltic dictator clique acted in every way to 
establish the political influence of a state hostile to Russia. By 
1939 the Baltic area was a German outpost, needing only a few 
finishing touches to become a modern system of fortifications 
suitable alike for defensive and offensive action. 
The growth of German influence led to correspondingly in-
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tensive counteraction by Russia. At the All-Union Congress of 
Soviets in Moscow in November 1936, Andrei A. Zhdanov, 
leader of the Leningrad Soviet, significantly declared: "We 
wish to live in peace with the Baltic peoples, but if these tiny 
countries allow big adventurers to use their territories for big 
adventures, we shall widen our little window on Europe with 
the help of the Red Army." 
This threat of the Soviets was carried out only after the lapse 
of three years, during which Russia exercised its diplomatic 
and political influence in every way to restrain the Baltic coun­
tries from entering the Hitlerite camp. 
The last attempt was made in the summer of 1939, during the 
Moscow talks. The international guarantee of the Baltic states 
against foreign and internal aggression, which in concrete 
terms merely meant the restoration of democratic parliamentary 
regimes headed by anti-German statesmen, appeared to be the 
ideal solution, providing both for defense of northeast Europe 
against German attack and for placing the independence of the 
Baltic states on a solid foundation, naturally in close military 
and political alliance with Russia. 
But neither the Baltic dictators nor the governments of 
Chamberlain and Daladier wanted it. The Moscow talks col­
lapsed, with the result that in Russia the Baltic question passed 
from the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to the Commissariat 
of Defense. 
The Soviet government ordered units of the Red Army to 
move into the Baltic area. The opening phase of the war with 
Germany had really begun. That the Germans offered no re­
sistance did not alter the situation. Retreat is one form of mili­
tary operation, remaining so even when conducted under the 
formal label of a nonaggression pact. In the Baltic area more 
than anywhere else it was clear that the cat of latent conflict 
was out of the bag sealed by the Russo-German Pact. 
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With the formal consent and sanction of Germany, the Soviet 
government peremptorily called representatives of the Baltic 
regimes to Moscow. Bereft of outside backing, they submitted 
without a murmur. At that moment Germany could not sup­
port them, because, interested in the maintenance of peace 
along her eastern frontiers, she conceded to a kind of Brest-
Litovsk in reverse. This time not the Russians but the Ger­
mans evacuated the Baltic area. 
Just as, following the earlier Brest-Litovsk, the Germans had 
in the surrendered territories begun to prepare for offensive 
operations against Russia, so now the Russians conversely ini­
tiated defensive operations obviously directed against Germany. 
On the quiet Germany and Russia closely watched each 
other. All was calm and proper on the surface. Every step was 
seemingly taken in mutual accord, with pardoning smiles and 
obeisance. However, only in western Europe and America, 
where influential circles sought to represent the Russo-German 
Pact as permanent and inviolable, were people misled by this 
dissimulation. 
The approaching crisis was clear to all in the Baltic countries. 
With sinking heart the population looked on, watching the 
main adversaries contend cautiously, as chess players who move 
toward the inevitable finale. 
THE GERMAN-RUSSIAN DUEL 
Both sides were well matched. As formerly, Germany acted 
through her pawns, the dummy governments of Smetona, Pats, 
and Ulmanis, who employed the only political cards left to 
them, anti-Semitism and the Soviet phobia felt by certain 
circles. 
Agitators suddenly appeared in Lithuania, Latvia, and Es­
tonia, assuring peasants that the Bolsheviks would take away 
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their land, would "confiscate" their wives and children. 
Wealthy urban folk were frightened with horrific accounts of 
the imminent Red terror. 
In Latvia and Lithuania police spies and government agents 
organized widespread anti-Semitic propaganda. In Latvia, the 
government hurried to pass a series of anti-Semitic decrees. 
Jews were barred from entry into large urban centers. For Jews 
to acquire real estate was verboten, while in Lithuania's newly 
restored Vilnius (Vilna) Jews were mobbed and slaughtered by 
the Lithuanian police and Polish Fascist hoodlums, who staged 
a savage pogrom, an outrage unheard of in the Baltic area, al­
though pogroms were notorious in Poland and the czarist 
Ukraine. 
Until World War I the Baltic peoples, especially the Latvians 
and Estonians, were quite free of anti-Semitism. In those 
regions where the peasantry was wholly literate and the na­
tional struggle was headed by labor parties, no police stratagems 
could create a wave of anti-Semitism. In 1906, the year of dark­
est reaction, although roving bands of hooded police and anti-
Semitic "Black Hundreds" organized massacres of Jews through­
out Russia, they failed to do so in areas inhabited by Latvians 
or Estonians. No sooner did a rumor spread that czarist lynchers 
were en route to some Latvian town, than the whole popula­
tion rose en masse against them. In repeated clashes the Latvian 
and Jewish people usually gave a good account of themselves 
and administered a sound thrashing to the cowardly mob of 
bloodthirsty marauders. 
After the independent Baltic states were established, reac­
tionary circles began to encourage anti-Semitism by artificial 
stimulation, for want of better arguments in political dispute. 
Certain student groups were victimized by this agitation. Anti-
Semitic excesses became more frequent in the universities of 
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Riga and Kaunas. In Latvia a Fascist anti-Semitic organization, 
Perkonkrusts (Swastika), was set up to promote Jew-baiting on 
the streets of Riga. But its activity was paralyzed by the opposi­
tion of the Riga Latvian labor unions. In a short time the 
Latvian capital and provincial towns were cleared of this evil, 
because members of workers' athletic societies stood guard. On 
occasion violence flared up with an exchange of gunfire on the 
streets. 
After Fascism had established itself, anti-Semitic ruffianism 
gave way to a calculated official policy of economic pogroms. 
Later, when the Fascists saw their end approaching, they staged 
outrageous massacres to distract the public and demoralize , the 
growing opposition. 
But all their efforts proved vain, for the opposition was en­
couraged by the presence of Red Army men, who had removed 
the immediate threat of German intervention. In Lithuania 
and Estonia the dictator regimes relaxed their grips, presenting 
an ever-weakening resistance to the restoration of democratic 
freedom. In Latvia, however, the Ulmanis dictatorship re­
mained strong. The Riga police opened fire on workers' dem­
onstrations held in honor of the Red Army men. There were 
casualties in killed and wounded. Although evidently indig­
nant at this outrage, the Red Army men remained unmoved. 
Their orders were not to interfere in the internal affairs of the 
Baltic states. 
The unarmed workers, peasants, and minority groups whom 
the Fascists had fired upon under the very eyes of the Red army 
men were dumbfounded. Whispers began to circulate against 
the Soviet Union, which in the name of formality declined to 
assist progressive circles struggling against the Fascist hench­
men Ulmanis, Pats, and Smetona. All was in vain. In Sep­
tember 1939 the Red Army had entered the Baltic area not to 
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implant a new order, but to defend strategic approaches to the 
U.S.S.R. The internal political struggle was, therefore, outside 
the sphere of its activity. 
But the Russians naturally kept a vigilant watch on all hostile 
intrigues and on every internal movement that might prove of 
military importance. Moreover, they strove also to win favor 
among the mass of the population. Unlike the Germans, who 
never ceased to regard the ruling Fascist cliques as their main­
stay, the Russians from the very first day staked their hopes on 
the people. 
The billeting of Red Army units in Baltic ports and other 
points contributed greatly toward winning public sympathy 
for the U.S.S.R. The population of the Baltic countries had 
heard much about the "vicious Bolsheviks" and the "Asiatic 
Russians." Now the people were face to face with Russian 
officers and soldiers, finding them to be good-natured fellows 
deeply attached to their Socialist fatherland and with a hatred 
for Hitlerism no less vehement than that of the Baltic people. 
Nor had the Red Army ceased its preparations for the struggle 
against Fascism, even during the "peace that fostered revenge 
in its bosom," as the Russians aptly called the Russo-German 
Pact of August 22, 1939. 
The local inhabitants were pleased with the deportment of 
the Red Army men, who, according to eyewitness reports, acted 
modestly, making no effort to impress the public with a show of 
force. They acted courteously, petted the children, and never 
permitted any rudeness to women. 
The Soviet government, however, never overlooked the Ger­
man danger. It took steps to eliminate the known fifth column 
among the local Germans. As a result of semicompulsory evac­
uation from the Baltic, 53,000 Germans left Latvia, 12,000 left 
Estonia, and 50,000 left Lithuania. By this measure the Rus­
sians killed two birds at once. They removed the outright Nazis 
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and at the same time rendered an inestimable service to the 
local inhabitants, ridding them of the hated progeny of Ger­
man barons. For this "favor" the Latvians and Estonians par­
doned many transgressions of the Bolsheviks. Even though be­
lated, it was repayment for an old account of long-standing 
violence with interest compounded over seven hundred years. 
The heritage of arrogant depredation handed down from the 
Teutonic black knights to generation after generation of local 
German tyrants was avenged. 
THE RUSSIANS STRIKE FIRST 
But the danger lay not in Germans alone. For with time the 
German "internal aggression" had borne its fruits, and in all 
the Baltic countries strong pro-Hitler forces were still holding 
government positions. As ever, they looked with hope to Ger­
many and were preparing for the hour when the inevitable 
clash would occur, making their treachery again an asset to their 
patrons in Berlin. 
The disposition of the higher administration in the Baltic 
area was well expressed by the chairman of the Kaunas Cham­
ber of Justice when he declared: "If the Germans come, they 
will destroy the Lithuanian nation, but leave our houses and 
property intact, while the Soviets will leave the Lithuanian 
nation intact, but confiscate our houses and property. I prefer 
the former." 
In January 1940 the chiefs of staff of the Latvian and Es­
tonian armies, General N. Rozensteins and Colonel A. Jackson, 
respectively, exchanged visits, for undisclosed reasons. In June 
1940 a Baltic congress was convened in Tallinn to discuss the 
problem of a Baltic federation. Behind the scenes Finns were 
active. 
Tension mounted. The Baltic countries stood still, watch­
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ing the silent duel of the giants. Their fate depended on the 
outcome and they knew that behind the pro-Fascist govern­
ments stood Germany. 
The Russians struck the first decisive blow. It was rumored 
they had forestalled the Germans only by a few days or even 
hours. The words of Premier Gedvilas passed from lip to lip 
in Lithuania, to the effect that on the day before Hitler's troops 
in conspiracy with the Smetona government were to have en­
tered Lithuania, the pro-Fascists were ousted and a people's 
government installed. This may be merely dramatization, but 
one thing is certain—Hitler had no intention of giving up 
Lithuania even after he was obliged to reconcile himself tem­
porarily to letting the rest of the Baltic slip from his hands. 
The best evidence of this is that he postponed by every pretext 
the date set for evacuating Germans from Lithuania. 
It happened at the time when the French front collapsed. 
Nobody could predict which way the Germans would choose to 
move. Rather than take further risks, the Russians decided not 
to tolerate pro-Fascist regimes any longer. Strong warnings 
were given to these governments. Soviet tanks rumbled through 
the frontier posts, rushing to enter the capitals of the Baltic 
states. This served as a signal for the popular opposition. It be­
came clear at once that without the support of Germany the 
"iron" Fascist regimes were powerless. No sooner had the 
U.S.S.R. withdrawn its objections to a change of government, 
than the long-standing Fascist regimes collapsed like a house of 
cards. Even the average Baltic citizens were somewhat sur­
prised to see how widespread the opposition was, coming not 
only as expected from illegal or semilegal Socialists, Com­
munists, and united-front groups. The opposition was also vig­
orously supported by the nationally minded bourgeoisie, intel­
lectuals, and even military officers. 
The new people's governments of Premier Gedvilas in Lithu­
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ania, Professor Kirchensteins in Latvia, and Dr. Vares in Es­
tonia bore no resemblance to local administrations set up by 
occupation authorities. Both in composition and mass support 
they were typical democratic coalition governments of the peo­
ple's front type. 
BOLSHEVISM—THROUGH NATIONALISM AND ATTACHMENT TO THE 
LAND 
The small Baltic countries went through a profound crisis. 
The old tenor of life, the economic and political system, were 
all radically and irrevocably changed. It would be a mistake 
to regard this break-up as simply the result of military occupa­
tion, which naturally exerted a certain pressure. But the mere 
presence of Soviet troops alone cannot explain the immediate 
response of the huge public majority which supported the new 
government and accepted the changes as inevitable and neces­
sary. Not only could public elections be held without hindrance; 
the new government also had at its disposal an administrative 
and even military apparatus. With resistance limited to isolated 
instances, terrorist measures were hardly necessary. Behind the 
new government stood all the labor elements, the intelligentsia, 
and part of the bourgeoisie, motivated by national no less than 
social aspirations. 
The threat of a German invasion had hung for years over 
the Baltic countries. Meanwhile, events in Europe and the 
criminal, suicidal policy of the Baltic dictators had blocked 
every road of national salvation except that associated with loss 
of independence. The Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians 
faced the dilemma: either Germany or Russia. They chose Rus­
sia. The choice was made not only by workers who shared the 
social viewpoint of the Soviets. It was made, as well, by peasants 
in the face of prospects of collectivization, and by propertied 
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classes, to whom the new regime signified loss of social status. 
Overriding all these social and political prejudices was the fear 
of Hitler tyranny and the desire to preserve their national 
existence and national culture. 
In Baltic countries, where the peasantry forms a majority of 
the population, peasant aspirations cannot be ignored with im­
punity, and the local peasants knew that the former Baltic 
German barons, whose estates had been divided among them by 
the postrevolutionary reform, would once again return in the 
baggage trains of Hitler's invading troops. It can be said that 
the Baltic area was led to Bolshevism by the national self-con­
sciousness of the people and by the peasants' attachment to their 
land. 
The almost unanimous preference of most Latvians, Lithu­
anians, and Estonians to lean on and even merge with the 
U.S.S.R. is more deeply rooted in the local economy, which 
had been stagnating in a permanent crisis. The peasantry either 
lived from hand to mouth or, among the well-to-do, was always 
imperiled by the prospective loss of foreign markets and bank­
ruptcy. Workers could not even dream of improving their lot 
in the decaying Baltic industry. The intelligentsia and young 
people languished as a result of unemployment, despondency, 
and the lack of anything big to do. In detaching the Baltic peo­
ples from Russia, the Versailles Treaty did them a bad turn. 
"The big idea" was to carve out the Baltic "lungs" from Bol­
shevist Russia. But big Russia learned to breathe even without 
the Baltic ports, while these "lungs," the Baltic states, carved 
from the body which nourished them, were left to decompose 
on the sands by the Baltic seaside. 
In the post-Versailles period many political, national, and so­
cial obstacles stood in the way of a Baltic rapprochement with 
Russia. But once they had been removed by the sweep of his­
toric events, the Baltic people, in particular the workers, the 
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urban and rural youth, and the intellectuals wanted to become 
fully merged forever with the mighty organism from which they 
could obtain vital nourishment and connections opening up 
perspectives of constructive labor and growth. 
WHO'S WHO IN THE SOVIET BALTIC 
The new statesmen in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia proved 
to be old acquaintances for all who remembered the leading 
figures and factions of the parliamentary period in the Baltic 
republics. 
If the solidity of the administrative and state apparatus was 
surprising, the composition of the top-flight ruling circles in 
the new Soviet regimes proved wholly unexpected. Leadership 
was exercised not *by deputies of the official Communist parties, 
as might be thought, but by the most prominent statesmen of 
the earlier parliamentary regimes, Bourgeois Democratic and 
Social Democratic writers, journalists, scientists, and co-opera­
tive leaders. 
This does not mean that the Communist party was weak. In 
all three Baltic countries, though illegal during twenty years, 
even under the democratic regimes, the Communist party had 
survived. Despite repression and the constant loss of its best 
members, who invariably found themselves consigned to con­
vict labor, the Communist party in the Baltic area retained its 
organized solidarity and considerable vitality. 
After the change of government Communists were released 
from prison, some of them having been confined for six, eight, 
and ten years. They were naturally glorified in party circles. 
Moreover, the Maximalist mood, the thirst for power and in­
tolerance of anything alien, was no less strongly developed in 
the Baltic Communist party than in any other illegal move­
ment. 
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One might expect that these people would now get their 
inning. Under both democratic and Fascist regimes they had 
known the bitterness of dungeon life, had hungered for ret­
ribution through long years of (desperate, often hopeless, strug­
gle. Now they would take everything in hand, become dicta­
torial, and impatiently push through their own policy. 
But it did not happen that way in the Baltic. In composition 
the new government and the leading circles generally were in a 
singular way the successors of the old parliamentary regimes 
which had existed in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia until they 
were suppressed by Smetona and Voldemaras in Lithuania 
(1927), by Pats in Estonia (1934), and by Ulmanis in Latvia 
('934)-
The Soviet governments in the Baltic states would have 
corresponded, let us say, in France to a cabinet of Herriot, 
Blum, and Torrez with de Gaulle included; in Czechoslovakia 
to a cabinet of BeneS with Social Democrats, Communists, and 
some higher officers included. 
Such was the Soviet government created in the Baltic states 
upon their entry into the U.S.S.R. Herriot, Blum, Benes, de 
Gaulle at the head of Soviet governments—the sensation is easy 
to imagine. But if analogous regimes arose in the Baltic area 
without even "making the headlines," it was merely because the 
Baltic states are hard to discern on the map of Europe. The 
names of Baltic statesmen mean nothing to the European or 
American reader. People have hazy notions about two or three 
dictators, and only because these men in their time spent con­
siderable sums from the state budget for personal advertisement 
abroad. 
The parliamentary regimes did not re-emerge identically in 
all the Baltic countries. Where the Fascist intermezzo was too 
prolonged, few of the well-known democratic statesmen sur­
vived in the public memory. But in Latvia, for example, where 
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the Fascist regime was relatively short-lived, out of thirty per­
sons who composed the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the 
Latvian Socialist Soviet Republic and its Council of People's 
Commissars, only seven were originally Communists; of these, 
three were former deputies of the democratic Diet, and one was 
Andrejs Upitis, recognized as modern Latvia's most distin­
guished writer. The remaining twenty-three were prominent 
Bourgeois Democratic or Social Democratic parliamentarians, 
journalists, scientists, and technicians. 
Former democratic party circles were least influential in 
Lithuania, the first Baltic country to go Fascist. There the 
parliament had been crushed before it even developed. During 
the long intervening years of Fascism the country had forgot­
ten its former parliamentary leaders. 
If it was easy in Latvia and Estonia for the new power to 
determine the degree of public confidence given to one or an­
other leader, it was most difficult in Lithuania. The test in 
Latvia and Estonia was the political activity of persons and 
parties during the earlier democratic regime, the degree to 
which they opposed the Fascist regimes, and, above all, the re­
sistance they offered to German penetration in the Baltic. In 
Lithuania this measure could not be employed, because 
Fascism had had time to break down almost the entire fabric 
of public life. Moreover, the Memel and Vilna disputes there 
had shuffled the cards of the international setting, so that the 
dividing line between anti-German and anti-Soviet forces was 
not so clearly defined as in Latvia and Estonia. 
In Lithuania, therefore, the Soviet power had to feel its way, 
seeking collaborators. According to a rather trite but neverthe­
less demonstrative anecdote, one criterion employed to de­
termine whether one or another candidate for a leading post in 
Lithuania could be trusted was to examine the dossier filed on 
him by the former secret political intelligence office. If the 
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person was under suspicion or on the blacklists of the former 
Fascist pro-German government, he could expect to be well 
received by the new government. 
But even in Lithuania the Soviet government was not formed 
of unknown Communists formerly repressed. Widely repre­
sented in it were well-known popular democrats, army officers, 
writers, who had been able to remain personally independent 
of the former regime. Among the writers were Justas Paleckis, 
Lithuania's most brilliant journalist, and Ludas Gyra, seer of 
Lithuanian literature, known throughout the country. During 
the more than twenty years of independent Lithuania s exist­
ence, under every regime, Gyra's portrait embellished the covers 
of official student notebooks distributed to pupils in the state 
schools. 
In Estonia, both during the transition period and later in 
the Soviet republic, the new power was formed of persons who 
represented the most respectable and influential democratic 
parties of the country. 
Various government posts were held by Social Democrats, 
whose deputies in the parliament were headed by Nigol Andre-
sen, Minister of Foreign Affairs and later People's Commissar 
for Public Education. A leading spirit of the new regime, An-
dresen has remained head of the Estonian people's organized 
resistance against the German occupation. Together with the 
entire government of the Estonian Soviet republic he is now 
in Moscow. 
As a personality Andresen merits attention. A son-in-law of 
Martna, "father of Estonian freedom," he has always been 
revered in Estonia. In Scandinavia and Finland as well, he is 
widely acclaimed as a champion of Estonian democracy. Dur­
ing the days of the Pats dictatorship, Socialist Deputy Andresen 
was deprived of his salary as a form of repression. Despite ex­
treme hardships, he continued to wage an active struggle, or­
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ganizing workers, publishing literature on his own small means, 
sending information to the western European and Scandinavian 
Socialist press. Repeatedly Pats sought to do away with this 
indomitable fighter against Fascism. More than once Andresen 
was repressed; the last time he was banished by the government 
to a desert island. 
Also among the new Soviet ruling circles was Doctor Vares-
Barbarus, a typical representative of the highly cultured rural 
intellectuals in Estonia. A national poet and country doctor, 
Vares-Barbarus enjoyed the complete trust and esteem of the 
peasants in his native province, where he lived during these 
twenty years. 
If the groups on which the Estonian Soviet republic was 
erected be roughly compared to those composing the democrat­
ically elected Riigikogu (Estonian Diet), it becomes evident that 
had the new government required a vote of confidence from 
the old democratic parliament it could certainly have mustered 
forty to fifty per cent of the votes. From 1922 to 1932, of the 
one hundred deputies in the parliament twenty-five were Social 
Democrats, ten were of the Labor Party, and six were of the 
independent workers' group, which stood close to the Com­
munists. In the parliament of 1932-1934, the last one before the 
rise of Fascism, twenty-three deputies were of the national 
middle party, which was a union of Piip's labor party with 
other central parties, twenty-two were Social Democrats led by 
Andresen and Rei, while five were Left workers. 
The succession of regimes was even more marked in Latvia, 
where the Fascist period had only been short-lived (1934-
1940), and where the former democratic parties, especially the 
Social Democrats, had in close collaboration with the illegal 
Communist groups continued to carry on an incessant struggle 
against the Fascist regime. 
The top leadership of Soviet Latvia is essentially a coalition 
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government, which both by party membership and by the in­
dividual prominence of deputies could have obtained a vote 
of confidence in the former parliament. 
The president, Doctor Augusts Kirchensteins, later also 
chairman of the Supreme Soviet; the chairman of the Council 
of People's Commissars, Vilis Lacis; and the People's Commissar 
for Public Education, Julijs Lacis, were associated with the 
editorial board of Jaunakas Zinas (Latest News), Latvia's most 
widely read bourgeois newspaper and organ of what was called 
the democratic center. Although it had only six deputies in the 
last democratic Diet, the democratic center wielded far greater 
influence in the country through its newspaper. This party, by 
the way, gave Latvia its first state president, Janis Cakste. 
The Social Democrats, who formed the strongest faction of 
the parliament during all the years of Latvia's existence—always 
having twenty-one to thirty deputies among the total one hun­
dred—gave all-out support to the Soviet Latvian regime. The 
Social Democrats in the government's ruling circles were A. 
Rudevics, the party's vice president; A. Busevics, the party's 
financial and economic leader as well as former mayor of 
Liepaja; the engineer, J. Jagars, one of Riga s municipal lead­
ers; Bruno Kalnins, the Social Democratic leader best known 
abroad and head of the party's military and sports organization. 
The Minister of Justice in the people's government and later 
a member of the Presidium of the Latvian Supreme Soviet was 
Juris Paberzs, a prominent member of the former magistracy 
and leader of the party of Latgallian progressives * which had 
four deputies in the old Diet. Repeatedly, Paberzs held the post 
of Minister, including that of Minister of Justice in one of 
Ulmanis's cabinets. 
Representatives of the Russian, Polish, and Jewish minor­
ities, who together held not less than ten mandates in the for-
* Peasant Party of Latgale, the Catholic region of Latvia. 
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mer parliament, supported the new government without reser­
vation. 
Finally, the Soviet government coalition was naturally backed 
by the worker-peasant faction of the old Diet, where it held 
seven seats. The members of this faction, through which Com­
munist workers found parliamentary representation, together 
with a few party leaders, comprised also the Communist stratum, 
but only a stratum, of the new power in Soviet Latvia. 
A splendid characterization of the rulers in Soviet Latvia 
from the viewpoint of their democratic conviction and party 
membership has been given by none other than A. Bilmanis, 
the former Latvian Minister to Washington. In his article, 
"Recent Events in Latvia," which appeared in the Information 
Bulletin issued by the Latvian Legation in Washington,2 Bil­
manis describes the persons whom he is now trying to slander 
and misrepresent as vicious Communists with daggers in their 
teeth, as follows: 
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs ad interim: Dr. 
Augusts Kirchensteins; born September 18, 1872, in Mazsalaca, 
Latvia; studied in Valtenberg elementary school, Mazsalaca parish 
school, the Alexander high school in Riga and the Veterinary Insti­
tute of Dorpat; was involved in the Latvian revolt for freedom in 
• 1905 and therefore emigrated abroad; in 1919 was made associate 
professor of the University of Latvia, from 1923 to 1939 was professor 
of microbiology in the University of Latvia, since 1939 has been 
professor of agricultural microbiology and of cattle diseases in the 
Academy of Agriculture; was also Chief of the Veterinary Adminis­
tration of the Latvian army and director of the Latvian serum sta­
tion, has studied specifically problems of microbiology, bacteriology, 
and cattle diseases; since 1903 has written numerous articles and 
books on questions of bacteriology, vitamins, national health, et 
cetera; organized the magazine Tautas Veseliba [National Health] 
and now edits this section in the Jaunakas Zinas, the largest news­
paper in Latvia; has been decorated with the Latvian Order of 
Three Stars and with several foreign decorations. 
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Minister of War: General Roberts Dambltis; bom May 2, 1881, 
in Trikata, Latvia; after graduating from the Trikata parish school 
entered the Vilna Army Cadet School and later graduated from the 
Petrograd Military Academy of Intendancy; participated in the 
World War as an officer of the Latvian Rifles; is one of the founders 
of the National Association of Latvian Soldiers and was its presi­
dent in 1918; was the first soldier to enlist in the army of the newly 
proclaimed Latvian Republic and in 1918 organized its Ministry 
of Defense; was appointed Superintendent of the Ministry of De­
fense and later Assistant Minister of Defense; in 1919 commanded 
the Latvian reserve forces of the southern front against the army 
of Bermondt-Avalov; from 1920 to 1924 was Chief of the Supplies 
Administration of the Latvian army and later was appointed As­
sistant Chief of Staff; has been decorated with the Latvian Military 
Order of Lacplesis and the Order of Three Stars, and the Polish 
Order Polonia Restituta. 
Minister of Interior: Vilis Lacis; born May 12, 1904, in Mangali, 
Latvia; graduated from the Daugavgriva parish school and the Bar-
naula normal school; is one of the best-known modern writers of 
Latvia, being the author of such works as Fisherman's Son, Ances­
tor's Call, Old Seamen's Nest, and others. 
Minister of Public Relations: Peteris Blauss; born August 23, 
1900, in Engli, Latvia; graduated from the Ribielt high school and 
the Latvian Military Academy and studied architecture in the 
University of Latvia; participated in Latvia's war for independence; 
is an officer of the Latvian National Guard; for several years has 
been chief editor of the Jaunakas Zinas, Latvia's largest newspaper; 
has been decorated with the Latvian Order of Three Stars and the 
Order of Vesthardus. 
Minister of Social Welfare and Minister of Education ad interim: 
Julijs Lacis; born December 25, 1892, in Ledurga, Latvia; studied 
in the high school of the well-known Latvian patriot Kenins in 
Riga, the Nicholas Institute in Petrograd, the Riga Polytechnicum, 
and the University of Latvia; graduated from the Journalistic De­
partment of the ficole des Hautes Etudes Sociales in Paris; was for­
eign correspondent of the newspaper Jaunakas Zinas and recently 
has been chief editor of the magazine Atputa \Rest\\ has written 
several plays, a novel, and a collection of poems. 
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Minister of Justice and Minister of Finance ad interim: Juris 
Paberzs; born July 17, 1891, in Kalupe, Latvia; studied law in the 
University of Petrograd; was a member of the Latvian Constitu­
tional Assembly and a member of the Saejma [Latvian Parliament]; 
Minister without Portfolio in 1927; Minister of Justice from 1929 
to 1931; Minister of Social Welfare in 1934; up to the present time 
has been Vice-President of the Daugavpils District Court. 
Minister of Communications: Janis Jagars; technical engineer 
and well-known Latvian public worker; formerly chief of the De­
partment of Communications of the City of Riga. 
Commander-in-Chief of the Army: General Roberts Klavins; born 
November 10, 1885, in Grasi, Latvia; graduated from the Vilna 
Army Cadet School and studied in the Nicholas Military Academy; 
during the World War was Commander of the Latvian Rifles; 
joined the National Army of the New Latvian Republic on Novem­
ber 18, 1918; in 1919 was sent to Denmark as military specialist of 
the Latvian government; was chief of staff of the Frontier Guard 
Division and commander of the Valmiera Regiment; has been deco­
rated with the Latvian Military Order of Lacplesis. 
As a general characteristic of the new ruling group, Mr. 
Bilmanis found it necessary to say the following: 
In view of the rumors carried by the foreign press it must be 
emphasized that the new government, although friendly toward 
Soviet Russia, is not Communistic in any sense of the word and not 
a single cabinet minister is a Communist. 
A BRIDGE TO EUROPE 
An analysis of Soviet policy in the Baltic following the 
German Brest-Litovsk of 1939, makes clearly evident two under­
lying motives: One aim was to warm the cooling ardor of col­
laboration between Russia, Great Britain, and the United States. 
The other aim—quite in keeping with the desires of the Baltic 
nations, which were exhausted by economic vegetation in the 
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backyard of world economy—was to incorporate the anemic 
Baltic economy in the fast-growing organism of the U.S.S.R. 
During the early stages of Soviet penetration into the Baltic in 
1939, the first-mentioned trend was uppermost. 
Although garrisons were established at designated strategic 
points, these were elementary defensive measures, because the 
Russians, already rich in territory and population, did not aim 
simply at the annexation of the Baltic states to the U.S.S.R. In 
a military sense their aims were much wider. Incorporated in 
Russia the Baltic served as what Peter the Great called "a win­
dow on Europe," very necessary to Russia in peacetime, but of 
questionable value if Russia was isolated in time of war. The 
U.S.S.R. needed greater security and envisaged the Baltic as a 
"bridge to Europe." In this light the Soviet government raised 
the Baltic problem during the Moscow negotiations, proposing 
that the Baltic area become a mutual-defense zone where Red 
tanks would operate jointly with the British navy and Allied 
air forces. Although this proposal had to be abandoned after 
the failure of the Moscow talks, the Russians continued with 
characteristic persistence but with waning hopes to work in a 
circuitous fashion for the establishment of such a zone of 
mutual defense. 
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland were viewed as po­
litical intermediaries between Russia and the democratic West. 
The military front against German aggression was to be estab­
lished through mutual-defense treaties and given the necessary 
strength through Soviet garrisons stationed in the Baltic. Obvi­
ously, in forging such a chain of defense, Finland was a key 
link, not only strategically but also politically, being a country 
with a democratic form of government and excellent interna­
tional connections in Scandinavia, in western Europe, and even 
in the United States. 
From this standpoint the maintenance of completely inde­
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pendent Baltic states was a trump card for the U.S.S.R., because 
it would allay apprehension in Finland and Scandinavia and 
make a favorable impression on public opinion in western 
Europe and the United States. Moreover, Baltic independence 
would be regarded with favor in the Balkans, where the Rus­
sians could reap benefits from the encouragement given to the 
local bourgeois democratic and peasant classes. 
Accordingly, after the Bolsheviks had established their gar­
risons in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, they pursued without 
deviation and with rigid formality a policy designed to attain 
the desired zone of defense. 
To avoid provoking violent demonstrations of pro-Soviet 
feeling, the Russian garrisons behaved with exemplary modesty, 
holding aloof from the local population. In Baltic domestic 
affairs this policy of noninterference was actually carried to ex­
tremes. The Fascist, anti-Soviet governments of Smetona, Ul-
manis, and Pats remained in office, and their dictatorial rule 
continued unmolested. 
Lacking popular support, these dictator governments sat un­
easily in power. The Russians could have upset them without 
exertion, merely by encouraging the popular pro-Soviet demo­
crats and labor leaders, who had been driven underground. 
But the Russians maintained a hands-off policy. They even 
warned their sympathizers against the use of force. The Red 
Army was not to be employed in political reform. Such changes 
as occurred must be the fruit of ripened public opinion and be 
carried through with the observance of every democratic for­
mality. The U.S.S.R. actually applied this policy against the 
ardent hopes of the democratic opposition in Lithuania, Latvia, 
and Estonia, which had regarded the Red troops as their poten­
tial liberators from hateful Fascist oppression. 
Nor was this policy inconsistent with Soviet aims in general. 
It was a specific example of the ultrarealistic attitude assumed 
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by the U.S.S.R. in their foreign policy as a whole. The issues 
at stake were too important, the dangers menacing the U.S.S.R. 
too great for them to risk wrecking the last hopes of an anti-
Hitler encirclement by pursuing a minor goal such as accelera­
tion of socio-political changes in the Baltic states. 
Today we can readily understand why the Russians placed 
major emphasis in the policy of halting or isolating Hitler ag­
gression. At the time, however, all their efforts were in vain. 
The Soviet "bridge to Europe" was left suspended, a Soviet 
bridgehead only, without supports elsewhere in the West. Soviet 
policy in the Baltic states was thus undermined, even mali­
ciously misrepresented, by foreign correspondents; one, for 
example, was Donald Day.* 
The death blow was struck by Finland. The Russo-Finnish 
War put an end to this variant of an anti-Fascist front, the last 
effort made to set up a democratic front before Europe was 
plunged into the darkness of Fascist occupation. Thus, the 
fate of any independent existence for the Baltic states was 
sealed. 
Minus Finland, the Baltic could not serve as a mutual-
defense zone for joint anti-Fascist operations carried out by the 
East and the West. Minus Finland, the Baltic became an ex­
posed salient of the U.S.S.R. This new development determined 
the course of subsequent Soviet policy. The Baltic bastion must 
necessarily be consolidated militarily, politically, and adminis­
tratively. If previously the Russians had not desired to annex 
the Baltic area, annexation now became an urgent military 
necessity, intensified by the catastrophic outcome of "the phony 
war" in the West. Not until then, not until France was on the 
run, did the U.S.S.R. give the signal to act, setting into motion 
the latent opposition forces within the Baltic states. To these 
• Baltic correspondent for the Hearst papers, who has since joined Manner, 
heim's army as a volunteer. 
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forces, the overthrow of the Fascists was the realization of old 
and cherished dreams. Moreover, the Baltic internal opposition 
attached major importance to the stabilizing of the economic 
life of their respective states. Soviet military and diplomatic 
calculations were secondary in their minds. 
Responsibility for the loss of independence suffered by the 
Baltic states, regarded by some persons as a great calamity, 
should not be misplaced. It lies with the Western democracies 
which declined to unite with the U.S.S.R. for the common de­
fense of the Baltic. The coup de grace was administered by 
Finland, by that same "little, heroic Finland" whose cause was 
so ardently espoused by many sincere democrats in all coun­
tries. Their admiration and labors on Finland's behalf have 
been disdainfully spurned by their own protege, now a mem­
ber of "the international gang of robbers, murderers, and in­
cendiaries." 
To avoid further rude awakenings, these sincere democrats 
could, with profit, ponder the reasons why Finland failed to 
play the role in which the Soviet plans of the Litvinov collec­
tive security policy would have cast her. 
C H A P T E R  V I I I  
Finland: Legend and Reality 
FINLAND AND RUSSIA 
According to a simplified version of Russo-Finnish relations, 
Russia is Finland's perpetual enemy, regardless of the Russian 
regime in power or the policy pursued, and the Finns are so 
welded together by a common hatred of Russia and Russians 
that they will accept any allies in their anti-Russian struggle. 
This version is the more readily believed because of Fin­
land's political evolution during recent decades, and because 
the historical record generally lends itself to such interpreta­
tion. Ever since Finland was annexed to Russia in 1809 by 
agreement with Napoleon, the Finns have actively opposed 
Russian domination. A century after annexation in 1918, Fin­
nish leaders called the Germans in to assist their struggle 
against what they termed "the Russian influence" in Finland. 
Moreover, throughout the past two decades the Finnish out­
look has been markedly anti-Russian, although Soviet diplomacy 
has maintained a constant friendly attitude and never has 
wearied of reminding the world that Lenin was the first world 
statesman to recognize Finland as an independent small na­
tion. Yet in 1939, when international guarantees extremely 
advantageous to Finnish interests were offered, Finland con-
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sistently declined every offer because Russia was one of the 
guarantors. Rather than accept the mutual guarantees, Finland 
preferred to wage war against her great neighbor. Again in 
1941, although exhausted by one war, Finland allied herself 
with Hitlerite Germany for the "crusade" against Russia. 
Such being the record, it is not surprising that even the most 
serious students of the Finnish question are prone to view the 
problem in the light of this "historical and innate" hostility 
which Finland has toward everything that suggests the Russian 
spirit or savors of Russia. This interpretation, like all versions 
which summarize complex political relations in a simple 
black-and-white pattern, ignores many essential facts, with a 
resultant distortion of reality and misleading conclusions. 
A careful survey of Finland's historical development as it 
bears on her relations with Russia discloses that Finnish policy 
was determined by mutually conflicting influences and cross­
currents of history which, at every turning point, were reflected 
in the differing attitude of various social groups in Finland. 
Moreover, Finnish sentiment for and against Russia has shifted, 
and the differentiated attitude of various Finnish groups has 
varied at different periods in a manner as sharply defined as 
were corresponding social and political changes in Russia itself. 
During the first period of Russian domination in Finland, as 
in all Baltic states, Russian czarism was the welcome guest and 
protector of the ruling classes, a circumstance which determined 
Finnish public sentiment for or against Russia. Finnish nobles, 
despite their Swedish descent and culture, believed reasonably 
enough that their interests would be better guarded under 
dominion of the czar of Russian landowners than under aegis 
of Swedish burghers. History confirmed the belief. Up to the 
reign of the last czar, Nicholas II, who attempted to Russify 
the Finns, Finland was to all intents and purposes ruled by the 
native Swedish aristocracy. For the most part, Russian author­
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ities observed the autonomy which had been granted Finland 
in 1809. But the meaning of this autonomy lay precisely in the 
fact that once and for all Finland had been handed over to her 
Swedish nobility. The Russian czars and their officials hardly 
suspected the dour "Chukhontzi," as the native Finns were 
contemptuously called, of having any national aspirations dis­
tinct from those of either the Russian conquerors or their own 
nobles. Nor did the czarist administration even imagine that 
these Chukhontzi had a national culture and language of their 
own, such as they might dare to uphold against the proud cul­
ture and language of the Swedish aristocracy. Therefore, it is 
scarcely remarkable that the "Finnomans"—the first Finnish na­
tionalists to defend their native language against Swedish op 
pression—hated equally their haughty Swedish aristocrats and 
the latter's protector, the czarist Russian government. There 
was only one brief period during which the clash of Russian 
and Swedish ambitions prompted the czars to show an interest 
in the Finnish language: that was during the reign of Alex­
ander II (1855-1881), when intensive pro-Swedish propaganda, 
directed from Stockholm, induced the czarist government to 
play Finnish national aspirations against Swedish nationalism. 
Short-lived as it was, this policy bore important results. One 
consequence of the whim was the founding in 1858 of the first 
Finnish language school with government funds, which was in 
fact the first elementary school in Europe maintained by a gov­
ernment. 
Despite this temporary coolness, ties were maintained and 
co-operation was continued between the Russian government 
and the Swedish-Finnish aristocracy, who realized that czarist 
sovereignty was their sole protection against the national wrath 
of the Finnish masses, burgeoning in the hotbed of existing so­
cial inequalities. 
These ties remained unbroken even by the events of 1905. In 
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that year all Finland was shaken by a general strike which 
lasted for six days, forcing the Russian czarist government to 
permit establishment of a democratic system with a legally rec­
ognized Social Democratic party in what was virtually the back­
yard of St. Petersburg. 
The effect of these events on Russo-Finnish relations was a 
certain crossing of currents. The Finnish aristocracy realized 
more fully its dependence on the continued existence of the 
czarist regime. They came to hate sincerely not only the Fin-
nomans, but also the Russian masses, who were bent on under­
mining the czarist throne and thus destroying the golden trough 
where pedigreed Finnish "servants of the throne" came to 
feed. Typical of these Swedish aristocrats in Finland was Baron 
von Mannerheim, the future Marshal, who served the Russian 
czar as an officer of the Imperial Horse Guards, on such assign­
ments as suppressing revolutionary Persians or coercing muti­
nous Poles. 
In time the Finnish national liberation movement outgrew 
the Finnomans phase, when stress was laid chiefly on the lan­
guage problem. This problem of language and a national school 
was rooted in social antagonism. The Finnish vernacular was 
upheld in opposition to the language of the Swedish aristocracy. 
The social and political basis became clear during the 1905 
crisis, when the Finnish Social Democrats who assumed leader­
ship in the national liberation movement advanced definite de­
mands, such as political democracy and protection of small 
tenant farmers and workers. By the logic of events they became 
associated with parallel movements in Russia, establishing ties 
with anti-czarist circles there, ties which proved mutually bene­
ficial. This led to growing enmity against the czarist regime, 
persecutor of Finnish nationalists and protector of the Swedish-
Finnish aristocracy against whom the nationalists rebelled. 
Events of a truly symbolic character were enacted in Finland 
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in 1905. The Swedish-Finnish aristocracy poured oil on the 
troubled waters of the insurgent popular movement, but Rus­
sian garrison troops stationed in such Finnish cities as Tampere, 
for example, refused to take up arms against the Finnish libera­
tion movement and fought hand in hand with Finnish Social 
Democratic "Red Guards" against the troops dispatched from 
Russia to suppress the uprising. 
The events of 1905 clearly focused the political forces in 
Finland along a social rather than a national line of cleavage, 
which cut through differences of language and administrative 
position. No longer was the conflict a single combat between 
Finns and Russians; nor was it even a triangular struggle be­
tween the Finnish aristocracy, the Finnish people, and Russia. 
The forces were arrayed around a rectangle of struggle criss­
crossed with conflicting sympathies and antipathies. The Fin­
nish people hated both the Swedish-Finnish aristocracy and the 
czarist officialdom, while they sought support from progressive 
public forces in Russia. Swedish-Finnish aristocrats, like Man-
nerheim, feared and hated nationalist Finns, who spoke a lan­
guage alien to the aristocracy. Likewise, they detested the Rus­
sian workers and peasants who made common cause with the 
Finnish popular movement and were shaking the foundations of 
czarism at home. The highly placed gentry in Finland assem­
bled more closely around the footstool of the czarist throne. 
The rectangular lines of conflict emerged with particular 
force in 1917, when the overthrow of czarism focused attention 
on the future status to be accorded different parts of the Rus­
sian empire. 
THE CIVIL WAR IN FINLAND 
During World War I, a new public group emerged, one 
destined to play a decisive role in the creation of a new Finland. 
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Alone among all the territories of the Russian empire, Finland 
escaped mobilization in the gigantic struggle of 1914—1918 and 
was exempted from all czarist war measures. As a "neutral" ter­
ritory of an empire at war, Finland prospered. Her enterprising 
merchants and manufacturers, who were able to adjust their 
businesses to the war needs of their great neighbor country, 
grew wealthy. With this potent impetus the Finnish bour­
geoisie increased in number and flourished in power. This 
new class in 1917 differed in political outlook both from farmer-
worker Social Democracy and from the ruling aristocratic fac­
tion. 
The Finnish Social Democrats viewed the unfolding Russian 
revolution with sympathy. As the revolution upset more com­
pletely the old order in Russia, the Social Democrats expressed 
a growing disinclination to break their ties with the Russian 
workers, especially since the alternative meant embracing the 
cold steel of German militarism. The Swedish-Finnish aristoc­
racy on the other hand pinned its hope on various White move­
ments inspired by former czarist officers who sought to enthrone 
the Little Father again and restore the Russian monarchy. 
But Finnish bourgeoisie staked their future on a different 
card; they sought to advance their fortunes in Germany, which 
they firmly believed would emerge victorious. They began mov­
ing in this direction while Russia and Germany were still at 
war. Unlike the Mannerheims, who at that time distinguished 
themselves in czarist service, and unlike the masses of the Fin­
nish people, who in co-operation with the Russian progressive 
movement were struggling to liberate their own country as well 
as all of vast Russia, the sons of the well-to-do burghers and the 
Finnish parvenus began to side with Germany. As the so-called 
"Jaegers," they fought in the German army against Russia. In 
their dreams they saw Finland as a German principality. From 
the outset, the intellectual leader of this pro-German group was 
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Per Svinhufvud, who to this day remains behind-the-scenes 
overlord of Finnish politics. 
The Finnish Social Democracy, which had the backing of the 
people as a whole and had a majority of deputies in parliament, 
tried to find a peaceful solution to all the conflicting tendencies. 
This faction had strong habits of parliamentary compromise. 
Moreover, the Finnish farmers and workers had abundant 
faith in democracy and did not think there were insurmount­
able differences of opinion between themselves and the repre­
sentatives of the Finnish bourgeoisie, who now formed a power­
ful group. A compromise was actually arrived at on December 
6, 1917, when the Social Democratic Diet and the bourgeoisie-
controlled Senate jointly proclaimed the independence of Fin­
land on the basis of complete democracy, national culture, and 
a good-neighbor policy toward Russia. A month later, the 
Soviet government of Russia declared the Finnish proclama­
tion to be fully in accord with its own policy. 
New vistas were opened to little Finland for peaceful de­
velopment, on the broadest basis of Social Democracy. But such 
a development was completely at variance with that envisaged 
either by the Finnish or by the Swedish-Finnish reactionaries. 
Both Svinhufvud and Mannerheim commenced active prepara­
tions for a coup d'etat which they had long been contemplating. 
Disguised as fire brigades or sports clubs, bands of White 
Guards were organized all over the country. These bands were 
under the command of demobilized czarist officers with Man­
nerheim as their chief, and by the end of 1917 they had some 
37,000 members. Their weapons were smuggled across the 
border, as was admitted by the Finnish White Guards in 1923. 
In a pamphlet entitled Finland's Civil Guard, this organization 
confessed: "Happily enough, at the end of October and the be­
ginning of November, the central organization succeeded in 
importing one shipload of rifles, cartridges, machine-guns, and 
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pistols,—altogether 6,500 rifles, 25 machine-guns, 2,500,000 
cartridges, 800 pistols, and 5,000 hand grenades." 1 
Arms were supplied to the Finnish White Guards by the 
English (through one John Smith, owner of the S.S. John 
Grafton), by the Germans, and by the czarist officers who had 
fled from their commands following mutiny in the ranks. 
The declaration of an independent Finnish republic (on 
December 6, 1917) far from halting this feverish arming merely 
intensified it. Svinhufvud, who signed this declaration and was 
a member of the Finnish government, maintained secret rela­
tions with the "putschists." Parliament was forced to act with­
out delay. On January 28, 1918, Kullervo Manner, president of 
the Diet, and Tokoy, president of the Senate, proclaimed that 
Svinhufvud was deprived of his powers, all of which were 
transferred to a people's government they themselves claimed 
to lead. 
The White Guards established an insurgent committee at 
Vaasa and immediately opened negotiations with Sweden and 
Germany, appealing for intervention. Mannerheim began to 
reform the White Guard bands into regular army units. Pres­
ently the antigovernment leaders were joined by Svinhufvud, 
who succeeded in escaping from Helsingfors. He traveled 
through Germany and from there arrived at Vaasa. Thus civil 
war came to Finland. 
J. Hampden Jackson, who is a great admirer of Mannerheim 
and the Finnish White Guards, permitted himself the luxury 
of a certain objectivity when he wrote: 
The civil war is officially known today in Finland as the War of 
Independence, the implication being that the Whites fought for 
Finland's independence against Russian Bolsheviks and the mis­
guided native proletariat whom the Russians had fooled into sup­
porting them. This is the view of the Finnish writers, such as 
Soderhjelm and Koistinen, of Englishmen such as Sir Frank Fox 
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and T. A. Atchley, of Frenchmen such as J. L. Perret and Henri de 
Montfort, and of German and Swedish writers almost without ex­
ception. The truth, however, is not so simple. Actually each side 
fought for Finland's independence as they saw it, and each side 
relied on help from abroad. Without foreign interference there 
could have been in the first place no war on any serious scale, and 
in the last no such rapid victory. The Reds asked the Bolsheviks 
for help: from Russia came stores and armaments. The Whites 
asked the Scandinavian countries and Germany for help: from 
Sweden came volunteers, from Germany came first Jaegers, then 
equipment, guns, and even aeroplanes, then soldiers and marines 
under General Von der Goltz, then a fleet under Admiral Meurer. 
When the civil war was over the White politicians showed their 
gratitude to Germany in a fashion that boded ill for Finnish inde­
pendence: they invited a German sovereign to rule over Finland.2 
Svinhufvud found no difficulty in persuading the former 
Russian monarchists of the Mannerheim ilk who collaborated 
with him that German orientation was essential to the success 
of their cause. They had no alternative. The White Guards, 
numbering a scant 40,000, had no chance whatever of winning 
in a struggle against the entire Finnish people standing behind 
the popular government, regardless of how untrained and ill 
armed the citizenry might be. 
The character of this popular government deserves brief 
consideration. Was it actually a Bolshevik government, as it 
has been branded by nearly all historians, Finnish and non-
Finnish? 
A different view of the Manner-Tokoy government is taken 
by J. Hampden Jackson, although he is a Mannerheim partisan 
who sanctioned the Baron s terrorism against the Reds. Mr. 
Jackson points to the ties the popular government had with the 
Bolsheviks and accuses it of unleashing the civil war. He 
nevertheless admits: 
But it is not true that they had any intention of sacrificing one 
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jot of Finland's independence or even of imitating the methods of 
their Bolshevik friends. The provisional constitution which the 
Socialist Workers' Republic drew up contains no reference to class 
dictatorship or to Soviet administration. This document—and it is 
no more than a document for it never came into force—is interesting 
as the first socialist constitution in history. It provided for a parlia­
mentary government by a Diet consisting of the same number of 
members and elected by the same methods as before. Executive 
power was to be in the hands of a Prime Minister elected by the 
Diet and watched over by committees chosen by the Diet for that 
purpose. Provision was made for a referendum on the petition of 
one-twentieth of the electorate, and direct legislation could be made 
if a petition signed by 10,000 citizens was presented to the Diet. 
On the whole it shows the Finnish Social-Democrats to have 
been much closer akin in their ideals to the Viennese Socialists than 
to the Russian Bolsheviks.3 
German intervention decided the issue of the civil war, for 
prior to it the position of the White insurgents was critical. In 
March 1918, Mannerheim telegraphed Berlin: "I consider it 
an urgent duty to hasten the arrival of the German expedition. 
Delay fatal." 
The Germans arrived in time and in sufficient strength. The 
game was worth the candle. On March 7, 1918, Svinhufvud 
signed a treaty with the Kaiser's government establishing a vir­
tual protectorate of Germany over Finland. The considerations 
prompting the Germans to undertake the intervention were 
more exigent demands than any professed "historical" claims. 
The commander of the German expeditionary corps, General 
Riidiger Count von der Goltz, in a book published in 1936 by 
the Nazis, states the motives with complete candor. 
After quoting the statement by General von Ludendorff that 
"I made all my decisions with my head, but the decision to 
help Finland I made with both head and heart," General von 
der Goltz justly remarks that "heart" motives alone naturally 
would have been inadequate, but "It was necessary to bar the 
/ 
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way of Soviet Russia, which stood behind the Finnish insurrec­
tion, to check the extension of her influence, to prevent the 
creation of a new eastern front. At the same time it was 
necessary to prevent the influence of the Entente from reach­
ing Russia." 4 
Assisted by the well-armed German expeditionary corps, 
Baron von Mannerheim was able to smash the popular govern­
ment. Terrible punishment was inflicted on his opponents. 
Josiah C. Wedgwood, speaking in the House of Commons in 
May 1919, characterized the behavior of "Lahtari" (butcher) 
Mannerheim in these words: 
"With the help of German armies which were landed in Finland, 
and in co-operation with the White Guards of Finland under Gen­
eral Mannerheim, the Red revolution was suppressed. They stamped 
it out by a most shocking series of atrocities. 
"The number of men and women arrested during the first weeks 
of May 1918 came to about 90,000—and of these 15,000 to 20,000 
were shot out of hand. Red prisoners were commonly decimated, 
sometimes twice over, and then the survivors were searched for sus­
pects." 
To obtain a parliamentary majority, Baron von Manner­
heim was obliged to deprive forty-six per cent of the Diet mem­
bers of their legal status as elected representatives of the peo­
ple. He did so swiftly in the Mannerheim fashion: some Diet 
members were shot, others jailed, and still others forced to flee 
the country. Of ninety-two who were members of the Social 
Democratic party, ninety-one were deprived of their standing, 
and of these, fifty were arrested and many executed. 
Following the successful operation, the baron and Svinhufvud 
found little difficulty in gaining parliamentary approval of their 
decision to invite Prince Friedrich Karl von Hessen, Kaiser 
Wilhelm's son-in-law, to occupy the Finnish throne. 
The collapse of the German military machine saved the 
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Finnish people from complete subjection to Germany. In this 
connection, Count von der Goltz makes this melancholy com­
ment: "The German catastrophe prevented him [the Prince] 
from taking up his post, and thereby not only achieving a most 
desirable extension of the German sphere of influence, but also 
realizing the favorite dream of the majority of the Finnish 
people." 
Svinhufvud had done his utmost to turn Finland into a Ger­
man protectorate, and Germany demonstrably appreciated his 
efforts, for he was awarded the German Iron Cross. His only 
mistake was in failing to foresee an Allied victory. He appar­
ently has not profited by his experience of 1917, for today he 
has again staked everything on Germany, never for a moment 
considering it possible for the Germans to be defeated in the 
present war. 
When the project to enthrone a German prince in Finland 
collapsed, Svinhufvud, Mannerheim, and their faction hastily 
took refuge in disguised democratic professions, an almost com­
pulsory fashion during the Wilson stage of the Versailles Peace 
negotiations. Thereafter, Finland found a new existence as a 
democratic republic with a broken democratic spine. 
THE HINDENBURG DEMOCRACY 
Many obscurities in the contemporary policy of Finland, 
deeply perplexing to her friends, are clarified when it is re­
alized that in 1918 the organic evolution of prewar Finnish 
democracy was violently ruptured. In this respect Finland 
differs from the Scandinavian countries with whom she other­
wise has so much in common. 
Her new political system was built upon bloodshed; the 
smashing of old democratic institutions and the physical ex­
termination of persons who were democracy's standard bearers. 
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Tens of thousands of farmers and workers who had tasted the 
delight of freedom were slaughtered, or tortured in prisons.* 
Finnish democratic fighters of distinction and high public 
esteem were supplanted by men of the type of Svinhufvud, a 
German agent, and Mannerheim, a Swede who as late as 1918 
could not speak Finnish and who was a czarist hanger-on despis­
ing the Finnish working people as low serfs. In place of the 
popular forward-looking leaders, who for two decades had di­
rected the movements of city workers and country landowners, 
Finnish Social Democracy came to be headed by the neutral-
tinted bureaucrat Tanner, a leader of the co-operative move­
ment. 
An American journalist, H. B. Elliston, anxious to extol this 
"Finnish Jefferson" j* could find nothing more flattering than 
the dubious remark that in reply to someone who suggested cer­
tain changes in the government budget, Tanner said, "But, my 
dear friend, I have already had the budget printed." 5 Else­
where trying to show Tanner a man of great courage, Mr. Ellis-
ton quotes the episode in which Tanner, disregarding protests 
of fellow Social Democrats, consented to review the parade of 
the Civil Guards, at a celebration commemorating the entry of 
German troops into Helsingfors and the rout of Finnish Social 
Democracy. 
Such were the leaders and circumstances under which Fin­
land emerged during the stormy post-Versailles period. Behind 
the formal democratic facade of her republic lay concealed the 
• Oddly, of the numerous journalists who rhapsodized about the era of the 
war of liberation of Finland, hardly one found time to read the work by the 
Nobel Laureate, the Finnish writer Sillanpaa, entitled The Holy Poverty, with 
its vivid descriptions of the savage punishment inflicted on Finnish farmers by 
the White Guards. Sillanpaa is not a Red. 
f Mr. Elliston's eagerness to belittle great men of America by bizarre com­
parisons is noticeable. Not content with picturing Tanner as "the Finnish Jef­
ferson," his excessive zeal leads him to compare General Mannerheim, who 
dragged his country into perilous adventures, with Washington. 
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insidious dry rot of bitter reaction. The forces of Finnish reac­
tion, potentially Fascist, were led by able men who knew what 
they were after. The democratic ranks had been thinned out, 
were bereft of leaders, and followed policies formulated by 
colorless "sergeants," who in some way had survived the blood 
bath of General Mannerheim and the Germans. 
But democratic traditions were too deeply rooted in the 
Finnish people. All sections of the Finnish populace esteemed 
the example of neighboring Scandinavian countries to the 
west. The esteem could not be ignored with impunity. More­
over, the proximity of the U.S.S.R. compelled even the most 
reactionary circles to observe a great restraint in dealing with 
the social gains of the farmers and workers. The result was that 
the "Scandinavian spirit" of social reform and genuine democ­
racy became firmly implanted in the internal socio-economic 
policies of Finland. Issues were bitterly contested, yet by dint 
of hard struggle democratic groups were able to maintain cer­
tain rights at home in the face of repeated attacks by the capi­
talistic circles backing Svinhufvud and Mannerheim. However, 
Finland's foreign and military policy came to be wholly con­
trolled by reactionary circles. True democrats were not allowed 
within gunshot of these "delicate matters." Although some 
democrats did manage to get into the government, they were 
regarded as politically unreliable and held in check by the 
army, which General Mannerheim commanded. 
In the early 1930's, just when Finnish progressive circles 
were gradually recovering from the 1918 bloodletting, they 
were struck another devastating blow from which they have 
not yet been able to regain trength. The blow was delivered 
by Svinhufvud, the evil geniua of Finland. 
After Italy, Finland was the first among European nations 
whose progress in Fascism came to be heralded in sinister head­
lines which began to appear in the world press as early as 1930. 
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However, developments in other countries later diverted public 
attention from Finland, and the activities of Finnish Fascists 
were almost completely ignored. Yet their influence was felt 
throughout the subsequent history of the Finnish nation. 
Finland was particularly hard hit by the economic crisis of 
1929-1933, which stirred the reactionary elements to intensified 
activity. The Finnish Fascist movement, known locally as the 
Lappo movement—a name derived from the fact that the move­
ment had its center in the small town of Lappo, near Vaasa— 
took its cue from German Nazism, for which it became agent 
in Finland. 
When democracy still flourished in the Baltic states and 
throughout Europe, governmental power in Finland fell into 
the hands of Svinhufvud, in July 1930. Immediately, all Baltic 
progressive circles were alarmed. At first Svinhufvud obtained 
the post of premier; soon afterward, in February 1931, he suc­
ceeded in being elected president of the republic. With the 
support of the Lappo movement, he made himself virtual dic­
tator of Finland. The Lappo adherents began terrorizing the 
populace. They practiced lynching, carried off the Social Demo­
cratic deputies into the forests to be flogged, and committed 
other atrocities. They likewise deliberately sought to provoke 
armed conflicts on the U.S.S.R. border. With the aid of Gen­
eral Wallenius, an attempt actually was made to kidnap the for­
mer president of the republic, K. J. Stahlberg (a Left democrat), 
and his wife; they were to be taken across the Soviet border 
and there murdered, charging the crime to be a Bolshevik as­
sassination and a just cause for Finno-Soviet armed conflict. By 
a lucky accident, the kidnapers' automobile was halted on the 
road and the plot frustrated. General Wallenius was brought 
to trial. Although during preliminary examination Wallenius 
had admitted the kidnaping plot, he renounced his admission 
at the trial. Like other turbulent Lappoists, he escaped with a 
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few weeks' detention. As a reward for this "exploit," Manner­
heim later appointed him chief of staff. 
Although the Lappo movement never secured formal au-
tority, it was skillfully employed by Svinhufvud and Manner­
heim to gain their ends—political domination of Finland. Once 
they held the reins of power, these clever politicians ceased to 
support the village Mussolinis, such as Kossola and others. Cer­
tain capitalist circles also discontinued financial aid to the 
Lappo movement, which had received fifteen million marks 
from the banks and huge sums from the neutral co-operative 
movement, a competitor of the Social Democratic co-operatives. 
The Fascists had done their job and were paid off. They left 
behind badly mauled remnants of freedom of the press, of 
speech and assembly; parliament, reacting to the Fascist pres­
sure, had passed the usual Fascist law curbing democratic lib­
erties. 
Apart from the Lappo movement itself, General Mannerheim 
found support in his pro-Fascist Civil Guards, numbering 
100,000 bayonets, as against the 20,000 men in the Finnish 
army. 
With Fascist elements in such strategic positions, the govern­
ment composition at one or another period had little bearing 
on the actual power exercised. The Socialist and democratic 
ministers were perched on top of a volcano. At best, the actual 
status of Finnish democracy most resembled that of German 
democracy during the Hindenburg era. 
As the crisis in the European situation approached, Finland's 
position became increasingly strained in the sphere of foreign 
relations. Hitler's seizure of power in Germany resulted in the 
tightening up of the ties between Finnish military circles and 
the German Nazis. After 1937, Nazi officials paid ever more 
frequent visits to Finland. In August 1938 the German navy 
called at several Finnish ports. 
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Throughout the controversy about the "neutrality" of the 
Aland Islands, Finnish military circles were backed by Germany, 
whose anti-Russian plan assigned a strategic role to these 
islands. For many years, "scientists" from Germany had been 
active there preparing bases for an eventual attack on the Soviet 
coast from the sea. As early as 1934, a German agent named 
Grussner lived as a native on the Alands, where he married a 
local woman. Reporting this episode, the Swedish press also 
sounded a warning about German "scientific research" on the 
islands. 
In the summer of 1939, General Haider, chief of staff of the 
German army, visited Finland with the specific purpose of in­
specting Finnish troops and the progress of construction work 
on the Mannerheim Line. In the autumn of 1939, almost on 
the eve of the Finnish war against Russia, the German govern­
ment conferred one of the highest German decorations on Gen­
eral Esch, chief of staff of the Finnish army. 
Against this feverish activity of the Fascist military and reac­
tionary circles, Finland's so-called progressive factions had no 
realistic and considered opposition policy. Like all the small 
democracies of the early Hitler period, liberal Finland was 
mesmerized by the illusion of neutrality. Adopting an ostrich 
policy, Finnish Social Democracy turned its back on the Baltic 
and buried its head in the sands of the West, saying that Fin­
land was not a Baltic nation, but a nation belonging to Scandi­
navia and, consequently, unconcerned with the affairs of eastern 
Europe. When the persistent activities of the military clique 
was involving the country ever more deeply in all German in­
trigues, and in view of Finland's geographic position as a des­
tined arena of conflict between the two principal actors of the 
world drama, Germany and Russia, this ostrich policy played 
directly into the hands of the Nazis, making these Socialist poli­
ticians both the tools and the victims of Nazi aspirations. 
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A handful of statesmen, among them Karl Wiik, for many 
years secretary general of the Social Democratic party, realized 
the precarious nature of the official "neutrality" policy adopted 
by the Finnish government. Karl Wiik and his political fol­
lowers foresaw that the course of events would ultimately con­
front Finland with the choice between Russia and Germany. 
They realized also that the domination exercised by reactionary 
elements in the country would force Finland into an alliance 
with Hitler. In accord with these considerations, the group led 
by Karl Wiik adopted a program advocating that internal po­
litical demands—such as suppression of the fifth column, dis­
banding of the Civil Guards, liquidation of Fascist bands, et 
cetera—be co-ordinated with a foreign policy aimed at estab­
lishing friendly relations, or even an alliance, with Russia. 
But Karl Wiik did not have a majority even among the mem­
bers of his own party. Finland, as it proved, lacked political 
forces capable of carrying out such a policy even when an op­
portunity unexpectedly presented itself during the Anglo-
Soviet negotiations of 1938-1939. International guarantees for 
the inviolability of Finnish territory were under discussion at 
that time, not permission for Russia to establish military bases 
in Finland. It would seem that no better prospect could have 
been desired by a small country placed so dangerously close to 
aggressive Germany. Yet the Finnish minister of Foreign Affairs 
Erkko flatly declared: "I know that the guarantees demanded 
by the U.S.S.R. have for their object the insuring of its own 
safety, since the U.S.S.R. is disturbed by the threat coming 
from a country which might use Finnish territory for an attack 
against the Soviet Union. But Finland rejects the entire sys­
tem of guarantees—because acceptance of these guarantees 
would be incompatible with the policy of neutrality. " 6 
By refusing to become a partner in an anti-Nazi defense bloc, 
Finland adopted a course, upon which most influential circles 
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had already embarked, leading inevitably to the Nazi camp. 
As a result, Finland came to represent a real and serious 
menace to the security of Leningrad, of the northern sea route 
and the whole north Russian front. 
During the negotiations, the policies involved were the sub­
ject of wide public debate. Soviet demands on Finland were not 
generally accepted as being dictated by considerations of Rus­
sian security. Mr. Elliston, cited earlier in these pages, speaks 
of two schools—the school of Paasikivi and the school of Erkko. 
"Mr. Paasikivi," he says, "believes that the Soviet aim is pri­
marily military or defensive—pathologically defensive, if you 
insist. Mr. Erkko, on the contrary, thinks the aim to be primar­
ily political, or world-revolutionary." 
Before the outbreak of the Russo-German war, the second 
version was most preferred. In spite of its being so obviously 
forced, Mr. Elliston explains, saying, "The Finns will the sooner 
obtain allies if the outside world comes to believe that world-
revolution is the primary Stalin motive." 
Moreover, even among those who accepted the Paasikivi 
thesis, the majority disputed Russia s right to demand strategic 
guarantees. Only now, after years of cataclysmic events, during 
which Hitler's military machine carved up almost the whole of 
Europe, has democratic public opinion come to realize that the 
formal sovereignty of individual states cannot be permitted to 
obstruct the safety of the whole world. Today, such preventive 
operations as those of the Russians and the British in Iran, of 
the British in Syria, Iraq, and Madagascar, of the United States 
in Iceland and North Africa, are accepted and approved as 
necessary. The Russian campaign against Finland, although 
complicated by Finnish resistance, was not different in prin­
ciple. It merely happened at an earlier stage of the war. But 
in the autumn of 1939 the Soviet government had good reason 
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to hasten fortification of the approaches to Murmansk and 
Leningrad. 
At one time the whole Russo-Finnish dispute was pictured 
as an attempt of big Russia to devour little Finland. For some 
reason the view persisted that cession of Hango and the Rybachy 
peninsula was tantamount to abandoning Finnish independ­
ence. This idea has been disproven by subsequent events. In 
1939, although Finland maintained a firm grasp on Hango and 
Rybachy, as well as the strategic islands and the Mannerheim 
Line, she was defeated by Russian troops. Yet, in 1941, after 
losing the Mannerheim Line, Rybachy, and the islands in the 
Gulf of Finland, and although a strong Russian garrison was 
installed on Hango, Finland showed no signs whatever of hav­
ing lost her independence, at least so far as her attitude to 
Russia was concerned. So "independent" was Finland that at 
the moment of Hitler's attack on the U.S.S.R. she was harbor­
ing entire German divisions in full fighting array, and her 
government proved itself a loyal agent of Hitler, Russia s bit­
terest enemy. 
The reiterated declarations of the Soviet government that 
the friendship of Finland is of vital interest to Russia can be 
fully appreciated only today. When, however, such declarations 
appeared in the press at the time of the Stalin-Molotov-
Paasikivi-Tanner negotiations, "experts" dismissed them with 
knowing smiles, as if to say, "We know the sort of friendship 
you're after." But it is now clear that in this question, as in 
many others, the Soviet government displayed an extraordinary 
sense of reality, as was later demonstrated. Strategic bases and 
Russian garrisons in Finland were only minimum requirements 
necessary to strengthen the defenses of Leningrad, to hamper 
German communications in the eastern part of the Baltic, and 
to protect the approaches to Murmansk, port of entry for Allied 
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supplies today. An anti-Nazi, genuinely democratic Finland 
working shoulder to shoulder with the army and navy of a 
friendly Russia could have put the Germans in a very danger­
ous position along the entire northern front, if not rendering 
such a front impossible. The Russians abandoned efforts at 
mutual defense only when it became obvious that the Finnish 
government wished no relationship of friendship and collabora­
tion with the U.S.S.R. under any guise. The alignment forces 
in Europe and the internal contradictions in Finland all 
pointed in one direction: Finland was entering the anti-Soviet 
camp. An illusory neutrality could allay the apprehension only 
of the most naive politicians. War was inevitable. 
A study of the progress of negotiations between Russia and 
Finland in 1939 makes it clear that the Russians were anxious 
to secure not only military bases and territorial concessions. 
What they wanted was political accord—an agreement for joint 
defense against a common enemy, whom nobody named, but 
who lurked in the background. Paasikivi is reported to have 
stated afterward: "Stalin tried to teach me the wisdom of Fin­
land as well as Soviet interest in compromise." 7 
On their part, the Russians conceded so much that the reports 
of the negotiations do not read at all like talks between an 
enormously powerful state, militarized to the limit, and a small 
border state, with a population of 3,800,000. 
The official Finnish Blue Book describes the course of the 
negotiations and states that in responding to the note of Octo­
ber 5, 1939, inviting delegates to Moscow, the Finnish govern­
ment issued these instructions to the chief of its delegation, 
Juho Paasikivi: "He was to refer to Finland's decision, made 
in conjunction with the Northern States, to observe a policy of 
neutrality, and was to reject all demands which would infringe 
the political status and neutral policy of Finland." 8 
Negotiations continued from October 14 till the middle of 
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November. The Soviet government gave ground on all points 
except two, which the Blue Book formulates thus: "The Soviet 
Government insisted on a base at the entrance to the Gulf of 
Finland and the frontier referred to [i.e., to Koivisto] on the 
Karelian Isthmus." 9 
Although the Soviets no longer demanded bases on Hango, 
but were agreed instead to bases on the islands of Hermanso, 
Koon, and others at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, the 
Finnish government felt constrained to break off negotiations. 
By so doing it took responsibility for embroiling Finland in a 
war which brought only disaster to the country. 
The Soviet government was fully aware that war was the 
worst possible solution of the problem; it realized that affec­
tions can never be forced. Even after the war began, the Rus­
sians apparently still hoped for political developments inside 
Finland which would render war unnecessary. 
The Russians were not the only ones to delude themselves 
in this fashion. At the very outset of the war between Russia 
and Finland, when news reached Riga, Kaunas, and Tallinn 
that the old Finnish government had resigned, and that the 
Social Democrat Tanner had taken over, there was widespread 
jubilation in these Baltic capitals. Ignorant of Tanner's true 
role as scuttler of the negotiations, the inhabitants of these 
Baltic cities thought the Social Democratic leader would thrust 
aside the pro-German Fascists and bring the senseless war to a 
halt. 
There is little doubt that had Finland possessed a political 
group or a single statesman capable of taking such a step, the 
U.S.S.R. would have presented to them, with a flourish, terms 
of peace extremely advantageous to Finland, and that anybody 
so acting for Finland could have been as enthusiastically ac­
claimed in Soviet Russia as the English or Americans are hailed 
today. It cannot be too often repeated that what the Bolsheviks 
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needed most was the friendship of a democratic Finland. Such 
a friendship was far more important to them than territorial 
acquisition, and in many respects more advantageous than a 
Soviet Finland, which would have been headed by the Com­
munist Kuusinen and have been plunged headlong into inter­
nal turmoil. 
There was, however, nobody in Finland to wrest power from 
Svinhufvud and Mannerheim, who had steered the country 
with unfaltering hands in the direction of war, sure of support 
from Germany. 
The German general staff naturally knew that military op­
erations on the Finnish border signified only preliminaries to 
the great clash of arms for which they were feverishly prepar­
ing, the inevitability of which, as they were thoroughly aware, 
was also thoroughly understood by the U.S.S.R. So far as they 
could, within the prescribed limits of diplomatic decency—the 
time for breaking the Moscow Pact had not yet arrived—the 
Germans fought on the side of Finland. The American jour­
nalist Elliston, who was in Finland and maintained contact with 
the Finnish statesmen, writes of this: 
Before the war was more than a week old they [the Germans] 
had shown misgivings about the Soviet attack on Finland. Again 
to revert to a personal experience—they eventually allowed the use 
of their land lines for my broadcasts from Finland. They even 
began to put on their radios the official Finnish war news. They 
allowed Italian planes destined for Finland to pass through Ger­
many in sealed cars till the world's press got wind of the transit 
and the Soviet protested to Berlin. Later they began to send 
some war materials to Finland themselves, and it is said that all 
the wrong-calibred material for German use from the Czech Skoda 
works is going to Finland. German officers speak openly about 
Soviet Schweinerei and give money to Swedish campaign chests for 
Finland. Finally, I am of the opinion that Hitler must have given 
the Swedes a sort of tacit go-ahead signal, when, on Stalin's sixtieth 
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birthday, December 21, the Swedes decided to let the first contingent 
of Swedish volunteers go to Finland.10 
There can be no doubt whatever concerning the motives, 
aspirations, and objects of the Fascist clique in Finland. This 
group has long since been pursuing a persistent, a consistent, 
pro-German policy, which, after 1933, became pro-Hitler. But 
Finnish democrats and Social Democrats were drawn into the 
Fascist morass by more devious ways. They were led to de­
struction by the chimera of neutrality, which proved a lure 
and a snare to many other small states and which was given 
currency by the dangerous "activist" form of Munichism pro­
fessed during that period by many bourgeois politicians in 
France, in England, and in the United States. At that time also, 
a project was being discussed in France and in England to send 
an army under General Weygand to attack the Soviet Caucasus 
simultaneously with an Allied landing in Finland. The pros­
pect of shunting the war against Germany onto the anti-Bol­
shevik track was extremely tempting. The anti-Hitler war 
brought no delight to the hearts of the Munich gentry. 
The avalanche was loosed. Bourgeois democratic Europe of 
Munich was rushing into the abyss. The first pebble to go over 
the precipice was Finland. 
P A R T  I I I  
T O W A R D  A  N E W  L I F E  
C H A P T E R  I X  
The Soviet Baltic Republics 
THE COUP D'£TAT 
As the German blitz soared in triumph over fallen France in 
the West, Hitlerism was obliged to stage a retreat in the East. 
The Germans in the Baltic area had, since August 1939, 
been under silent Soviet pressure, which suddenly intensified 
with the collapse of France. On May 16, 1940, Russia gave a 
sharp warning to the Fascist or semi-Fascist governments of 
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, which had never ceased to look 
hopefully for German intervention. Immediately thereafter, 
Soviet motorized units rolled across the Baltic frontiers to ad­
vance on Kaunas, Riga, and Tallinn. 
As a preliminary to the armed invasion the democratic-
socialist opposition, co-operating with the local Communist 
parties, staged coups d'etat. In all three capitals People's govern­
ments were set up. These governments gave power to local 
political forces grouped in the Left bloc; formal in Latvia and 
Estonia, informal in Lithuania. 
Then lumbering Soviet tanks, with helmeted young men 
frowning but otherwise good-natured as they peered from the 
turrets, rambled down Laisves Alleja in Kaunas, Brivibas 
Bulvars in Riga, and Vabaduse Plats in Tallinn. The popula-
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tion greeted them variously. They were a very welcome sight 
to workers and all previously suppressed groups—Socialists, 
Communists and opposition democrats. From the nightmare of 
the political underground or of imprisonment, these people 
emerged to enjoy new liberties, after power had been wrested 
from the Fascists. Among the peasantry and the urban middle 
classes, however, there were mingled feelings of relief at having 
escaped Nazi oppression and of apprehension about their eco­
nomic future. Would they be allowed to keep their land and 
carry on their businesses? Obscured in the crowds lining the 
streets were collaborators of the old regime, who, fearful of 
retribution, hooted at the passing Soviet tanks. 
The policy of the new authorities was met with universal 
astonishment. The new people's governments, while backed 
by the Red Army and adhering to Marxian socialism, were ex­
ceedingly careful to observe the strictest possible democratic 
procedure in establishing their power. Their moderation was 
totally unexpected, and some correspondents who had prepared 
and sent in their stories beforehand actually reported Bol­
shevik atrocities, terrorization, and bloodshed which never took 
place. The transfer of power was a bloodless victory of the 
democratic forces, who were restored to the relative powers they 
had enjoyed prior to the Fascist coups. 
Of paramount importance in the peaceful course of events 
was the fact that power passed into the hands not of outsiders 
but of responsible local leaders highly esteemed by the people. 
However, this is only a partial explanation. Soviet Russia also 
exercised a restraining hand. Had the local, formerly oporessed, 
political leaders been given free rein, it is quite possible they 
would have conveniently forgotten parliamentary formalities 
in the early stages of the Baltic socialist revolution and indulged 
their desire for revenge against the Fascists who had uncere­
moniously ousted them from power. Yet not a single execution 
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was carried out in either Lithuania, Latvia, or Estonia; the 
chief of the secret police in Riga, notorious for maltreatment 
of political prisoners, was merely retired, with a payment of a 
monthly salary. For one reason only was such reserve exercised. 
The central Soviet government desired moderation. 
The motive behind Soviet policy in the Baltic was realistic 
"cost accounting"—the desire for maximum efficiency with 
minimum loss. The Soviets did not consider the Baltic area to 
be war booty or occupied territory; they regarded the Baltic 
states as newly acquired allies for the life-and-death struggle 
loooming ahead. Allies are naturally cherished, and Russia 
proved no exception, adjusting herself to the democratic habits 
and established traditions of the Baltic nations, which, though 
small, were valuable assets in the impending struggle against 
Germany. 
In all three countries, two months after the coups, elections 
were held on the basis of universal, direct, secret balloting. Al­
though the native Communists with Russian support could 
probably have easily gained a clear majority of votes, they chose 
rather to foster a broad democratic front, a genuine people's 
front in which the Communist party was allied to all established 
democratic parties, Social Democrats included. The erection of 
a democratic front was more than a mere gesture. Neither the 
Communists, who could have seized power without resorting to 
deceptive maneuvers, nor the Russians, who were not obliged 
to disguise their real intentions by tolerance of democracy, had 
any reason for double-dealing. Soviet "flirtation" with Baltic 
democrats, mortal enemies of the Nazis, could only alarm the 
Germans. Moreover, concessions in the Baltic, or a policy of 
appeasement such as the Russians had already rejected, would 
not placate the Western democracies; in short, Russian dissim­
ulation would have been completely pointless. The alliance 
with Baltic democratic circles was real, and the objective pur­
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sued by the Soviet government was consolidation of the new 
Baltic governments and the erection of a new social order on 
the basis of democratic collaboration. 
WITHOUT TERRORISM 
Erected on a broad democratic base, the new governments 
had no need to employ terrorism. Conversely, they could dis­
play great magnanimity and make the transition from the old 
and semi-Fascist way of life to the new socialist life as painless 
as possible. Realizing that their power was underwritten by the 
might of the U.S.S.R., the new governments were given neither 
to hysterical excess in domestic policy nor to fear of reprisal 
from the few remaining Fascist adherents. 
The powerful economy of the U.S.S.R. provided means to 
solve pressing economic shortcomings without haste or delay. 
If the gasoline supply ran low, more was imported from Rus­
sia. Increased demands for agricultural machines, seeds, et 
cetera, multiplied; they were met forthwith, and local Baltic 
industries were given a new lease on life, for there was no need 
to worry about markets. 
Under Soviet regime the Baltic states enjoyed a far more 
lenient policy than did the neighboring, formerly Polish, 
provinces of western White Russia and Ukraine. Apart from 
the general factors outlined above, and equally relevant to all 
the newly annexed territory, there were distinguishing features. 
In the former Polish "Kresi," land reforms were long over­
due, and the solution adopted by the Soviet government was 
confiscation. The estates of the Polish gentry were nationalized 
and handed over to the Belorussian and Ukrainian peasants. 
Land reforms, naturally, are seldom carried out with a sculp­
tor's chisel; the ax is the more likely weapon. A less drastic land 
policy could be adopted in the Baltic states, because following 
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World War I and the Russian revolution land reforms had 
been carried out (more thoroughly in Latvia and Estonia than 
in Lithuania). All that was necessary was to rectify certain dis­
tortions which had developed during the twenty years since the 
reforms were instituted. 
But there was an even more far-reaching difference in the 
problems faced by the new administrations. In the "Kresi," 
from the viewpoint of security the Soviets considered it their 
first duty to destroy the old Polish state apparatus root and 
branch. They wanted all ties of these borderlands with Poland 
severed. Therefore, Polish nationalist groups and political 
parties loyal to the Pilsudski-Beck government or unreconciled 
to the loss of Polish estates were severely repressed. But the 
situation was reversed in the Baltic, where the Russians gave 
full support to local nationalism, because it was hostile to 
Fascism and a potential ally in the approaching struggle against 
the Nazi invasion. 
ALLIED REPUBLICS 
One of the first acts carried out by the U.S.S.R. in the Baltic 
was to restore Vilna to Lithuania. This was ointment to the 
offended national pride of the Lithuanians, who had never 
forgiven the illegal annexation of their historic city by the 
Polish general, Zeligovski. 
The early days of the new regime in Latvia were marked by 
some isolated excesses, when the old Latvian colors were pulled 
down from buildings and Soviet flags hoisted in their place. 
In opposition, the central committee of the Latvian Com­
munist party published a warning in its official organ, Cina 
(Struggle), oh July 30, 1940, saying: 
"We have reports of a few cases in which some persons tore 
down the Latvian national flag, subjecting it to insulting treat­
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ment. Such actions are to be severely condemned, since nobody 
can be allowed to insult the national flag. Instead, it should be 
raised together with the red flag of the working classes." 
In Soviet Russia proper the ceremony of receiving the Baltic 
republics into the framework of the U.S.S.R. was invested with 
the pomp and solemnity of a great state occasion. At the session 
of the Supreme Soviet, representatives of the allied republics, 
including some from distant lands, greeted the new members 
with congratulatory speeches. Thereupon the small Baltic coun­
tries took their places in the U.S.S.R. as allied republics, their 
new status entitling them to representation in the Council of 
Nationalities on an equal footing with Soviet republics of the 
Ukraine and Russia proper. 
On this occasion the official Soviet press printed several di­
rective articles, while the speeches by the Baltic delegates, 
including Professor Kirchensteins, Lacis, Paleckis, Vares, Andre-
sen,, were published in full in Izvestia, both in their native lan­
guages and in Russian. 
The question of citizenship was solved in a most liberal 
fashion. All residents of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were 
automatically granted Soviet citizenship, even those who, al­
though living within the territories of the three Baltic states, 
were not citizens. Thus, Soviet citizenship was accorded to hun­
dreds of former Russians who, as Whites, had participated in 
the civil war and escaped from Russia to the Baltic states. Citi­
zens of these Baltic nations living abroad were also admitted 
to Soviet citizenship by a special decree of the Supreme Soviet, 
provided they were registered in Soviet consulates by a given 
date. 
All these large and small tokens of consideration produced a 
favorable reaction in the national consciousness of the small 
Baltic peoples, who remembered the hypnotic paralysis they 
had experienced under the glare of the Nazi boa constrictor. 
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Even the national intelligentsia and a segment of the bour­
geoisie were reconciled to the loss of formal sovereignty. 
"SLAUGHTERED" INTELLECTUALS ON THE SOVIET OF PEOPLE'S 
COMMISSARS 
The change of regime did not lead to the "internationaliza­
tion" of Baltic life. It deepened the national and cultural life. 
Not one government official, one school or university teacher, 
not one plant director was imported from Russia. The new 
machinery of government was manned by local residents and, 
particularly, by the local ultranationalist intelligentsia. The na­
tive languages—Lithuanian, Lettish, Estonian—remained the 
official languages. Instruction in the schools was increasingly 
conducted in the native languages. Publication of books ex­
panded greatly. Classics were reprinted. Young authors who 
had been knocking in vain at the doors of publishers found a 
cordial reception. 
Folksong festivals were held everywhere, attended as of old 
by peasants in colorful national costumes. Now, however, 
urban workers, just as colorfully attired, also joined in the 
festivals. 
At the time one American correspondent, Donald Day, re­
ported that the Bolsheviks in Estonia and Latvia had abolished 
all doctors, lawyers, engineers, and teachers. The nimble-
minded journalist even quoted figures on the number of intel­
lectuals destroyed, never pausing to consider that his zealous 
estimates exceeded the total number of professional people in 
the Baltic. 
Any unprejudiced observer who judged what was really tak­
ing place in the Baltic could hardly have failed to realize that 
it was the intelligentsia, above all, who most fully supported 
the new regime and who were, moreover, most completely rep­
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resented in the higher organs of the new governments. The list 
of People's Commissars, higher officials, and new deputies reads 
like a roster of the most prominent professional workers, espe­
cially writers, teachers, and engineers. Here are a few examples: 
the chairman of the Supreme Soviet in Latvia was Kirchen-
steins, a professor of biology; the chairmen of their respective 
Council of People's Commissars were the writer Paleckis in 
Lithuania, the writer Lacis in Latvia, the doctor and poet Vares 
in Estonia. 
Among the People's Commissars, besides several old Socialist 
parliamentarians, such as Andresen, of Estonia, and Jagars (for­
mer deputy mayor of Riga), were many young engineers, doc­
tors, and writers drawn from progressive students' organiza­
tions. Almost half the members of the Council of People's 
Commissars of Latvia, for instance, were alumni of the oldest 
Latvian student society, Zemgalia, which, prior to World War I, 
had nurtured most of the statesmen who rose to prominence in 
the Baltic region. Subordinate administrative personnel was 
chosen along the same lines. 
The choice of personnel was influenced greatly by the cir­
cumstance that the intelligentsia in the Baltic states still had 
close ties to the working people. Intellectuals, for the most 
part, sprang from poor peasant and working-class stock. The 
biographies of most Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian writers 
seem to follow a set pattern: a man is born in a poor peasant 
home, works as a herdsman, through great effort reaches the 
parish school, and finally gets to the Gymnasium, where he is 
beset by all-pervasive Germanism; then come the lean years of a 
persecuted, nationally minded writer, stimulated by national op­
position. Most native doctors, lawyers, and engineers of the 
older generation followed similar careers. Although the 
younger professional men grew up under somewhat different 
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circumstances, their ties with the village remained unbroken. 
The Baltic intelligentsia "came from the land." 
Plainly, the Bolsheviks trusted the patriotism of the Baltic 
intellectuals and relied on their anti-Nazi, anti-German senti­
ments. In Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia the Russians did not 
hesitate to broaden their basis of support, which was not re­
stricted to politically orthodox and socially loyal circles. From 
the very first these new territories assumed the position of allied 
republics not only officially but in fact. 
REORGANIZATION OF THE BALTIC ARMIES 
Conservation of the popular anti-German forces at full 
strength was a basic principle of Soviet administration in the 
Baltic. Accordingly, although the Baltic armies were capitalist 
armies with anti-Soviet traditions and Fascist elements among 
the officer personnel, the Russians did not disband them as 
might have been expected. They set to work to reorganize the 
Baltic armies for reasons at once subtle and simple. 
Since the Baltic armies were raised on the basis of national 
conscription from a population which was in the main pro-
Russian, the Soviet government had no ground to fear "citi­
zens in military uniforms." While the officers were less favor­
ably disposed toward Russia, they were not all of one mind, 
and there was room for a satisfactory modus vivendi. Anti-
Soviet prejudice was rife among the top-ranking officers in the 
Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian armies, most of whom were 
former czarist officers. Yet they were not necessarily hostile to 
Russia, for nearly all Baltic generals had once served as cap­
tains or colonels in the Russian army. Most officers of subordi­
nate rank sprang from the common people, were thoroughly 
plebeian in outlook, and had strong ties to the peasantry and 
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industrial working class. For these younger Estonian, Latvian, 
and Lithuanian officers with professional ambitions but of 
plebeian native extraction, the caste-bound German Wehr-
macht offered no prospects of advancement, for as members of 
a "lower race" the Baltic officers were doomed to subjection. 
Such was not the case with the Red Army, in which, as these 
younger officers well knew, their working-class origin was an 
advantage and their national status as Lithuanians, Latvians, or 
Estonians no handicap. Many of their compatriots had achieved 
distinguished service records in the Red Army, with which every 
young Baltic officer was familiar. 
Under the Russians the organizational nucleus of the Baltic 
armies was accordingly preserved; the discipline, languages, and 
territorial structure remained as they were. Only gradually, 
with great caution and almost without painful incident, were 
the Baltic armies absorbed in the Red Army. 
As a first step, the Baltic armies were converted into people's 
armies by the expulsion of officers hostile to the popular move­
ment. The old high command in the Lithuanian, Latvian, and 
Estonian armies was dismissed and replaced not by Soviet ap­
pointees who were strangers to the natives, but by high-ranking 
Baltic officers who had either been active opponents of the 
Fascist dictators or had stood aloof from the pro-German rul­
ing clique. All the officers, whom the governments of Smetona, 
Ulmanis, and Pats had deprived of their commissions or 
neglected to promote on political grounds, were recommis-
sioned and promoted to higher ranks. 
In Lithuania the people's army was placed under the com­
mand of Brigadier General Baltusis-Zemaitis, one of the 
founders of the Lithuanian republic and its army, which he had 
led in decisive engagements during the war of liberation in 
1918-1919. 
In Estonia the people's army was organized under the com­
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mand of Colonel General Tonis Rotberg. Generals Klavins 
and Dambitis headed the people's army of Latvia. General 
Klavins had been assistant commander of the Riga garri­
son during the parliamentary regime. On the night of the coup 
staged by Ulmanis (May 15, 1934), he had been dismissed from 
his post and placed under house arrest, charged with being a 
potential organizer of defense for the old democratic regime. 
As for General Dambitis, tribute was paid him by none other 
than General Balodis, Minister of War and closest collaborator 
of the dictator Ulmanis. Speaking at the Officers' Club in Riga 
on December 19, 1939, on the occasion of General Dambitis's 
retirement, ostensibly because of age, General Balodis said: 
"General Dambitis is among the foremost soldiers of our na­
tional army. More than that, he began his work of creating our 
military forces as a member of the Presidium of the Latvian 
Military National Union before the existence of the Latvian 
state was formally proclaimed. In 1919, with a rifle in his hands, 
Dambitis took his place among the defenders of the Daugava 
River. In later years, General Dambitis served on the staff of 
the Latvian army, as assistant chief of staff." 
The command of the Baltic people's armies, later organized 
into the Baltic military district of the Red army, was therefore 
in the hands of a native officer corps left almost intact by the 
Russians.* Nor were the views or habits of native officers ruffled 
much by the introduction of the institute of Political Commis­
sars, a characteristic Communist innovation which the Russians 
carried through with much tact. 
To head the political administration in the Latvian people's 
army, for example, the Russians appointed a non-Communist, 
Captain Bruno Kalnins, a former officer and a Social Demo­
cratic deputy of the Diet. People familiar with the situation in 
* The total number of officers retired in the Latvian army was fifty, according 
to the report of Captain Bruno KalninS, chief of the political administration of 
that army. 
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Latvia could scarcely conceive a more unexpected choice. As 
head of the Social Democratic Labor Sports Union, Bruno 
Kalnins had waged a determined fight against the Communists. 
In Communist circles he was, without exaggeration, the most 
thoroughly hated of all the native Social Democrats. But he was 
also known to everybody as an implacable foe of Germany and 
Nazism, and the secretary of the anti-Fascist International, 
headed by the Austrian Social Democrat Julius Deutsch. The 
courageous struggle Kalnins had waged against the Fascist 
regime of Ulmanis, who had him confined for three years in 
jail and later banished from the country, inspired all anti-
Fascists with confidence in him. Moreover, as a result of his 
part in the war of liberation fought against Bermondt's German 
forces, Kalnins had good connections among Latvian officers 
and excellent qualifications as head of the political administra­
tion—the central political nerve of the Latvian army. Neither 
his Menshevik party standing nor the old, bitter enmity felt by 
Latvian Communists were charged against him, for the Soviets 
were not interested in settling ancient party feuds in the Baltic. 
They had business to do, preparations for the inevitable fight 
against the Nazis; and for this business, men of Captain Kalnins' 
type were most suitable.* 
Even after being incorporated in the Red army, the Baltic 
people's armies retained their national character as territorial 
military forces and continued to wear their national uniforms. 
The Latvian army was renamed the Latvian Territorial Rifle 
* The deliberate distortion of facts by some of the Baltic diplomats residing 
in the United States is astonishing. The New York Times published on July 23, 
1940, a long statement by the Latvian Minister in Washington, A. Bilmanis, 
setting forth as proof of Communist coercion of the Latvian army the allegation 
that the Russians had "a Latvian Communist at its head as political commissar." 
The Minister could hardly have been ignorant of the name and political affilia­
tions of Bruno KalninS—son of the president of the Diet—who for many years 
had been a prominent Social Democratic deputy and altogether one of the most 
brilliant representatives of the Latvian intellectual aristocracy 
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Corps, a name giving emphasis to its historic predecessors, the 
old Latvian riflemen, who had distinguished themselves during 
the famous Russian offensive in East Prussia in 1915 and later, 
in 1917, in the defense of Riga. But the association was deeper 
than a mere name for some of these former riflemen were still 
in service as instructors and officers of the new army. Aware of 
the national role played by the Baltic territorial armies, the 
Soviets were preparing them to resume their struggle against 
the Germans. 
FACTORY DIRECTORS FOR SOCIALIST RECONSTRUCTION 
The trend of Soviet policy in the Baltic states was most ap­
parent in domestic affairs, particularly in economic life. The 
general line of this policy in Latvia, a policy likewise applied in 
other Baltic states, was set forth in clear and unmistakable 
terms by an editorial published on July 4, 1940, in one of the 
first issues of Cina. Said the editorial: 
Changes in the economic system created by the old regime are 
essential. Everybody realizes that, but only the body of freely 
elected national deputies can settle the issues. The workers' party 
demands limitation of the economic powers of big capitalists and 
landowners; at the same time, it is convinced that all changes in 
this direction must be made only on the basis of laws adopted by 
the freely elected representatives of the people. This means there 
must be no recurrence of the malodorous actions of 1919. 
Thus, in plain, unequivocal language the Latvian Com­
munist party condemned the policy adopted in 1919 by the 
short-lived Latvian Soviets, under the direction of the old 
Bolsheviks, Stucka (later a prominent lawyer in Russia, where 
he died) and Danisevskis (at present a director in the Soviet 
lumber industry in north Russia). The terrorist methods em­
ployed by Soviets in Latvia in 1919 were aimed at destroying 
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the bourgeoisie as a class, but little distinction was made be­
tween small farmers or shopowners and real "capitalistic 
sharks." The Communist paper Cina, in the editorial quoted 
above, proceeds to dot the i's and cross the t's: 
During the twenty years of reaction the working class has learned 
that its economic demands must not be directed against the prop­
erty rights of small and moderately prosperous peasants and the 
productive bourgeoisie of the towns. Small peasants and artisans 
who themselves work on their farms or in their workshops, and also 
those somewhat more prosperous persons who, although hiring 
labor to assist them also work under the same conditions them­
selves, are not, properly speaking, enemies of the working class. 
Workers have no interest whatever in opposing the peasant's rights 
to his land or the ardsan's rights to his workshop and means of 
production. 
Moreover [continues the editorial] in respect to large enterprises 
of a capitalistic nature it is a mistake to believe that sweeping ex­
periments are now in order. Such experiments would only cause 
disorganization of the economic life and difficulties in the supply 
of the population.1 
Voicing an official view of the government, the Communist 
party organ directed its appeal both to owners or directors of 
large enterprises whose support was doubtful and to the small 
proprietors in town or country who were already stanch sup­
porters of the new regime. It was hoped, said the paper, that 
"the owners and directors of big enterprises will also continue 
to work conscientiously and will not permit closure of their 
business or reduction of output." 
Their means of "ensuring for themselves a place in the new 
order," suggested the editorial significantly, is "to perform their 
duties toward the people and the state as well as they did for 
their own interests"; whereas sabotage will prove tantamount 
to "exclusion from the people's collective organism and classi­
fication as enemies." 
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These pronouncements were not mere gestures, for the new 
government authority left former owners at the heads of many 
business concerns, and former executives and technical per­
sonnel almost without exception were allowed to remain at 
their posts. The only persons dismissed were those who had 
made themselves particularly objectionable to the workers. 
Even workers' complaints were viewed with moderation. Janis 
Spure, member of the Presidium of the Latvian Supreme Soviet 
and the secretary general of the Communist party, speaking at 
a meeting of the Riga Printers' Union on September 1, 1940, 
warned against "the ignorant elements who, instigated by the 
enemy, compromise the members of the workers' committees 
engaged in assisting the director, engineer, and management to 
organize industrial work." He continued, "It is an intolerable 
situation when the heads of factories are not supported in their 
work, when they are kept in fear and under threat of dismissal." 
No SWEEPING EXPERIMENTS 
Soviet reorganization of the entire economy of the Baltic 
countries was governed by the principle: go easy. Complete 
nationalization was carried out for railways and other means of 
transportation, and for banks. Nationalization of industrial 
enterprises was limited only to big concerns: in Latvia eight 
hundred were affected; in Lithuania, six hundred. All these en­
terprises were owned by persons whose annual income ranged 
from 20,000 to 500,000 litas (or lats)—which by local standards 
made them very wealthy. 
Small industrial and commercial firms were not nationalized 
nor were small apartment houses. Former owners remained in 
possession in all houses having less than 220 square meters of 
floor space in large urban centers like Riga, or less than 170 
square meters in smaller towns. 
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To give the populace a sense of economic stability, the new 
measures, apart from publication as decrees, were written into 
the constitutions adopted by the Baltic states and providing, in 
Article 6, that only big plants and big houses in towns and in­
dustrial centers shall become the property of the state. Whereas 
fisheries are nationalized in the U.S.S.R., decrees were passed 
in the Baltic excluding all fisheries from enterprises subject to 
nationalization. 
Thus, the new regime took pains to avoid anything that 
might provoke the opposition of large sections of the petty 
bourgeoisie. Having established their control over the key in­
dustries, transport, foreign trade, large dwelling houses, and 
public utilities, the Russians in the Baltic left private initia­
tive in the saddle over the vast remaining "sector" of national 
economy. How extensive this "private sector" was can be 
judged by the fact that the portfolio of People's Commissar of 
Labor, the supervisor of labor conditions in private industry, 
had to be introduced into the administrative system of the 
Baltic republics. No such post exists in any of the other re­
publics of the U.S.S.R. 
THE PEASANT POLICY 
The Baltic peasantry is extremely individualistic. Unlike 
that of Russia, it had never known communal economy. In 
Latvia and Estonia, but not so much in Lithuania, the peasants 
are farmers of the Danish or American type, who live not in 
villages but on isolated farms in the midst of fields. When 
Soviet garrison troops appeared on Baltic territory, anti-Soviet 
factions attempted to frighten the peasants with horror stories 
of collectivization, including prospects of sharing wives and 
children in common. 
For this reason, the first decree of the new Baltic govern­
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ments was as follows: "Every attempt to encroach on the pri­
vate property of the peasants, or to compel working peasants to 
organize collective farms against their wishes, will be severely 
punished, since such attempts injure the interests of the people 
and the state." 
Following this, several leaders issued statements making it 
clear that the Russians were particularly anxious to avoid any 
thing at all likely to arouse anti-Soviet feelings among the 
peasants. For example, the Premier of Lithuania, on July 11, 
1940, declared the aim of his government was to carry out the 
land reform in such a way that not a single peasant should be 
made to suffer. 
The basic provision of this land reform was a standard land 
ownership of thirty hectares, thus duplicating the standard of 
Latvian land reform which was carried out by the bourgeois-
peasant-Social Democratic governments of the first period of 
independence. Since in the Baltic economy a peasant farm of 
this size ensured a prosperous existence, the government reform 
in no way lowered the standard of peasant life. The only ele­
ments repressed were the so-called gray barons, who had built 
their fortunes and had risen to the class of landed gentry 
through buying up the land of bankrupt farmers; whereupon, 
they would migrate to the cities to engage in speculation, be­
coming in time absentee owners, no longer living on their land. 
Since hardly any land was taken away from individual peas­
ants for redistribution, the state land funds of Lithuania, Latvia, 
and Estonia were not large. The governments were unable to 
make large land grants. The usual allotment was from eight to 
ten hectares to landless peasants, and from three to four hec­
tares to substandard farmers. 
During the first six months of reform in the three republics, 
no fewer than 200,000 homesteads received new land as addi­
tional acreage. In Latvia 50,000 farm hands were granted land 
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allotments totaling 475,000 hectares; 23,000 substandard farmers 
received additional land totaling 75,000 hectares. Thus, out of 
the total state land fund of 1,000,000 hectares in Latvia, half 
was distributed during the first six months. 
In Lithuania 600,000 hectares of land were divided among 
over 70,000 farm hands and landless peasants. In Estonia about 
60,000 peasants received allotments and additional land from 
the Estonian land fund. 
Whether a peasant had previously owned land or had newly 
been granted it by the government, his right of private owner­
ship still was secured by the constitutions of the Baltic repub­
lics, in which the words "collective farm" are absent. Article 9 
proclaims: "Land occupied by peasant homesteads, within the 
limits set by law, is secured for their free use for unlimited 
time." 
The land situation in the Sovietized Baltic merits special at­
tention, because the Russians had to deal with a peasant pop­
ulation of the western European type. The policy pursued to 
organize collaboration between the peasantry and the workers' 
governments in the Baltic countries was different from that fol­
lowed in the U.S.S.R. In the Baltic, the Russians made no at­
tempt to introduce the system of collective farming, the very 
foundation of Soviet rural economy. On the contrary, they mul­
tiplied by tens of thousands the number of small independent 
farmers. In doing so the Russians did not relinquish, even tem­
porarily, their control over agriculture, the most important 
branch of Baltic national economy. Although collective farms 
were not set up, state control was actually enforced in a most 
effective manner. The rural system of co-operative societies, 
which during the preceding twenty years had been firmly estab­
lished, became the instrument of state control in the Baltic 
agrarian economy. 
These co-operative organizations had become, especially in 
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Latvia and Lithuania, very powerful as centers for marketing 
the chief farm products—export produce, in particular. Dairy 
products, bacon, eggs, and the like were handled through spe­
cial central organizations. In time these marketing bodies lost 
much of their original co-operative character and developed 
into what were substantially private enterprises, operated by the 
gray barons for personal gain and to the disadvantage of the 
average peasant. The trade in certain farm produce—such as 
flax or seeds, for example—was a state monopoly. Under the 
general system in force before the Russians entered the coun­
try, special receiving centers had been set up all over the coun­
try, and to them the farmer was accustomed to bring all his 
surplus products for sale either to the co-operative or to the 
state at a fixed price. Therefore, the Russians were able to se­
cure, simply by taking over the co-operative apparatus, im­
mediate control over the entire mechanism of rural economy 
without interfering with the proprietary interests of the peasant. 
In dealing with the religious sentiments of the peasants, the 
Russians also showed consideration, especially, in countries of 
strong clerical influence and prevalent Catholic faith, such as 
Lithuania and Latgale (the Catholic region of Latvia). 
Priests in country districts were placed on an equal footing 
with the peasants and were granted the same rights of land 
tenure, being allowed likewise to own not more than thirty 
hectares. The Lithuanian government even granted a further 
concession, by ratifying the following regulations of the State 
Land Commission: "In every parish where at the present time 
the clergy officiate at the altar, the rector and the priest ap­
pointed by the canon shall receive for their use out of the parish 
land owned by the Roman Catholic Church three hectares of 
land each, including garden and arable land." 
A lot of water did flow under the Soviet bridge in the interim 
between 1918 and 
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DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION 
How public sentiment in the Baltic countries was trans­
formed before one's eye under the driving "winds of history" 
has been described by a well-known Polish writer, who was in 
Lithuania during the entire period of Soviet administration. 
She writes: 
The new reality came upon the dumbfounded average citizen 
in the shape of lines outside the stores, pictures of labor heroes in 
the papers, posters on the walls, films without a happy ending and 
the kiss, and overcrowded houses. Every day life became more and 
more ascetic, and lacking in comfort. People began to realize there 
was no returning to the past. Ahead was a tremendous straining of 
energy; ahead lay the spreading of the world conflagration. In that 
conflagration the prewar world would be consumed to the ground. 
Sitting in cafes, nibbling at minute synthetic cakes, ladies said 
mournfully: Capitalism is coming to its end all over the world. 
What is not yet clear to many intellectuals in countries spared by 
the war, is here understood by everyone, from the sharp-witted lad 
who sells mittens under an archway to the banker's wife who shivers 
and wraps herself in a knitted shawl.2 
It was this realization of the world catastrophe, of the irre­
vocability of supervening changes, which prompted certain sec­
tions of the Baltic population to offer a wholly unexpected and 
equally loyal support to the new regime. Everyone put all he 
had into the rebuilding of life on a new basis. It was discov­
ered that what had seemed fantastic was actually possible, that 
under certain circumstances democrats, even of the bourgeois 
variety, and Social Democrats, too, were able to co-operate loy­
ally with the Bolsheviks on the platform of thorough socio­
economic reforms. 
On the other hand, it was made plain that, given an oppor­
tunity for "a second youth," Bolshevism makes wide use of its 
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Russian experience, follows a flexible policy, and knows how 
to avoid the errors of terrorism, sectarianism, and a class nar­
rowness which constricts the social foundation of the regime. 
Through the collaboration of Communist with Social Demo­
crat and Bourgeois Democrat, of peasant with city intellectual, 
of worker with former capitalist, a unique system was created 
in the Baltic, prior to the German invasion—a system demo­
cratic in spirit and method, socialist in tendency, and display­
ing a strong though certainly not dominant socialized segment 
of national economy—side by side with co-operatively organized 
peasants. The war interrupted this highly promising laboratory 
experiment of an original synthesis of revolutionary ideas and 
democratic habits and traditions. After liberation of the Baltic 
from the Germans, the experiment will no doubt be continued. 
It can be maintained that no generalizations are permissible 
on the strength of a single experiment in the Baltic. That may 
be true. Even so, the experiment of successful collaboration of 
such diverse public elements is vested with considerable interest 
at present, when so much depends on the possibility of collab­
oration between democratic and social-revolutionary forces. 
The significance of this experiment is heightened by the fact 
that the agent entering into the collaboration with the demo­
crats was not a local Communist party, but the U.S.S.R. itself 
—the Soviet administration. It was thus demonstrated in the 
Baltics that the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet government are capable 
of doing business with democrats sincerely and over a period of 
time not only in matters of foreign policy, but also in the field 
of internal socio-political reconstruction. 
Since this proved to be possible in one small locality, it is 
reasonable to believe that it would be workable in other parts 
of the world. 
C H A P T E R  X  
Ostland: Reichsminister 
Alfred Rosenberg 
SETTING THE STAGE FOR WAR—FINLAND: MARCH 1940 TO JUNE 
i94i 
A clash between the U.S.S.R. and Germany was inevitable. 
This was clear in 1939 and 1940 to all in the Baltic nations, al­
though the newspapers maintained a tense unbroken silence. 
But the inhabitants of Kaunas, Riga, and Tallinn needed no 
editorials to explain what the Russians were driving at in the 
Baltic area. They saw Soviet policy unfolding before their eyes. 
Meanwhile, across the Gulf, they could easily follow the de­
liberate designs of the Germans in Finland. With genuine 
alarm the population observed the danger signals in the Finnish 
policy of 1940-1941. If Anglo-Saxon circles were then unaware 
of the situation, it was chiefly because many persons were still 
complacent and would not face disturbing facts. 
When military operations ceased along the entire Russo-
Finnish front at noon on March 13, 1940, it became apparent 
that Russia had exacted minimum demands from defeated Fin­
land. In his address to the Sixth Session of the Supreme Soviet 
of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Foreign Commissar V M. Molotov 
had every reason to point out that "the Soviet Union, having 
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smashed the Finnish army and being thus enabled to occupy 
the whole of Finland, did not do so and did not demand any 
reparations for her war expenditures as any other power would 
have done." 1 
After the victory of Soviet arms, as during the diplomatic 
negotiations preceding the outbreak of hostilities, the Soviet 
government sought to gain military security alone and not to 
liquidate the Finnish state or to debase the national dignity of 
Finland. Even after her successful military encounter, the 
U.S.S.R. pursued her peculiar policy of appeasement. 
The Russians persisted in their efforts to placate the Finnish 
military and government leaders, whose involvement with 
Germany and the Hitlerites was apparently underestimated by 
the Russians. Soviet troops, who had for some months occupied 
Petsamo, evacuated in accord with the peace terms, after work­
ing several days to restore order in the town. There was no 
counterdemolition to retaliate for the wholesale destruction 
carried out by the Civil Guards in the Finnish territory ceded 
to Russia. 
Nor did the Russians protest when their base in Hango, 
which had been leased to them for thirty years, proved to be 
literally encircled. To the north of Hango the Finnish govern­
ment erected fortifications mounting heavy guns aimed at the 
back of the Soviet garrison. 
According to Article 7 of the Finnish-Soviet peace treaty, 
both parties were obliged in the shortest possible time to con­
struct a railway spur to their respective borders, connecting 
Kandalaksha with Kemijarvi. Although Finland dallied with 
construction of the line east from Kemijarvi, the U.S.S.R. 
within six weeks had completed their spur west from Kan­
dalaksha to the Finnish frontier. 
Moreover, the Finnish-Soviet trade agreement provided for 
a limited trade exchange, but the Finnish government was in 
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no hurry to trade with Russia. During the first year Finland 
exported to Russia only twelve per cent of the agreed quota. 
Yet the U.S.S.R. refrained from protest. Despite the Finnish 
lapse, the Soviet foreign trade commissariat was ordered not to 
delay grain shipments to Finland. 
This policy of "turning the other cheek" did not do the Rus­
sians any good. The purpose was to win the sympathy of the 
Finnish people, but time was running short and the art of 
winning friends takes a long time. The Soviet government was 
certainly not so naive as to expect that Mannerheim and Svin-
hufvud, who had originally started the war against Russia, now 
could suddenly be reformed. 
Even while Finnish delegates were negotiating in Moscow 
about stopping the war and were imploring the Russians to 
display magnanimity, the veteran plotter Svinhufvud visited 
both Berlin and Rome and talked with Hermann Goering, the 
Reich Air Minister. He was given to understand, as it was later 
reported, that at the moment the Fiihrer could not openly side 
with the Finns, but he promised to do so in the future. On his 
return Svinhufvud immediately contacted the proper ruling 
circles in Finland and persuaded them to prepare for the com­
ing joint German-Finnish armed front against the U.S.S.R. 
The preparations made were both political and military. 
Hardly had the peace treaty with the U.S.S.R. been signed 
than the Finnish government endeavored to involve Norway 
and Sweden in a defensive union of the Scandinavian coun­
tries. A favorite child of German diplomacy, which always con­
ceived this "defensive" union as a link in a German-controlled 
military bloc against the U.S.S.R. in northern Europe, this plan 
was too familiar for the Russians not to recognize the danger 
at once. 
The immediate and resolute opposition of the Soviet govern­
ment disrupted this Finnish scheme. Besides, influential circles 
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in the Scandinavian countries were not so eager to become in­
volved in the current anti-Russian conspiracy. The disposition 
of these circles, who have now become more convinced in their 
opinions, especially in Norway, was recently distinctly expressed 
by the Norwegian Halvdan Koht. In reply to a Stockholm 
dispatch from George Axelson to the New York Times about 
a projected Scandinavian bloc for defense against Russia, Koht 
wrote to the editor of the paper, as follows: 
Your Stockholm correspondent, George Axelson, certainly mis­
reads Norwegian ideas when he, in his telegram in your edition of 
May 2, ventures to state that, after this war, Norwegians will be 
glad to have Sweden say the decisive words about their alliances, 
and that they would be willing to enter a union with Sweden with 
the first, last and perpetual aim of forming a bulwark against Rus­
sian aggression. 
According to all reports from Norway, there is no doubting that 
the Norwegian nation is perfectly satisfied by her present alliance 
with her two great neighboring powers, Great Britain to the west 
and Russia to the east, and she will not be willing to let Sweden 
draw her out of this alliance, no more than out of the alliance with 
the United States and the other United Nations. 
Norway certainly will be glad to see Sweden enter again the 
Nordic co-operation after this war, but it is just as certain that 
nobody in Norway can conceive of such co-operation as founded 
upon suspicions or fears of Russian plans. 
By virtue of a friendship of long standing between Norway and 
Russia, Norwegians feel convinced that the Soviet government has 
no plans of encroaching upon their independence or their territory. 
Rather, they should feel their country endangered if they allowed 
themselves to be lured into such policies as foreshadowed by your 
correspondent. -2 
When the idea of the Scandinavian bloc came to naught, the 
Finns advanced a proposal to create a military-political union 
of the Baltic states to be known as the "Zone of the Baltic Sea." 
Behind this proposal loomed the shadow of the German gen­
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eral staff, seeking a devious path for its return to the Baltic area. 
This scheme was not merely condemned by Russia. Russia was 
also obviously impelled to hasten complete Soviet control over 
the Baltic area because the dictators, who still held office in the 
Baltic states, were evidently ready to enter the conspiracy. 
Their intentions were revealed in secret and open diplomatic 
acts as well as in conferences between the chiefs of the respec­
tive general staffs. 
The military preparations of the Finns and Germans on 
Finnish territory were an open secret. The Finnish government 
and generals realized that Finland was an outpost of the Ger­
man army and that the U.S.S.R. would hesitate long before un­
dertaking anything which might swing into movement the 
mighty war of the titans. Therefore, they were brazenly in­
sulting to Russia. 
On the very day military operations ended, March 13, 1940, 
General Mannerheim, in an order to the Finnish army, an­
nounced that "the sacred mission of the army is to be an out­
post of Western civilization in the East." 
The end of hostilities did not bring demobilization in 
Finland. On the contrary, large-scale fortification work was im­
mediately begun along the new frontiers. The workers em­
ployed were recruited from among those previously engaged 
at armaments plants. During 1940-1941, Finland placed big 
munitions orders in many countries, chiefly Sweden, Germany, 
and the United States, purchasing hundreds of heavy guns, 
thousands of warplanes, and other arms. 
Germany openly encouraged all this activity. The Germans 
supervised the construction of defense works along the new 
frontier with the U.S.S.R. Germany supplied all the ferro­
concrete installations for the new Mannerheim Line. 
Nazi activity in Finland assumed large proportions after Sep­
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tember 1940, when German troops were allowed to enter Fin­
nish territory on the pretext of transit passage to Norway. In 
reality, this signified the occupation of Finland by Germany. 
The railways of western Finland passed into Nazi hands. The 
Germans were garrisoned chiefly in the Lapland region, where 
Finnish military forces were commanded by the notorious Gen­
eral Wallenius, a mature Fascist conspirator, who gladly turned 
over his residence to the Germans. 
The comradeship-in-arms between Finnish militarists and 
the Hitlerite Reichswehr was marked by such demonstrative 
acts as the German and Finnish staffs sharing the same quar­
ters, often under a single sign, such as "Defense Staff of the 
Gulf of Bothnia." Through the ports of Helsinki, Turku, 
Vaasa, and Petsamo the Germans, with almost no attempt at 
concealment, delivered large shipments of arms to Finland. 
Joint German-Finnish war maneuvers were held. 
After March 1940 the German mission in Helsinki was en­
larged, becoming the largest diplomatic mission in the Finnish 
capital. Apart from the very active German envoy, Bliicher, the 
mission comprised ten other ranking diplomats, five of them 
military, as well as innumerable officials of the embassy itself, 
the press bureau, the Nazi party, and the Gestapo. Scattered 
throughout Finland were eleven consulates, eafch with an over­
sized staff. 
It was smooth sailing for the German diplomats and the 
Gestapo in Finland, where the government and the army re­
ceived them with open arms, while the fifth column was fat­
tened on the nourishing beef tea of subsidized propaganda. 
In April 1941, some 12,000 German troops disembarked at 
Turku with tanks and arms: reinforcements for the increasingly 
impressive Hitlerite garrison in Finland. At the time it was 
saicj that the landing was carried out at Mannerheim's request. 
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However, the Germans did not need any prodding, since to 
them Finland was a springboard for attack on the U.S.S.R., and 
they were determined to use it to the utmost. 
During 1940 and 1941 the Finnish state radio broadcasting 
service was engaged in a systematic pro-German campaign. 
Glamorized biographies of German leaders were regularly 
transmitted for Finnish listeners. Hitler's Mein Kampf was 
printed and circulated in huge editions. An endless stream of 
German journalists, actors, and others came to Finland on 
excursions. 
To swing the population toward Fascism at home many 
Fascist and semi-Fascist societies were organized in Finland. 
Thriving on State subsidies they sprang up like mushrooms 
after a rain. A most active part in these new organizations— 
the "Comrades in Arms," "Revival of Finland," "Union of 
Invalids," et cetera—was taken by the former Jaegers: that is, 
the Finnish soldiers who had been trained during World War I 
in Germany and had fought then in the ranks of the German 
army. Again the militant youth of Finland were likewise sent 
to Germany to be trained for the new Jaeger units in process 
of formation. 
At the beginning of January 1941 an official Fascist magazine, 
The National Socialist, appeared in Finland. Not without 
reason did the German press hail Finland, observing that "the 
main line of the authoritarian regime there became set after 
March 1940" 8 and that the German Reich's friendly policy 
toward Finland over recent decades remains a golden tradition.4 
Although the unusually cautious policy of the U.S.S.R. to­
ward Finland strengthened the anti-Fascist forces, the opposi­
tion was impotent to halt the march of Finnish Fascism toward 
the abyss of war. The democratic politicians headed by Karl 
Wiik, who had himself been ousted from Social Democratic 
leadership by Tanner, and the established liberal groups were 
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able to muster several thousand followers in an organization for 
"Finno-Russian understanding," but all together they were 
too feeble to withstand the police and Fascist hoodlums who 
broke up their meetings and suppressed street demonstrations. 
At the opportune moment, democratic leaders were thrown 
into prison and the unopposed Finnish government could then 
call up the reserves on June 17, 1941, just five days before the 
Nazis launched their invasion of Russia. On that same day Fin­
land declared her "political connection with the League of 
Nations broken." 
A few days later Risto Ryti made an unctuous radio speech, 
saying that "the whole genius of Hitler and the entire might of 
Germany will assist Finland in the war." Then Mannerheim, 
again at the head of Finnish forces, issued his battle order re­
minding the troops that "already in 1918 he had told the Finns 
and Karelians he would not sheathe his sword until Karelia is 
liberated." 
Trailing behind the Hitler war chariot, jackals licked their 
chops in anticipation of promised booty. 
WAR BEGINS IN THE BALTIC AREA 
June 22, 1941. Sweeping all before it, the Hitlerite avalanche 
descended on the Baltic area. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia 
bore the full impact of the blitzkrieg launched by the German 
Wehrmacht, heralded as the world's most powerful war ma­
chine and glorified in the legend of invincibility. No country in 
Europe had been able to withstand or bring it to a halt. What 
could be expected of the tiny Baltic states? 
But had the arrogant German generals, then intoxicated by 
unbroken victory, been able to reflect on their experience in the 
Baltic area, they might well have hesitated before plunging to 
their doom in an offensive against the main Russian land. For 
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in assaulting the Baltic outposts, the German army at the very 
outset encountered a stubborn resistance that multiplied ten­
fold as these modern woebegone Napoleons advanced to invade 
Russia itself. 
In the Baltic nations the population rose in arms. Resistance 
came not merely from the few Soviet garrisons stationed at 
coastal points; and not only from the national regular armies of 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, whose trained regiments put up 
a fighting retreat to the northern shore of Riga Bay and the Gulf 
of Finland, for a last stand in the north of Estonia, while re­
cruits were being dispatched to the interior of Russia to be 
mobilized into new fighting units. The resistance was uni­
versal; even civilians joined in the battle, erecting street barri­
cades, disrupting communications, and acting as snipers. Such 
local action first blocked the German mechanized forces in 
Daugavpils, where armed railway workers and local young peo­
ple, mostly Jews, blew up the ferry crossing the Dvina River 
and then converted every house in this small town of 40,000 
inhabitants into a fortress, compelling the Nazi troops to storm 
it street by street. Enacted here in miniature were the later legen­
dary defenses of Leningrad, Moscow, Sevastopol, and Stalin­
grad. 
The stripling lads of Daugavpils had not been trained for 
this struggle. All they knew of military affairs had been ac­
quired during one year's compulsory service in the antiquated 
Latvian army. Almost none of them had ever seen a tank, 
while the flight of an airplane was a great event in Daugavpils. 
Yet they were determined to make a stand against the monstrous 
weight of invading tanks and dive bombers. 
Had the Germans used their heads, they would have realized 
what awaited them in Russia itself, where people knew how to 
handle a tank and an automatic rifle. In the Baltic area, civilian 
resistance was also stanch at Krustpils, Riga, Tartu, and Lie-
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paja. Liepaja was only a few score miles from the nearest Ger­
man frontier post. Surprised there, the soldiers had no time to 
evacuate, but they sold their lives dearly. For a whole week 
the Wehrmacht could not overcome the resistance of the Lie­
paja garrison. Even after the Germans had occupied the town 
and their main army was far advanced to the east and the 
north, fierce street fighting suddenly flared up in Liepaja. 
Only with field artillery could the Germans blast out the last 
barricades erected by the enraged citizenry. More than 10,000 
Liepaja workers were shot by the Germans. 
According to the plans of the Soviet general staff, the Baltic 
area was viewed as a field for rearguard action designed to delay 
the enemy. Taking up defense positions in northern Estonia on 
a line from Paldiski to Narva, units of the Latvian, Lithuanian, 
and Estonian national armies operating jointly with Soviet air-
; men, Red Army infantry and tanks blocked the onslaught of the 
German army, and for ten weeks they prevented the Nazis from 
closing the siege ring around Leningrad. Only after firing their 
last shells did they stage a Baltic Dunkirk, evacuating the coast 
under terrific pounding by Stukas. In bombarded vessels and 
with heavy losses, heroic remnants crossed the Gulf of Finland 
to Leningrad, where the last-ditch successful stand was made. 
THE BARONS RETURN 
Following in the van of the Wehrmacht, the Gestapo arrives 
in every country occupied by the Germans. But the Baltic area 
suffered a still greater misfortune, since the Nazi troops brought 
with them, bag and baggage, the German barons who had been 
driven out. For the Baltic nations this meant that those who 
arrived were not simply hangmen and impassive jailers, but 
hangmen who knew every corner of the country and every per­
son intimately, who bitterly hated the local inhabitants, nursed 
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a consuming desire for vengeance, and regarded themselves as 
hereditary masters to whom the people were but chattel. 
To be sure, not all the Germans who had left during the 
Soviet-German Pact returned. Permission to return was given 
only to those who, during the intervening two years, had proven 
themselves loyal Hitlerites. 
Lacking enough German colonizers, the Nazis proclaimed the 
Baltic area a land for the resettlement of the Dutch as well. In 
Holland, young zealots of the Dutch Nazi leader Mussert 
have not had marked success in recruiting settlers of good 
Fascist repute. Nevertheless, the first contingents of Dutch 
Fascists appeared in the Baltic countries shortly after the Ger­
mans had been reinstated there. 
The new masters demanded from the local inhabitants in­
demnity for all losses incurred by the Germans during their 
former evacuation, although it had been carried out by formal 
agreement with Hitler. From all dwellings that Germans had 
previously occupied, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians were 
ousted to make room for their "rightful owners." The Ger­
mans also proclaimed themselves to be sole owners of all 
denationalized property and of all Jewish holdings. Posing as 
the heirs apparent of the Teutonic order, Germans in the Baltic 
area have now organized what is called the Deutsche Orden, 
which aims to fulfill a long-cherished dream of reactionary 
Germany: the Germanization of the Baltic territory. 
The very names Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have been 
abolished. In their place has appeared the province of Ostland 
headed by Reichskommissar Heinrich Lohse.* Ostland is di­
vided into four General-Bezierke—Latvian, Lithuanian, Es­
tonian, and Belorussian—which are administered by military 
commissars, among whom the Lithuanian Governor General 
von Rintelen is most distinguished for brutality. The Com-
* Recently killed by fearless Belorussian Partisans. 
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missar for Latvia is Dr. Drechsler and for Estonia—Litzmann. 
The occupation authorities are subordinate to the Ministry of 
Occupied Eastern Provinces in Berlin, which is headed by 
Alfred Rosenberg, who is a Baltic German and high priest of 
Nazi philosophy. 
The establishment of a special "Grundstiick Gesellschaft" 
(real estate company), which has jurisdiction over all real estate, 
buildings, and industrial plants, was one of the first acts taken 
by the German authorities. This Gesellschaft is directed by 
commissioners sent from Berlin; it certifies the rights of private 
persons to property which had formerly been nationalized. If 
a given person has rendered meritorious service to the Reich, 
he becomes the owner of the property in question; otherwise, 
it is handed over to German or Dutch settlers. 
Since the collective-farm system had not been introduced in 
the Baltic area, the peasants remained in permanent individual 
possession of their land, and the Germans could not represent 
themselves to the peasantry as restorers of private property. 
They began, on the contrary, to confiscate those peasant plots 
which either had been added to the holdings of small farmers 
by the Soviet government or were claimed by German barons 
as their property through "historic" right. In this way, literally 
many thousand—not merely isolated—peasant farms were con­
fiscated. 
The peasants now once again felt the heavy hand of the 
barons. The Germans sought to take from the Baltic whatever 
provisions they could get hold of quickly. In the rural areas it 
was common talk that the Baltic Germans had replaced the 
usual greeting "Heil Hitler" with the more appropriate "But­
ter, Eier und Speck" (butter, eggs, and bacon), since they 
thought of nothing else. A natural assessment was levied on 
the peasants, obligating them to deliver a certain quota of 
farm products to the authorities. These assessments were most 
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exorbitant. The amount of butter, eggs, and other products 
which the peasants in certain districts were required to deliver 
to the Germans exceeded even the highest local output ever 
attained in the best years. Besides, all the peasants were held 
mutually responsible for quota deliveries, while nonfulfillment 
entailed confiscation of their land. In an age-long unequal 
struggle against the German barons, the Baltic peasantry had 
remained unsubdued. Nor would they now allow Hitlerite off­
spring of the feudal barons to oppress them with impunity. 
Partisan warfare flared up immediately after the first German 
forces appeared in the Baltic area, and a fierce unrelenting 
struggle against German occupation is waged today in the rural 
areas of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. 
PARTISAN WARFARE 
At the outset, the partisans operated in large detachments, 
actually small armies, whose leaders are now legendary figures. 
To cope with them, the Germans had to deploy from offensive 
military action large forces used on purely punitive operations. 
Partisan activity embraced whole districts and contributed to 
delay the advance of the enemy's main armies. According to a 
German newspaper report, during the month of July 1942 
alone the German command had to dispatch in succession two 
punitive expeditions into the Jaunlatgale district of Latvia to 
stamp out guerrilla warfare. The first expedition had been 
decoyed into swampland and wiped out. 
In combating the partisans, the Germans resorted to very 
efficient countermeasures. To establish control over the peas­
antry from whom the partisans sprang, they introduced a com­
plex intelligence system, with agents stationed in rural areas 
and reporting by field telephone to the nearest military com­
mand. The agents were recruited from among local Germans 
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or trusted Fascists from the ranks of the Aizsargi in Latvia or 
the Saulistai in Lithuania; that is, from the membership of or­
ganizations which had formerly been the main props under 
the Ulmanis and Smetona regimes. 
This German action compelled the large partisan detach­
ments to disperse into small bands operating along lines sim­
ilar to those followed by the "forest brothers," who had made 
life miserable for the barons in 1905. Instead of organizing gen­
eral uprisings of entire districts, the partisans directed their 
struggle at limited objectives, striking the Germans from am­
bush by day or by night in surprise raids. 
To the credit of these partisan bands is a long record of 
raids on enemy detachments, innumerable acts of sabotage and 
general subversive work. 
Latvian partisans blew up the bridge near the Valka station, 
dynamited the railway shops in Daugavpils, demolished the 
railway depot at Krustpils, seized a truckload of arms near Riga, 
burned down, near Plavinas, the house occupied by the Ger­
man commandant together with storm troopers dispatched to 
confiscate peasant products—and all this within a short period. 
These actions were reported in an early account, one of scores 
now regularly received from Lithuanians, Latvians, and Es­
tonians at the fighting front. At a recent meeting in Moscow to 
celebrate the third anniversary of the Baltic Soviet Republics, 
representatives of the Baltic units in the Red Army reported 
accomplishments of the Latvian and Estonian Partisans and of 
the Lithuanian guerrilla armies "Vilnius" and "Zalgiris." These 
fighters are said to be abundantly provided with automatic 
arms and hand grenades. 
The ground under German feet is no less hot in the Baltic 
cities. The arrogant conquerors were not long in reminding the 
Baltic people of those forgotten days when the German master 
race had without restraint made laughingstock of the natives. 
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Everything is done to impress the Baltic people with a sense of 
their inferiority. Even the quota of hostages—two hundred to 
be shot for every slain German—is higher in the Baltic than it 
is in western European countries. In Kaunas four hundred 
Lithuanians were executed recently as hostages for two slain 
German soldiers. 
Jim Crow regulations are enforced. The natives are not per­
mitted to ride in the same trains or streetcars that the "master 
race" travel in. Natives receive a third of the wages paid to 
Germans for the same kind of work. Rations for natives are 
also scaled correspondingly lower than rations for Germans. For 
example, a Latvian in Riga is allowed 1,750 grams of bread, 
200 grams of meat, 50 of sugar, and 50 of salt a week. A German 
gets 3,500 grams of bread, 700 grams of meat, 130 of butter, 125 
of fats, 100 of cheese, 250 of sugar, 125 of salt and 3 eggs. 
Newspapers, which are not German-language papers, must be 
published both in the native language and in German transla­
tion. The German language is compulsory in government offices 
and courts of law. Court procedure resembles the former for­
eign concessions in China, with separate courts for the trial of 
Germans. Natives stand trial before native judges, who are of a 
lower grade and whose decisions can be appealed or reversed in 
a German court. 
The greatest humiliation which the inhabitants endure, 
however, is the incessant slave trade. Daily, scores of Lithu­
anians, Latvians, and Estonians are transported to Germany 
for slave labor in the RAD—Reichsarbeitsdienst. They are 
rounded up in a very simple manner. A police cordon sur­
rounds some district, checking up all identification documents. 
Only those are released who have a special pass issued by the 
German occupation authorities. The rest either disappear com­
pletely or are loaded immediately on freight cars for shipment 
to work in Germany. The rare letters that reach relatives from 
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persons exiled to Germany tell of almost incredible hardships. 
The working day is unlimited. Punishment for infringement of 
discipline includes loss of rations and starvation. 
The degradation imposed on the Baltic prisoners in Ger­
many is worst of all. It affords the Hitlerites a special sadistic 
pleasure to compel native Baltic students to work as street 
cleaners in Berlin; as much as to say, "What right have you, 
menials of a lower race, to study science?" On good authority it 
is now also known that many of the Baltic girls, abducted to 
Germany, have been forcibly put into brothels for soldiers. This 
is confirmed by letters from several of the girls and by the 
testimony of a few girls who managed to escape. These unfor­
tunate girls, we learn, are branded by red-hot irons or tattooing 
with the letters SM, meaning Soldaten-Madchen (a soldier's 
girt)-
Considering the outrageous conduct of the Nazis, it would 
be surprising if groups of city folk, students, workers, and others 
simply driven to frenzy did not from time to time join up with 
the peasant partisans. Hundreds of Jewish young people, 
refugees from foul ghettos, have also joined the partisans. 
Dreadful reports have been made of the horrible persecution 
of Jews in the ghettos of Riga and Kaunas. It is a tale of the 
unmitigated horror in which the German Gestapo has become 
past master, surpassing even the worst nightmare. On the basis 
of information received in Switzerland about events in the Riga 
ghetto, American Jewish organizations have compiled a report 
for the United States Department of State. Here are excerpts: 
On November 29, 1941, an additional order was issued, saying 
that all men able for work and between the ages of 18 and 60 years 
had to line up in a street near the newly established small ghetto 
on November 30, while the rest of the population would be sent 
to camps. Each person was allowed to take along 20 kg. of luggage. 
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On November 30, the announced selection among the male popula­
tion took place. 
All people over 60 and all people ill or disabled were sent home 
to the large ghetto and also all doctors were sent home. The re­
sult of the selection was that as from November 30, about 4,000 
men were settled in the small ghetto. The living conditions there 
were awful. There was even less space than in the former ghetto. 
In a small room 16 people were living, five persons sleeping in one 
bed. 
In the night of November 30, all people living in one part of 
the large ghetto, numbering 8,000, were assembled. They had 
their luggage of 20 kg. with them. They had to stand there during 
the whole night without shelter and in the early hours of the 
morning of December 1, they were led away by Latvian auxiliary 
police under German supervision. 
They had to pass along the fence which separated the large 
ghetto from the small ghetto, so that the men inside the small 
ghetto were seeing what was going on. During their march, the 
group of 8,000 was treated with the utmost brutality. Those who 
were unable to keep pace were shot. The group of 8,000 was led 
to the woods, the so-called wood of Bickern and the wood near 
Zarnikau, and there all the 8,000 were shot. 
After this mass execution, only 16,000 Jews remained in the old 
ghetto. 
In the following week nothing special happened. Only 800 
women were arrested, 400 were imprisoned while the other 400 
returned some time later to the ghetto. 
On December 7, an order was issued that all women had to be at 
home by 7 o'clock in the evening. In the night of December 7 to 
December 8, the 16,000 people still in the old ghetto were assembled 
and taken away, just like the 8,000 a week before. 
According to a statement of the commander of the Latvian ghetto 
guard who later told about these things to some people with whom 
he took drinks, the 16,000 people were led to the woods. Russian 
prisoners of war had to dig trenches 3 to 4 meters deep. Then the 
men were separated from the women and children, each group 
standing to one side of the trenches. Anything of any value they 
possessed had to be laid down at a certain spot. Then the 16,000 
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had to undress so that the men were completely naked while the 
women were allowed to keep their skirts. 
All the clothes had to be put down and were collected by the 
police. Then the naked men were ordered to lie down in the 
trenches after which five or six German soldiers with machine-guns 
arrived and shot the men lying in the trenches. The next group 
had to lie down on the bodies and were shot in the same way. 
Women and children suffered the same fate. 
The shots of public avengers ring out in the city streets ever 
more frequently. More and more German barracks in Baltic 
cities are blown up in a crescendo of retributive explosions. 
The Germans reply with mass arrests and executions. Under­
ground sources have informed the Baltic people living in 
Russia that the number of Lithuanians killed by the Germans 
has already reached 30,000, and more than 100,000 Lithuanians 
are confined in prisons or concentration camps. Not less than 
120,000 inhabitants of Latvia have been slain. Meanwhile, the 
Nazis threaten new repressions against recalcitrant Baltic peo­
ple and cast ironic slurs at those muzhiks who think themselves 
above cleaning streets in manorial Berlin or serving the glorious 
German army in a brothel.5 
The full weight of German vengeance has fallen on the cen­
ters of cultural life of the Baltic countries. Recent reports 
from Sweden brought news from occupied Lithuania that prac­
tically all prominent intellectuals—including professors, physi­
cians, lawyers, and priests—have been arrested by the German 
authorities. George Axelson, the New York Times correspond­
ent in Stockholm, writes: 
All universities and public libraries have been closed and 
Gestapo hordes sent out willfully to destroy or remove the equip­
ment of scientific institutions and the books of national libraries. 
Thus, it is believed here the Nazi occupation powers have now 
set about systematically to wreck the countryside, break up cultural 
institutions and ruthlessly persecute the educated classes. 
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In Vilna, for instance, it is reported, Gestapo gangs smashed up 
all apparatus at the Academy of Medicine. Police came down also 
on the Academy of Sciences, burning manuscripts for a Lithuanian 
dictionary which had required forty years to compile, as well as 
smashing up 2,000 gramophone recordings of Lithuanian folk-songs. 
The Academy of Arts was also ransacked. In Kaunas, archives of 
the Academies of Science and Music and of the Faculty of Law 
were destroyed. Ten thousand volumes were stolen from the State 
Library and 23,000 more from the University Library, it is asserted.6 
Recently, the small partisan bands again began assembling 
into large detachments concentrating their forces in districts 
near the Lake Ilmen-Velikie Luki line, where the Red army is 
evidently preparing a big striking force. Regular liaison has 
now been established between the partisans and units of the 
Red army, and at the appointed time their action will be co­
ordinated. 
BALTIC REFUGEES IN RUSSIA 
Kaarel Pusta, who was Foreign Minister at the time Estonia 
followed a pro-Polish policy, recently published in America a 
pamphlet about Estonian-Russian relations. He writes that the 
Russians no doubt aim to liquidate the Estonians as a nation, 
and as evidence thereto presents the following figures: 
On December 1, 1941, the population of Estonia numbered 
1,010,135, i.e., 111,865, or 10 per cent less than in 1934. According 
to the estimates of the local authorities, 60,911 people were deported 
to Soviet Russia—40,737 from the towns and 20,174 from the coun­
ty-
Similarly, in Latvia the disappearance of 60,000 people, including 
20,000 women, 7,300 children and 3,100 killed, has so far been ac­
counted for. Until recendy the names of 30,000 deportees had been 
registered in Lithuania. 
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The honorable diplomat indulges also in a count of the eco­
nomic damage done by the Bolsheviks: 
The economic life of these countries has been seriously stricken. 
Estonia lost the greater part of her shipping, 85 per cent of her 
motor vehicles, 70 per cent of her railway equipment. The number 
of horses either destroyed or requisitioned is over 52,000; 219,504 
head of cattle were lost as were also 274,350 sheep and 123,439 pigs. 
About 6,000 farms and 3,000 town houses were blown up or burned 
in execution of the "scorched earth" strategy. 
In the statistical exercises of the Baltic ex-diplomat this men­
tion of the scorched-earth strategy is the only hint that the 
migration of the population and economic destruction occurred 
in connnection with an important event which took place in 
1941—German invasion of Russia and its Baltic regions. Passing 
this information, which is based exclusively on data published 
by the German occupation authorities, to the American public, 
the Baltic ex-diplomat purposely attempts to create the impres­
sion that the Russians deported the Baltic population in order 
to denationalize these countries. Other Baltic ex-diplomats, like 
the Latvian A. Bilmanis and the Lithuanian A. Zadeikis follow 
Pusta s lead and repeat in their publications his assertions. The 
true facts are that the Baltic peoples migrated into the interior 
of Russia coincident with the German invasion. The Latvians, 
Lithuanians, Estonians, Jews, and Russians sought escape from 
the enemy, and they found asylum in Russia. Before evacuat­
ing, they burned down their homes so as not to leave them to 
the enemy, and in this way applied the scorched-earth strategy 
earlier than it had been officially proclaimed by Stalin. What 
the Baltic pro-Fascists seek to represent as Russian violence 
against the Baltic peoples is actually merely the normal reac­
tion of the population, who together with their own armies 
retreated into the interior of their country. Pusta and Com­
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pany might glory in their misrepresentation. Goebbels himself 
could envy them! 
After long journeys full of hardship and the danger of enemy 
air raids, scores of thousands of Baltic refugees found their way 
to collective farms in the Volga region, Turkmenia, and eastern 
Siberia. Some of the most important factories of the Baltic area 
were evacuated completely with machines, workers, and engi­
neers. After a brief period of restoration, they were soon in 
operation again behind the Urals, producing for the Red army. 
The governments of the Baltic republics, their scientific in­
stitutions, schools, and public organizations, were also evacu­
ated to Moscow and other cities. From the very first day, the 
refugees in Russia took steps to maintain the cultural traditions 
of their own people. In the most trying conditions, schools were 
organized with instruction in the Lettish, Lithuanian, and Es­
tonian languages. Since most of the Baltic intelligentsia escaped 
from the Germans to Russia, it was possible not only to set go­
ing the publication of newspapers, magazines and even books 
in Lettish, Lithuanian, and Estonian. It was possible also to 
create skeleton organizations of the Riga and Tartu univer­
sities, under the leadership of Professor Kirchensteins, chairman 
of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian republic, and Professor 
Hans Kruus, principal of Tartu University. Recently, the Es­
tonian theater opened in Moscow. Troupes of Latvian and 
Lithuanian actors also give performances to soldiers and to 
refugee settlements. 
The greatest national achievement was certainly the creation 
of national military cadres—Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian 
units in the Red Army. They originated as follows: Faced with 
the lightning assault of the Hitler armies, the Baltic republican 
governments did not attempt mobilization. They preferred to 
evacuate all persons capable of bearing arms, except those who 
were commissioned to remain behind and lead the partisan war­
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fare. Covered by the rearguard action of the small regular units 
comprising the Baltic military district's Red army, almost all 
the Baltic young people were enabled to escape into the interior 
of Russia. There, in Turkmenia and Kazakhstan they were 
mobilized and mustered into special national units under the 
command of their own officers. 
The Baltic units received their baptism of fire in the autumn 
battles before Moscow in 1942—especially in the battles for 
Borovsk and Naro-Fominsk. For distinguished service there 
many Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian regiments were 
awarded the honorary title of Guard units, and many individ­
uals received citations for bravery. At present the Latvian Rifle 
Corps comprise two Guard divisions commanded by Major 
General Brantskalns, Colonel Barkalis, and Colonel Zutis. They 
have already destroyed about 30,000 Germans, according to a 
late report. Although the Estonian national unit, commanded 
by Colonel Kukk, and the Lithuanian are smaller than the 
Latvian, they have frequently been mentioned in communiques. 
Thus, with their own armies, schools, cultural institutions, 
and governments transferred to Russia, the Baltic republics 
survive as nations-in-exile. They will not fail to preserve for 
posterity the national character and culture of their people, 
now crushed under the jackboots of German occupation. 
WHO BECAME THE QUISLINGS? 
For many years prior to 1941 the Nazis promoted energetic 
internal aggression in the Baltic area, and not in vain. Their 
long labors could not fail to uncover some persons useful as 
Quislings. To be sure, all their tall talk about creating a Baltic 
army "for the struggle against Bolshevism" proved an empty 
boast. Nothing more was forthcoming than a few despicable 
units of auxiliary police recruited from local Fascist 
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Yet the Nazis have endeavored to create a semblance of volun­
tary local action and have conducted propaganda abroad about 
the independence of the Baltic states. With an eye perhaps on 
"foreign consumption," Alfred Rosenberg, therefore, in March 
1942 issued a decree about "landeseigene Verwaltung" (self-
administration) for the Baltic provinces. According to this de­
cree the occupation authorities naturally retained their pre­
rogatives, remaining the dominant power over the territory's 
entire economic and political life. But the authorities appoint 
"self-governing" Quislings, both great and small. At the head 
of the administration are special general directors, appointed 
likewise by the occupation authorities. 
In Lithuania Brigadier General Rastikis was appointed gen­
eral director. He had been at one time the Defense Minister 
in Smetona's administration. His assistant is General Kobelunas, 
who participated in the coup staged by Smetona and Valde-
maras. Chief of the general staff of the Lithuanian army until 
1934, Kobelunas then became implicated in the feud between 
the dictators and was retired in disgrace. 
In Latvia the general director appointed was General Oscar 
Dankers, one of the prominent officers of the Ulmanis period. 
This man was the officer whom Ulmanis sent in 1938 to Berlin 
to be his proxy at Hitler's birthday party. Ulmanis had also 
appointed Dankers to be commander of the Libau (Liepaja) 
garrison, the one nearest the German frontier. One of his as­
sistants is Alfred Valdmanis, who also was a minister in Ul-
manis's cabinet. 
The Estonian Quisling is Dr. Mae, a physician, who had been 
active in the Vabs Fascist organization. Once, when he had been 
thrown into jail, he obtained his release through complicity 
with the Pats police. In 1940, classed as a Volks-Deutsche (low-
caste German), Mae was evacuated to Germany. 
Most heads of local "autonomous" institutions, district bailiffs, 
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and burgomasters were appointed from among local Germans 
or trusted Fascists trained also in the schools of Ulmanis, Sme-
tona, and Pats. In the Baltic countries the^ermans failed to 
win the support of any single public group. Their sole sup­
port is a gang of Fascist collaborators, who were thrown out of 
office in the Baltic Soviet republics and thereafter conspired 
against the governments. Representing only themselves and up­
held by German bayonets alone, these Nazi henchmen live in 
constant dread, fearing the hate of the patriotic citizens. 
Abroad, however, they are portrayed by their masters as 
statesmen who personify the "national aspirations" of the Baltic 
peoples, who collaborate with the Germans, but only against 
the Russians; therefore, they are men to be relied on. Also the 
diplomats who pretend to represent the Baltic nations in the 
United States and England today are the same persons who 
formerly served as envoys for Ulmanis, Smetona, and Pats, local 
Fascist dictators known to have imprisoned or banished every 
real democrat in the Baltic area. Those diplomats who, like 
Felix Cielens (until 1935 Latvian Minister in Paris), did not 
consent to carry out the Fascist policy were either replaced or 
retired. Only those remained envoys who were in accord with 
the Fascist and pro-Hitlerite governments. In 1940 these diplo­
mats also were out of office, like Rastikis, Valdmanis, and 
Dankers. They also are inclined to forgive and forget the Nazi 
crimes while raising a clamor about Bolshevik transgressions. 
As envoys abroad they continue to "represent" nonexistent 
regimes in the Baltic analogous to the Petain government in 
France, and whether consciously or not they have actually be­
come the mouthpiece of the Baltic Lavals. Their information 
bureaus released to the American and British press the rumor 
about an alleged uprising against the Russians in Lithuania, 
and still poison public opinion with malicious slanders about 
the anti-Baltic policy of the U.S.S.R., about the hostility of the 
Ostland: Reichminister Alfred Rosenberg 207 
Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians toward Russia, et cetera, 
although this kind of propaganda could originate with and be 
of service only to those who now control the Baltic area and 
exploit it to the utmost. 
The supposed uprising against the U.S.S.R. in Lithuania 
during June 1941 actually occurred as follows. At the outset of 
the Soviet-German war the Russian troops and republican insti­
tutions were evacuated from Kaunas before the German forces 
entered, and for several days the city was without a government. 
All the law-abiding citizens who could do so had either fled the 
city or gone into hiding. The streets remained in the hands of 
hoodlums and Fascist riff-raff who, led by a certain Ambroze-
vicius, engaged in a riot of looting and a massacre of what Jews 
remained. Thereupon they proclaimed the establishment of an 
"independent" Lithuanian republic under German protection. 
The Germans, however, with customary arrogance, booted out 
the uninvited sycophants and three days later established a real 
occupation authority. 
In Estonia and Latvia where this "no-man's period" was 
absent, there were neither "national governments" nor mas­
sacres of Jews except those organized by the Germans. 
Making it plainly understood from the start that no inde­
pendent governments of any kind were wanted in this Deutsche 
Siedlungsland, the German authorities engaged all the mer­
cenaries and Landsknechts (hired soldiers) available for dirty 
work. Such collaborators were found only, as previously men­
tioned, among the Aizsargi in Latvia and among the Saulistai in 
Lithuania—the two pro-Fascist groups which had upheld the 
former dictator regimes and which are still "represented" here 
by Zadeikis, Bilmanis, Pusta, and others. 
The Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian servants of the Nazis 
were drawn from elements totally unfit for the dangerous serv­
ice at the front. They were, accordingly, mustered into auxiliary 
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police units entrusted with guarding the exits of ghettos and 
also serving as secret or open agents of the police authorities. 
Some of them were sent into Poland to be guards at concentra­
tion camps and ghettos. According to eyewitness reports, these 
mercenaries are inveterate ruffians whom the population hates 
worse than Germans. 
Strange to say, the "Committee to Promote the Restoration 
of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as Free Independent and 
Democratic States," organized in the United States under the 
leadership of the Baltic ex-diplomats, maintains complete silence 
about these traitors and Hitlerite hangmen at home in the 
Baltic nations. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Latvians, 
Estonians, and Lithuanians now in America steer clear of these 
ex-diplomats, whose only associates are confirmed Fascists and 
friends of the Russian Fascist Anastase A. Vonsiatsky, now con­
fined in an American prison for treasonable activity. On the day 
Germany invaded Russia, the local Lithuanian pro-Fascist news­
paper issued by these men had the banner headline: "Glory to 
God! At last Lithuania has been liberated!" 
C H A P T E R  X I  
The Baltic and the Future 
WHEN WE CONQUER! 
The stream, silvery clear, impetuously shall race 
Through meadows green from native uplands to roam. 
My heart shall be in blossom as the sapling willow. 
I'll see the banks along the Niemen at home. 
Then breeze will waft away the fog above the river 
And rafts down waves of blue will slip in a string. 
I'll see a flock of storks serenely cleave the water 
And hear you call me in the summons of spring. 
Your voice will be resounding in a hearty welcome, 
Your babe in arms outstretched for me to embrace, 
Your smile of greeting wreathed in a fresh willow garland. 
A tear of dewdrop will be stained on your face. 
I'll see my native Niemen River when we conquer, 
The smoke on my roof, willow buds and you, my country.1 
This simple poem, full of homebred emotion, written by the 
Lithuanian poet A. Venclavas, gives utterance to the undesign-
ing aspirations of the small Baltic peoples, who share a common 
patriotism. It could have been written by a Latvian or an Esto­
nian, but scarcely by a Finn. What a difference in their outlook 
and sense of destiny! 
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By capitulating to the great U.S.S.R., it was argued, the small 
Baltic republics of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia doomed them­
selves to national nonexistence, while by taking up arms against 
Russia "heroic little Finland" defended her independence. 
Yet more than three years have now passed since 1940, most 
momentous years for the Baltic area, and only the blind fail to 
see that in contrast to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, Finland 
has much less favorable prospects today. 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are, of course, now occupied 
by Nazi troops, just as Finland is. Their native inhabitants re­
ceive more relentless persecution, suffer greater humiliation, 
and endure far greater hardship than the unfortunate Finns. 
But the enemy is not given a moment's respite. Gunfire flares 
up incessantly in the streets of deserted Baltic towns, where re­
pressed patriots continue their unequal yet unyielding struggle. 
In the forests of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are redoubtable 
partisan detachments embracing every peasant and young per­
son capable of bearing arms. Many a German supply train has 
been derailed, and not a few Hitlerite storm troopers have met 
their doom in bivouacs set ablaze by partisans. 
Meanwhile, many thousands of refugees from Lithuania, Lat­
via, and Estonia, who have found asylum in the interior of Rus­
sia, do not idly await the happy day when they will again see 
their native Niemen, Narva and Dvina rivers. Whether serving 
at the front in the Latvian, Estonian, and Lithuanian regiments, 
or working in collective farms and mills behind the Urals, they 
are mobilized in the great "fatherland war." Their aspirations 
are no less home-felt than those of the Ukrainian tiller of the 
soil who yearns for his own collective farm in the Dnieper val­
ley or of the Minsk worker who dreams of returning again to 
his own workshop. All are alike firmly convinced that victory 
will be theirs, and they do everything to attain it. "When we 
conquer" means to them the day of common victory for all anti-
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Hitler forces. For them the outlook is clear, unreserved, and 
hopeful. Their future is aligned with the destiny of all freedom-
loving peoples. 
Can the Finns look forward with hope and joyous anticipa­
tion to the day when the anti-Hitlerite coalition is victorious? 
Guided by a delinquent policy, Finland has become entangled 
in disastrous contradictions, and by tolerating an unnatural 
coalition with Hitlerite gangsters, the Finnish people have be­
come powerless to resist Mannerheim and Ryti, who are drag­
ging them ever deeper into Complicity with Germany. With 
every passing day she spends in such company, Finland's pros­
pects deteriorate. For such crimes history has exacted and will 
take a heavy toll. The Finnish people, even those who now 
strive singly to throw off the yoke of their own and German 
Fascists, cannot have the same unfaltering assurance in victory 
and righteous hopes for justice that inspire the Latvians, Lithua­
nians, and Estonians. 
The Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians feel it is highly un­
just to identify them with the Finns, as some American circles 
try to do. As nations, the Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians 
declare themselves forthright to be full-fledged members of the 
family of United Nations. In the ranks of the Red Army their 
national troops discharge their obligations, sometimes with a 
heroism beyond the call of duty. For their own countries the 
governments of Kirchensteins, Vares, and Paleckis represent 
what de Gaulle is to France and what Benes is to Czechoslova­
kia. These nations and these governments have, accordingly, 
every right, both juridical and moral, to build their future on 
those foundations they deem most suitable. 
But Finland is in the camp of the enemy. The United Na­
tions can come to terms with her only after the unconditional 
surrender of Mannerheim and Company. Her fate must be de­
cided by the Allies from the viewpoint of their own future 
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safety, and woe to Finland if by that time she lacks genuine 
democrats like Karl Wiik, now languishing in prison, with suf­
ficient influence to give the Allies a guarantee of complete and 
irrevocable reversal in policy. Otherwise, the Allies will be 
obliged to secure themselves with military guarantees. 
After this war, when the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian 
peoples lay the bases of their future, they will remember the 
bitter lessons of the past and strive to avoid its pitfalls: the 
grave danger of again becoming an instrument of intrigue 
manipulated by some alien power. 
THE FUTURE OF THE BALTIC NATIONS 
The Baltic nations are small and weak. They are well aware 
that their own destiny depends upon the outcome of the wider 
conflict embracing Europe and the world. But it behooves even 
the smallest nations to lay such plans as will coincide with Euro­
pean development and to adjust their national endeavors within 
a framework of international equilibrium. 
Therefore, the most vital political question faced by the Bal­
tic nations today, and perhaps not by them alone, is whether a 
solution is possible that will secure their national existence and, 
at the same time, contribute to European and world stability. 
Is it organically possible to reach a final settlement for the east­
ern Baltic nations? 
During a long and arduous history the Baltic area's destiny 
has been variously resolved. Every new project now advanced 
can be scrutinized in the light of this historic experience. 
History has shown that, of numerous possible solutions, one 
is impossible. The existence of the Baltic republics as "inde­
pendent" and isolated states has proven to be a pathetic fiction, 
false and harmful in effect. During the entire twenty years of 
their existence, these states were neither independent nor self-
The Baltic and the Future 2 1 3  
governing in any real sense. They were always under the wing 
of one or another patron state. Their "independence" amounted 
to their being regarded as suitable for nothing else than to carry 
out temporary political tasks. Such was their status whichever 
the patron state, and hence the Baltic states became objects of 
international intrigue and exploitation, besides being passed 
from hand to hand. 
The very origin of this "independence" was perverse. The 
fault lay in the local state cabals sponsored by the great powers. 
At the outset, democratic America raised objections, although 
these cabals functioned under the guise of national self-determi­
nation. Since the midwives were the "Political General" von 
der Goltz and the cunning Prussian diplomat Winnig, it was 
no wonder that their nurslings, the Baltic "national" statesmen 
Ulmanis and Smetona, later became useful tools in Hitler's 
hands. 
The "independent existence" of the Baltic states was not only 
a mockery of independence. It could hardly be called an exist­
ence at all. During twenty years these countries did not have a 
single year of prosperity; they knew only prolonged and unre­
lieved depression. From crisis to crisis their standard of living 
and degree of security steadily deteriorated. Entangled in a net 
of international intrigue which obstructed satisfactory co-exist­
ence with the great and growing economic system of Russia, 
these countries, led by state cabals, turned their own economy 
upside down. Going counter to common sense and ordinary 
business calculations, the local governments declared war on in­
dustrialization and forcibly drove agriculture out to become a 
peddler hawking native farm products in the vestibule of the 
world market. 
At the source of the economic strangulation of the Baltic na­
tions lay the fiction of independence which proved a dangerous 
screen as well for international conspirators. So it remained un­
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til, with independent Baltic Fascist and semi-Fascist regimes for 
disguise, Hitler completed his preparations for an offensive in 
the East and disrupted all attempts to create an anti-Nazi en­
circlement. 
Anyone who views the Baltic problem without hypocrisy from 
a sober and realistic standpoint realizes that an isolated state 
existence is out of the question for the Baltic nations. Many 
observers have pointed to this, especially in America, where 
strong objections were raised to the dubious plans of the Ver­
sailles schemers. It is all the more obvious today when the inter­
relation of world economy has become clear and when the con­
viction is steadily gaining ground that the principle of state 
sovereignty for any price has, to a considerable degree, become 
obsolete. 
As the Baltic peoples see it, a final settlement of their prob­
lem is possible organically only if they are given an opportunity 
for normal economic life and for industrial and social progress. 
Above all, an end must be met to an intolerable "buffer" exist­
ence, which can eventuate only in national disaster. This means 
that the Baltic nations must find their place in some other more 
powerful economic and political organism. 
In all, there are three possible solutions, each of which has, 
to a certain degree, been tried out. The Baltic area has in the 
past leaned either on Russia, on Germany, or on nonneighbor-
ing powers. All three variants can now be evaluated not merely 
abstractly but on the basis of experience. 
VARIANT I: ORIENTATION ON NONNEIGHBORS 
This orientation on nonneighboring states was generally 
known abroad and in the Baltic countries also as the "inde­
pendence" of the Baltic states. 
A peculiar political aberration made this possible. The pa­
The Baltic and the Future 2 1 5  
tron states "from afar" had little economic interest in the poor 
Baltic countries and found little profit in exploiting them. To 
their sponsors the Baltic states were essential for the attainment 
of their own political objectives. In the post-Versailles period 
this objective was the creation of a barrier against Russia. A 
paradoxical situation arose. The masters demanded that their 
vassals be "independent." 
In this sense the periods of English and Franco-Polish domi­
nance were very much alike. Although Poland is a neighbor of 
the Baltic states, she acted there merely as the representative 
of a nonneighboring sponsor. Since she had no independent 
policy, and in general was not a great power either in an eco­
nomic or political sense, Poland was only a conductor and in­
strument of French or English influence. 
This meant that the Baltic states were subjected to all the 
degradation and dangers associated with vassalage to a great 
imperialist power, without enjoying any of the advantages con­
nected with well-managed colonial status. For in its colonies 
the patron state usually fosters the native economic life, even 
though it is better to exploit them. 
But the Baltic countries were left to shift for themselves eco­
nomically. England interfered only when Baltic economic ac­
tion led to undesirable political affiliations, like the opening of 
trade relations with the U.S.S.R. Warnings were then duly 
sounded and the vassal was rapidly brought to reason, as hap­
pened with Latvia and Lithuania. If the finances of the Baltic 
states became unsteady and a country was on the verge of bank­
ruptcy, as was Estonia, the high contracting power sent in a 
financial expert dictator. But elimination of economic poverty 
could not even be considered, since the main problem in the 
Baltic area was the impossibility of establishing a "balanced" 
economy in which agriculture and industry would supplement 
and reinforce each other. Markets were needed to develop in­
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dustry, and the home market was too restricted. Western pow­
ers had no markets for Baltic industrial products, and trade 
with the East was taboo for political reasons. The natural re­
sult, therefore, could be only a complete deadlock. 
Translated into the terminology of international diplomacy, 
the orientation of the Baltic area on nonneighboring powers 
meant its conversion into an area of special designation, a buf­
fer or quarantine zone. The implications remain unaltered even 
today. 
Never mind whether the formal relations of one or another 
Western power with Russia are improved or not after this war. 
If England, the United States, or any other non-Baltic power 
desires to establish its own sphere of influence in the Baltic area, 
this in itself will be evident proof that they again seek to re­
create the old cordon sanitaire, which has brought so much mis­
fortune to Europe. 
Such a policy now, as in the past, can have only one outcome: 
the cordon sanitaire will in time, by the logic of events, be con­
verted into a springboard for attack. Whether the sponsor of 
the cordon becomes the aggressor or is himself shoved aside by 
a more energetic sponsor is not important. The essential point 
is that the logical evolution of a policy of cordons inevitably 
leads to preparations for aggression. 
VARIANT 2: ORIENTATION ON GERMANY OR POLAND 
Orientation of the Baltic states on Germany would be the 
only possible and inevitable variant should victory go to Hitler 
in the present war. Even now, while war is raging, the Germans 
have been attempting to achieve it. To the good fortune of the 
Baltic peoples, the situation is such that postwar German hege­
mony in the eastern Baltic is a purely academic question. Nev­
ertheless, the question is worthy of attention, because certain 
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Baltic emigrants are inclined to prefer German control to union 
with Russia; and this variant may be advanced, even after the 
defeat of Germany, as a last resort to keep Russia out of the 
Baltic area. 
Judging from the experience of German occupation during 
World War I and from what has been learned about the Nazi 
depredations during the past two years, the prospects are gloomy 
indeed if German postwar dominance in the Baltic area be as­
sumed. As in 1915-1918, so today the country and its inhabit­
ants are subjected to systematic despoliation, while the German 
landed gentry are forcibly restored to power over native peas­
ants, who are reduced to the status of semifeudal serfs. 
For the sake of argument, the lamentable experience of two 
German occupations can be ignored on the hypothetical as­
sumption that a decent and considerate Germany will come 
into being. Even then the prospects are not very promising for 
the economic development of a Baltic area incorporated within 
the sphere of greater Germany. 
German industry has no need for the auxiliary industries in 
the eastern Baltic area. Germany has no need for the eastern 
Baltic harbors to trade with the West. She has harbors enough 
of her own. In the German economic system the Baltic area, 
therefore, could be only an agricultural hinterland producing 
for the parent state. Although this would be somewhat better 
than existing in a vacuum, as Baltic agriculture has done dur­
ing the past two decades, it would mean that for generations the 
Baltic area was doomed to be exclusively agrarian. Besides, 
many social and national factors make this variant wholly in-
acceptable for the Baltic nations. 
The conception of the Baltic area as a German area for colo­
nization has become firmly rooted in the mind of the German 
public generally.. In Mein Kampf, Hitler raves about reviving 
the crusade of Teutonic knights to the East. General Karl 
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Haushofer expounds the geopolitical significance of the Baltic 
territory, which in his opinion is "a void" very much suited for 
the settlement of militant Germans. But the conception ante­
dates the Nazis. In 1917, when the plans of Wilhelm II and 
Hindenburg to colonize the Baltic area with German soldiers 
seemed close to fulfillment, the entire German press, including 
the Social Democratic Vorwarts, rose in exultation. Even the 
future Weimar Republic's Foreign Minister, Gustav Strese-
mann, made a jubilant speech in the Reichstag about the "pene­
tration of German Kultur in the East." 
The inclusion of the Baltic area in the German sphere of 
power, whatever the make-up of Germany, would imply the 
colonization of the territory with Germans and the denationali­
zation of the native peoples. Whether this liquidation is to be 
carried out by sterilization of "surplus" natives or by more hu­
mane methods is not the point. The fact remains that the seven-
hundred-year dominance exercised by the progeny of the Teu­
tonic crusaders and the Hanseatic merchants has profoundly 
influenced the attitude of Germans, who have grown accus­
tomed to regard Riga, Libau (Liepaja), and Reval (Tallinn) as 
their own German towns. And it has, conversely, influenced 
public opinion in the Baltic area, where the natives know only 
one breed of Germans: the bloodthirsty arrogant Baltic barons. 
In the event of a German victory, the Wehrmacht and the 
Gestapo would, of course, be able to herd the Baltic peasants 
back again into the estates of the German landed gentry. This 
solution, however, could hardly be regarded as an organic set­
tlement. For seven hundred years these peasants have resisted 
the German subjugators. Should the attempt be made to saddle 
them again with German barons and Prussian Kultur, the age-
old struggle would merely be resumed. 
In its international aspect, this variant, the inclusion of the 
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Baltic area into a German power sphere, could imply only prep­
aration for a new Drang nach Osten. 
To be more precise, a peace-loving and democratic Germany 
has no need for the Baltic area. Only for those imbued with the 
spirit of the Teutonic crusaders does this area have value as a 
point of departure for further expansion into Russia and the 
East. 
Writing in the Russian newspaper Pravda recently, Academi­
cian E. Tarle, author of Napoleon in Russia, revealed that the 
myth makers of the Nazi imperialist school have proclaimed the 
foremost heroes of German history to be not Bismarck nor Wil-
helm I, nor even Frederick the Great, but the "collective hero," 
the Order of Teutonic Knights. 
Quoting German sources, Tarle exposes the Nazi point of 
view, as follows: "We, Germans, found ourselves surrounded by 
several civilized nations who barred the way for our expansion 
and development. In front of Germans was a vast Slavic en­
closure extending from sea to sea. Hence, for us Germans, the 
first and foremost heroes are those who went to break a way 
through this enclosure. For us they are heroes who endeavored 
to give us living space in the East." 2 
The issue of German influence in the Baltic area has, there­
fore, two possibilities: either a democratic Germany will be 
created which must renounce forever German claims to the 
eastern Baltic area, or Germany will remain an imperialist 
power which will again attempt to carry on where the Teutonic 
knights left off. In such a case the Baltic area will be the start­
ing point for fresh aggression. 
Although the dream of a Polish empire embracing the entire 
eastern shore of the Baltic Sea is largely a product of the Polish 
gentry's delirious fantasy, a few words about the Polish variant 
are in order. For there is no guarantee against the advancing 
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even of such a plan, if only to prevent Russia from gaining ac­
cess to the Baltic Sea. 
In this connection a book, Poland and the Baltic, written by 
Colonel Henryk Baginsky, an official lecturer of the Warsaw 
Army Staff College, is much to the point. Its subtitle is "The 
Problem of Poland's Access to the Sea," and the foreword is 
written by Alan Graham, M.P. In this book we read: "The 
northern Baltic road is the natural channel of expansion for the 
Polish state. Poland has always been the guardian of Europe in 
the East and she carried out her task successfully whenever her 
flanks on the Baltic and the Black Sea were secure." Therefore, 
the colonel demands "a union of Poland, Czechoslovakia and 
Lithuania allied to other neighboring countries and having 
adequate access to the sea, with several ports [Tallinn, Riga, 
Memel, Danzig, Konigsberg] and a navy protecting them" and, 
in addition, "a Polish canal between the Baltic and the Black 
Sea." 
Former Baltic diplomats now in the United States (some of 
whom, like the former Estonian Foreign Minister, Kaarel Pusta, 
for instance, have a long record of underhand intrigue with the 
Polish general staff) are again trying to cultivate connections 
with the Polish government-in-exile. Official meetings of Polish 
diplomatic representatives with local Lithuanian, Latvian, and 
other ex-ministers and ex-ambassadors have been reported in 
the press. It is rumored that they are trying to settle among 
themselves the old vexing question of Vilna, in order to present 
a common front against Russia. If that is so, may the Lord pre­
serve the Baltic countries from fulfillment of their plans, as that 
would be catastrophic for Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians. 
It would be senseless from national, cultural, and economic 
viewpoints to incorporate the relatively advanced Baltic nations 
into the backward, atrophied, and anaemic organism of Poland. 
Politically, it would mean their inclusion into a decadent impe­
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rialist system. Here, again, a democratic, restored Poland will 
find enough to do at home without even thinking about the an­
nexation of foreign territory. Only a robber Poland of shabby 
noblemen can hanker after the Baltic states; and such a Poland, 
even if resurrected after this war, will no doubt be finally sub­
ject to a new partitioning—time without number! And the Bal­
tic countries would once again be left out in the cold. 
VARIANT 3: THE BALTIC INCORPORATED IN THE U.S.S.R. 
The prospects for orientation of the Baltic peoples on mas­
sive Russia remain to be examined. Mutual relations of the 
Baltic countries with Russia are many-sided. Before 1905 the 
conception of Russian people was unknown in the Baltic area, 
where there were only czarist soldiers, Cossacks, police, officials, 
teachers, governors, and priests. The natives identified these 
persons with the German barons, for whom the Russian official­
dom was a compliant servant. The people hated czarist satraps 
no less than the age-old German enslavers, who became still 
more arrogant after czarist Russia took over the Baltic region. 
The 1905 revolution marked a dividing line between czarist 
power and the Russian people. The Latvians, Lithuanians, Es­
tonians, and Finns took a most active part in this revolution, 
associating their national demands with the emancipation strug­
gle of the best elements of Russian society. The workers' parties 
of the national minorities became component units of the gen­
eral Russian revolutionary movement, sharing its doctrines and 
organizational work, and even participating in the internal dis­
sension between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. 
Because of a series of historical events, the Baltic area was de­
tached from Russia at the very moment when forces in Russia 
came to power with whom the Baltic peoples had long-standing 
ties. Later the forces of repulsion and attraction were again at 
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work, but along new lines. National enmity toward the multi­
national U.S.S.R. was completely out of the picture. Antago­
nism was developed along the lines of social and state organi­
zation. 
Encouraged and inflamed by powerful patrons of the Baltic 
states, this antagonism, at one time, superseded "geography" 
and economic common sense. In an economic sense Russia is a 
natural outlet for the products of existing and potential Baltic 
industry, even for disposal of surplus Baltic farm products; and, 
at the same time, Russia herself has great need of Baltic rail­
ways and ports for her foreign commerce. Both economies are, 
as it were, made for the closest collaboration. The social and 
political contradictions, however, seemed insurmountable. In 
the Baltic countries the working class was weak and scattered, 
and the peasantry was largely of the isolated farmer type, with 
the standards and mentality of rich peasants, or kulaks—as the 
Russians call them. The cities were run by a handful of big 
capitalists, for the most part foreigners, and the urban petty 
bourgeois were disposed to dread the Communists. In foreign 
policy and finances the Baltic states were dependent on great 
powers, which required of them one thing only: to keep clear 
of Russia. At home the Baltic chiefs of state were men who 
made a career in the struggle against Bolshevism. 
However, when the conflagration of war spread through Eu­
rope, the superimposed influences and political depositions 
failed to withstand the dictates of historic growth and geo­
graphic necessity. 
At one time, progressive circles in the Baltic states sought re­
lief from economic decay through trade relations with Russia. 
Later, when the tentacles of German Nazism began to reach into 
the Baltic area and take hold in the ministerial cabinets and 
army staffs, the mass of the public led by national intellectuals 
sought salvation of national and cultural values through politi­
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cal agreements with Soviet Russia. Though this involved radi­
cal social changes, the Baltic peoples agreed to pay the price 
without hesitation. Afterward, it turned out that their fears 
were exaggerated. The Bolsheviks eliminated only a clique of 
big capitalists, who managed to save part of their investments. 
Most of them have come to live, and to prosper, in Sweden and 
the United States. At the time, a certain number found refuge 
in Nazi Germany. These, of course, have since returned to run 
things as business managers in occupied Ostland. 
The transition regime established in the Baltic area by the 
U.S.S.R. proved acceptable to the peasantry, the petty urban 
apartment-house owners, state officials, the workers, intellectu­
als, and parish clergy. Based on wide public support, the regime 
had surmounted the political divisions which had been, per­
haps, the main obstruction to the organic co-existence of the 
Baltic area with the vast, rapidly developing Russian economic 
system. 
Although the war has brought this experiment to a halt, in a 
certain sense it has solidified the union. Together with their 
own evacuated plants, thousands of Baltic industrial workers 
and office employees are now at work in the interior of Russia. 
Organized in special national units of the Red Army, young 
Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians are fighting against the 
Germans and the Finns. For the sake of a common liberation, 
Russian soldiers—Ukrainians, Belorussians, Siberians, Georgi­
ans, and others—give their lives storming Baltic frontiers. 
In the occupied Baltic area, partisans receive supplies flown 
in by Soviet airmen and deliver their reports to the Red Army 
staff. All this can only contribute to the creation of a commu­
nity of interests, aims, hopes, and destinies. Any who endeavor 
to break up this union, welded in common struggle and suffer­
ing, will face a most formidable task. 
This is the situation from the viewpoint of the national and 
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economic interests of the Baltic nations themselves. But the 
Baltic problem, as pointed out, has not ceased to be an inter­
national one. In the search for an organic settlement, therefore, 
the international aspect cannot be overlooked. 
In a geographic sense, the Baltic area in the mass of Russia is 
the westernmost territory. In old Russia it was officially desig­
nated as the "Western Territory," which from Peter I onward 
served for commerce with the West. It comprised what became 
known as Peter's famous "window on Europe." Through a win­
dow, however, one can smile amiably at a neighbor, and also 
stick out a menacing rifle. What kind of window to Europe the 
Baltic area becomes will not be decided either in Riga or in 
Kaunas. Indeed, the Baltic territory has always been only an 
index of the mutual relations between Russia and the West. It 
will be so in the future also. But here one can easily ascertain 
just what these relations are in reality. Moreover, through the 
attitude assumed by this or that circle toward the Baltic prob­
lem, one can get the drift of their genuine intentions toward 
the future peace. 
Those who are interested in the normalization of future re­
lations with the U.S.S.R. are not thinking of restoring buffers, 
cordons, and blockades; on the contrary, they are searching for 
more points of contact. From the viewpoint of democratic pow-s 
ers, what could be more desirable than to have the Russian 
bridge to Europe erected across a territory which for twenty 
years has been accustomed to participate in European life, 
which has a socio-economic system intermediary in form be­
tween the Soviet regime and the Western democracies, and a 
population profoundly "Westernized"? 
WHAT WILL A PLEBISCITE YIELD? 
It can be asserted with conviction that those circles in Amer­
ica and England who are still talking and dreaming today of 
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isolating the Baltic area from Russia either have in mind seri­
ous disagreement with the Soviet Union and regard the Baltic 
area as a good pretext or are victimized by misunderstanding, 
false information, and hostile propaganda. At any rate, they 
have not realized that the era of the cordon sanitaire has passed, 
never to return if Russia can help it. The effort to restore such 
a policy can only force the U.S.S.R. to erect a cordon sanitaire 
in reverse against a world hostile to her, and then the cordon 
will extend far to the west of the Baltic area. 
Whereas, if following this war, normal relations are estab­
lished between Russia, England, the United States, and the rest 
of the world, what would be the sense of ousting Russia from 
Baltic ports which serve her for commerce with the outside 
world? 
After World War I the United States displayed greater com­
mon sense in handling the Baltic question than the other Al­
lies did. Or, to be more precise, the United States was less inter­
ested in the covert machinations employed for the repartition 
of the map of Europe. Therefore, the United States was the last 
of the Allies to recognize the "independence" of the Baltic 
states. 
Only in 1921, after a vigorous campaign by certain congress­
men, was recognition granted. The advocates of recognition, 
however, had to employ arguments which, from the present 
standpoint, appear somewhat ridiculous. 
On April 20, 1921, at a session of the House of Representa­
tives, the Hon. Walter M. Chandler of New York made an ad­
dress in which he argued that the existence of the Baltic states 
as independent units was both permissible and possible. In clos­
ing his speech, he was obliged to admit that it would be a far 
better solution for the Baltic area to enter some large federa­
tion. But since the only possible federation was Russia, Mr. 
Chandler thought this solution quite inappropriate. He said: 
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"If England, France, the United States or some other masterful 
and intelligent nation could be placed where great Russia is, a 
federative republic might be possible, since the dominating race 
would then form the intelligent head of a confederation of peo­
ple of different races and religions. The United States, Great 
Britain and France illustrate this truth in their governments to­
day. But it is inconceivable to think that great Russia could gov­
ern a federative republic where the non-Russian members of 
the confederation would form the only intelligent and educated 
elements. " 
At the time, such arguments were convincing enough to gain 
approval for the creation of stillborn state bodies. It cannot be 
said that reasons no less rash and ill-founded will not again be 
advanced after this war. But the sweeping arguments of Mr. 
Chandler, which then proved "exceedingly good," can hardly 
be used again. Indeed, in the European bedlam, where different 
nations now are wringing each other's necks and where the 
smoldering fires of national discord will be a menace to peace 
for many years after the war, the only cases of deep-rooted fed­
eration, national tolerance, and cultural multiformity are little 
Switzerland and the U.S.S.R. 
The Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians are intelligent and 
enjoy a high level of cultural life, but they are not in any dan­
ger of becoming, as the honorable congressman surmised, "the 
only intelligent and educated elements" in the Soviet confedera­
tion. For them federation is not a menace but an opportunity. 
After long years of sedentary isolation, they would be able to 
apply their talents to a great collaboration in a vast new eco­
nomic organism. 
Very much is said about the necessity of a plebiscite in the 
Baltic states to determine their future course. The implication 
is that the elections of 1940, in which an overwhelming major­
ity of votes was cast for the Soviet governments, did not express 
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the real desires of the Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians, be­
cause the electorate was under the pressure of Red Army units 
stationed in the country. 
But the question must be raised, in all frankness, with a com­
plete sense of reality. Under what conditions would the present 
advocates of a plebiscite conduct the public poll this time? 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are at present occupied by the 
Nazi army. The most active elements of the Baltic peoples 
either have evacuated into the interior of Russia or have joined 
the ranks of the Red Army and partisan detachments. The best 
minds of the Baltic nations are now in Moscow, among them 
the majority are well-known writers, scientists, and statesmen. 
All big factories together with their workers have been evac­
uated from the Baltic area to the Urals. The peasants and 
urban middle classes who have remained on the spot are being 
subjected to unrelenting persecution. The more patriotic 
among them, if they have not escaped to join up with partisans, 
are regularly led before firing squads. Thousands and thousands 
are being sold for slave labor in Germany. 
Under whose control will the plebiscite be conducted this 
time? Under German control? This would merely mean a repe­
tition of von der Goltz's epic correlated with a revised form of 
the Armistice Convention's disremembered Article 12. And to 
transport (would it be on Soviet ships?—there are no other 
Allied ships in the Baltic) American soldiers halfway around 
the world to the Baltic to conduct a plebiscite there, without 
waiting until the Baltic refugees have returned home from Rus­
sia, would be a travesty of democracy, depriving a large group 
of the most active inhabitants of suffrage. 
All that can be done then is to postpone the plebiscite until 
the day when the liberating army enters the Baltic area, clears 
out Germans and Quislings, rehabilitates factories, assists the 
partisan peasantry to resume farming, et cetera. But everyone 
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seemingly must know that this liberating army will and can 
be only the Red Army, with its Latvian, Lithuanian, and Esto­
nian troops in the vanguard marching home again. The gov­
ernments of these republics, the universities, the factory work­
ers and young people, will also return. Who would dare to stop 
them? It is certain also that the inhabitants who have been op­
pressed under the German yoke will meet them as their own 
longed-for deliverers. The outcome of a plebiscite is, therefore, 
predetermined. 
It is time for sound-thinking people to realize that history 
has passed her verdict on the Baltic problem, and the Baltic 
people will not appeal for a retrial. 
A P P E N D I X  X  
S P E C I A L  P R O B L E M S  O F  B A L T I C  
P O L I T I C S  
S P E C I A L  P R O B L E M S  O F  T H E  B A L T I C  
A R E A :  V I L N A ,  M E M E L ,  A L A N D  I S L A N D S  
The discussion of the Baltic issue as a whole is from time to 
time complicated by certain related controversies over terri­
tories which have repeatedly been the object of dispute in 
power politics. Most significant among these side issues are the 
three special problems of Vilna, Memel, and the Aland Islands. 
Lithuania and Poland have more than once been on the 
verge of armed conflict over Vilna. Memel (Klaipeda) has been 
a stumbling block not only in Lithuanian-German relations. 
Memel has, like Danzig, been a pivot of an international con­
troversy which, in some degree, contributed to the outbreak of 
World War II. While the question of fortifying the Aland 
Islands has been a friction point in the relations of the U.S.S.R., 
Finland, and Sweden, there is reason to presume that these 
problems may remain points of international friction even after 
the Baltic issue as a whole has been settled satisfactorily. Al­
though the controversy would be less sharp, Vilna, Memel, and 
the Aland Islands may yet prove obstacles in the path of those 
who are called upon to win the peace in northeastern Europe. 
The public in the democratic countries will probably have re­
peated occasion to discuss the claims and counterclaims in­
volved. It seems fitting, therefore, to present a few dry facts 
and figures to serve as landmarks in the labyrinthine maze of 
contradictory distortions created around those tangled issues. 
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I. THE VILNA CONTROVERSY 
Involved in this long-standing dispute between Lithuania 
and Poland are both Vilna city (Wilno in Polish, Vilnius in 
Lithuanian), of 200,000 inhabitants, and the Vilna district, hav­
ing a population of 1,200,000. 
Unlike many other territorial disputes of the post-Versailles 
Europe, the controversy over Vilna was not merely a frontier 
incident. For Vilna is the capital of Lithuania, and the Polish 
claims to it were disguised efforts to bring the whole of Lithu­
ania under Polish domination. In seizing Vilna by force, the 
Poles forewarned Lithuanians of what they could expect from 
Poles in general. 
Vilna was declared the capital of Lithuania in the fourteenth 
century, in 1320, when the Lithuanian Prince Gediminas 
moved his castle to that city. It remained the capital of the 
Lithuanian principality until the Lublin union of Poland with 
Lithuania in 1569, after which the city began to decline. 
When it was incorporated in the Russian empire, Vilna be­
came the center of a guberniya and a noted railway junction for 
the important Minsk-Kaunas, Dvinsk-Bielostock-Warsaw, and 
Vilna-Rovno railroads. Through it passed a busy traffic of grain 
and timber from Russia. It was also important for leather and 
woodworking factories, and hosiery mills. 
Later, under Polish domination, Vilna was a provincial 
town. Its once flourishing industry and trade declined, because 
the anaemic Polish economic organism lacked the resources to 
sustain its own hinterland, the so-called "Kresi." 
With the rise of the new Lithuanian state after World War I, 
in 1918-1920 Vilna again came to prominence as a capital city. 
During these first two years Vilna changed hands several times, 
being occupied in turn by the White Lithuanians, the Reds, 
the Poles, again the Reds, and once more the Poles. After the 
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Reds had finally withdrawn in September 1920, Vilna was ceded 
to Lithuania, according to the treaty concluded by the Lithu­
anian government with Moscow. 
At Suvalki, in October of the same year, the Lithuanians 
and the Poles signed a treaty based on the "Curzon Line," the 
demarcation line established by a British commission on the 
basis of the ethnic and national composition of the local in­
habitants. This treaty provided that both parties would cease 
military operations and that Vilna as well as Vilna district 
would remain within the boundaries of Lithuania. However, 
on the following day, October 8, the Polish General Zeligovsky 
occupied Vilna, and after flimsy maneuvers—like the proclama­
tion of the "independence" of the Vilna municipal council— 
practically annexed it as a Polish possession. As soon as it be­
came evident that the seizure would go unpunished, official 
Polish circles hurriedly took General Zeligovsky under their 
auspices and formally incorporated Vilna into Poland. 
In desperation Lithuania sent a protest to the League of Na­
tions. A League commission was dispatched in October 1920, 
and it acknowledged the Polish occupation of Vilna to be "a 
violation by Poland of obligations she had undertaken." How­
ever, the Council of the League of Nations, with an eye to "big" 
European policy, did not want to check Poland. Rather than 
approve the commission's report, it began to search for a solu­
tion favorable to the Poles. On October 28, 1920, the Council 
decreed that a plebiscite be conducted in Vilna, but on March 
3, 1921, it revoked this decree, proposing that both parties 
negotiate directly. Since the negotiations failed to regulate the 
dispute, the Council was obliged to appoint several new com­
missions and to hear additional contradictory reports about the 
Vilna district. On January 13, 1922, the Council declared that 
it considered "the Polish-Lithuanian controversy a closed case." 
However, the Lithuanians remained unreconciled, and the 
234 Special Problems of Baltic Politics 
Council was forced time and again to re-examine this formally 
"closed case." But the Lithuanian protests were, at best, purely 
demonstrative. Meanwhile, Poland remained firmly in control 
of Vilna, and only rare diplomatic "incidents," such as the sign­
ing of the Soviet-Lithuanian guarantee pact on September 28, 
1926, in which Russia declared the seizure of Vilna to be illegal, 
served to remind the world that the case was not "closed." 
With the rise of Hitlerite revisionism in Europe, Beck s Po­
land endeavored to make Lithuania "behead herself" and recog­
nize as legal the Polish occupation of a city which the Lithu­
anians never ceased to regard as their capital. 
During 1937 the Polish authorities in Vilna undertook sev­
eral measures aimed at the humiliation of the Lithuanians. The 
only Lithuanian cultural society in Vilna was closed. Lithu­
anian daily newspapers were banned. Local Lithuanian leaders 
were arrested. Frontier incidents between Polish troops and 
Lithuanian border guards multipled. There were endless pre­
texts for these incidents, because during all these years the 
Polish-Lithuanian frontier had remained closed. Even mail 
and passenger traffic from Latvia and Estonia to Poland had to 
detour around Lithuania. 
At this time, the Nazi troops invaded Austria. The odor of 
the "New Order" filled the air. Poland regarded the moment 
opportune, so Colonel Beck handed the Lithuanian govern­
ment a forty-eight-hour ultimatum, demanding the uncondi­
tional establishment of regular diplomatic relations. In other 
words, Lithuania must forever renounce her claims to her own 
capital. 
The Lithuanian government of Smetona-Mironas accepted 
these conditions, defying the wave of public indignation. The 
general staff later overthrew the government, but at that time it 
could not stay the inexorable march of events. 
The catastrophic development of European politics in 1939-
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1940 proved an unexpected turn of destiny for Vilna. When 
Poland was again, as many times before, repartitioned, Russia 
obtained Vilna and promptly ceded the city to Lithuania, with 
which she had just concluded a guarantee pact. 
Lithuanian officials, police, and troops dispatched by the 
Fascist government of Smetona arrived in Vilna. They clashed 
with remnants of the infuriated Polish officialdom and mili­
tarists. A violent conflict ensued between two bands of vain­
glorious chauvinists. The chief victims were the local Jews, 
who comprised not less than forty per cent of Vilna s total pop­
ulation, and for whom Vilna had always been a most important 
cultural center. 
Without halting their own bitter feud, the Lithuanian and 
Polish Fascists often united for joint pogroms perpetrated on 
the Jews. The local population was distraught. 
The inclusion of Lithuania in the U.S.S.R. and the coming to 
power of progressive and cultured Lithuanian leaders had an 
immediate effect in Vilna. The venerable Lithuanian poet, 
Ludas Gyra, was appointed Commissar for Cultural Affairs. 
With astonishing talent he gained control over the melting pot 
of national passions represented in Vilna. By giving unbiased 
and equal support to Lithuanian, Polish, Jewish, Russian, and 
other cultural institutions, Ludas Gyra won the respect and 
trust of all circles of the population. Every citizen could decide 
for himself in what language he wished his children to be in­
structed. After knowing nothing but racial antagonism for 
decades, multinational Vilna was on the road toward cultural 
collaboration, but the German occupation reversed the trend 
and again plunged the district into a morass of national decay. 
2. MEMEL (KLAIPEDA) 
Article 99 of the Versailles Treaty provided that Germany 
was obliged to relinquish the territory of Memel, comprising 
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the port of the same name, with 39,000 inhabitants, and a corri­
dor seventy miles long by ten to twenty miles wide, with 
150,000 inhabitants. This corridor is bounded on the north by 
Lithuania and on the south by Eastern Prussia. 
Memel passed to the jurisdiction of Allied commissioners 
under the predominant influence of the French, who main­
tained their police forces in Memel. However, Lithuania pre­
sented claims to the Memel territory on the grounds both of 
historic rights and of her need for an outlet to the sea. 
Memel was founded in 1252 by the Teutonic knights who 
overran the land inhabited by the Lithuanian tribe of Borus-
sians. After the Borussian tribe had been completely wiped out 
by the Germans, immigration of Lithuanians from near-by dis­
tricts was encouraged to obtain serfs for farm labor. In this way 
a considerable stratum of Lithuanians had come to inhabit the 
Memel district. 
Being dissatisfied with the red tape of the Allies and smart­
ing under the Zeligovsky outrage at Vilna, the Lithuanians de­
cided to face the great powers with an accomplished fact. They 
were also moved by a report circulated in Lithuania that the 
French intended to incorporate Memel within a "greater Po­
land." 
In a surprise attack on January 10, 1923, Lithuanian troops 
seized control of the Memel administration, setting up a local 
Diet which voted at once for the incorporation of Memel in 
Lithuania. 
The great powers were reconciled. On May 17, 1924, a 
League of Nations commission, headed by Norman Davis, 
worked out the Memel convention, which went into force in 
1925. It provided for the constitution of the Chamber of Rep­
resentatives elected by universal, equal, direct, and secret 
suffrage for three years by citizens of the territory. The con­
vention also provided that the governor general of Memel be 
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appointed by the president of the Lithuanian state and that the 
Memel port, of international importance, be therefore governed 
by a special Harbor Board made up of representatives from the 
Lithuanian government, the Memel directorate, and the ap­
propriate commission of the League of Nations. 
Since the majority of Memel's population were Germans, 
whose economic and cultural ties with the Reich remained un­
broken, the Memel convention swung suspended between two 
opposite poles: the local directorate always German and the 
governor general always Lithuanian. 
The Royal Institute of International Affairs thus describes 
the working of the Convention: "The Governor appointed by 
the Lithuanian Government was expected to choose a Direc­
torate having the confidence of the Diet. If he did so, he was 
bound before very long to lose the confidence of the Govern­
ment in Kaunas; if he did not, his rule was unconstitutional. 
The result was that events in Memel tended to repeat them­
selves in a more or less regular series. Elections were usually 
followed at first by a period of relative calm; then came a phase 
of conflict between the Diet and the Governor, accompanied 
by frequent changes of Directorate, this was terminated by the 
dissolution of the Diet, and a period of unconstitutional ad­
ministration by the Governor, finally Germany would appeal 
to the League Council, and the Governor would feel compelled 
to allow new elections. Between 1925 and 1933 this cycle re­
curred three times." 1 
The rise of Hitler to power naturally made the situation in 
Memel more acute. In the summer of 1933 two separate Nazi 
parties were founded: the Left party of Pastor von Sass and 
Doctor Neumann's party, with direct contact in Berlin. The 
Memel Nazis at once launched a furious political campaign, 
combining legal action with conspiracy and preparations for an 
armed uprising. The Lithuanian government put up an irres­
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olute struggle. Charged with treason, 122 Memel Nazis were 
brought to trial in Kaunas in December 1934. England, France, 
and Italy immediately made a demarche in Kaunas and notified 
the Lithuanians that they must not "irritate" Hitler. This 
happened at the very time that Sir John Simon and Anthony 
Eden were visiting Berlin. The Lithuanians were pacified, and 
the Germans began to manage "Lithuanian" Memel almost 
without interference. 
In 1939 Hitler handed Lithuania an ultimatum, demanding 
renunciation of her formal right to Memel. From aboard a 
German battleship which had entered Memel port, the Fiihrer 
watched the swastika being hoisted over the town hall. 
Through this action Lithuania lost her only outlet to the 
Baltic Sea and the shipping center through which passed three-
fourths of all Lithuanian exports and two-thirds of her imports, 
not counting the additional transit cargo coming from Russia 
and Latvia. 
The role of Memel in the national economy of Lithuania 
before her inclusion in the U.S.S.R. is shown in the following 
table: 
MEMEL 
% of Total %of Shipping 
Exports Lithuanian Imports Total (in 1000 net 
Year (in mil. litas) Exports (in mil. litas) Imports registered tons) 
*932 *23.6 65.4 783 46.9 5*9-7 
1933 106.6 66.6 79-0 55-6 600.7 
1934 97-3 66.1 839 60.5 622.8 
*935 118.2 77.6 80.0 62.2 691.3 
1936 *49-4 784 106.2 68.0 782.5 
*937 157.0 75-3 *45.0 68.0 844.7 
Of the total 844,700 net registered tons which passed through 
Memel in 1937, 295,000 tons went to Germany, 150,000 to 
Sweden, and 146,000 to Great Britain. 
Also concentrated in Memel were about fifteen per cent of 
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all the Lithuanian industrial concerns employing more than 
five workers, about a third of all persons employed in Lithu­
anian industry, and thirty-five per cent of all mechanical mo­
tive power in Lithuania. 
3. THE ALAND ISLANDS 
The Aland Islands, Ahvenanmaa in Finnish, are an insular 
group at the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia. They embrace 
the large Aland Island, of 475 square kilometers, ten smaller 
islands, and about three hundred isles, rocky islets, and sea 
rocks. The total population of the entire group is 27,000, of 
which ninety-seven per cent are Swedes. The chief city is 
Marienham, on Aland Island. 
The Aland Islands were ceded to Russia by Sweden in 1809, 
in accord with the Friedricksham peace. 
When Russia's international position was greatly weakened 
as a result of the Crimean War, the Franco-British fleet took 
advantage of the situation to force the Baltic Sea, where they 
bombarded Sveaborg, compelling the Russians to agree on the 
demilitarization of the Aland Islands. According to the Paris 
peace of 1856, Russia was obligated not to fortify the Aland 
Islands, nor to erect or maintain either military or naval in­
stallations there. Russia observed this agreement up to World 
War I, in 1914. The Franco-British allies, who had previously 
been interested in demilitarization of these strategic islands, 
were now interested in having Russia do as much damage as 
possible to the Germans in the Baltic Sea. The Russian high 
command then fortified the islands. 
One of the demands of the Germans at Brest-Litovsk in 1918 
was the demilitarization of the Aland Islands. Article 6 of the 
Brest-Li tovsk peace provided that "the fortifications erected 
on the Aland Islands must be removed at the first opportunity." 
240 Special Problems of Baltic Politics 
Nor did the Germans neglect to use the Aland Islands as a 
steppingstone, when Mannerheim, finding himself hard-pressed 
by the troops of the Finnish people's government in 1919, sent 
an urgent telegram appealing to the German high command for 
assistance. The troops of von der Goltz were landed on Hango 
via the Aland Islands. 
Subsequently, the question of the Aland Islands was raised as 
an insoluble international problem, cast as a dispute between 
Sweden and Finland. The Swedes had occupied the islands with 
military forces. The Finns later accused them of using false 
documents, saying that the Swedes were able to lure the Fin­
nish detachment from the islands by sending a forged com­
mand, in which Mannerheim allegedly ordered the evacuation 
of the islands. That is the Finnish version. But the Swedes de­
clared that their troops arrived just in time to forestall the Red 
Finns, who sought to occupy the islands. 
At the initiative of the Swedish government the Aland 
Islands controversy was presented for discussion in the League 
of Nations. On their side the Swedes had the local population 
and had collected among them a long list of signatures to a 
petition asking for annexation by Sweden. However, the com­
mission of three lawyers appointed by the League Council de­
cided in favor of Finnish sovereignty. Their decision was 
adopted by the Council in July 1920. The Swedes protested, 
reminding the League of the words of Napoleon, who said, 
"Aland is the key to Stockholm." Moreover, they distrusted the 
pro-German Finns. They were somewhat pacified only after 
the Geneva convention of October 20, 1921, between Germany, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, the United States, Italy, 
Latvia, Poland, and Sweden had once more established the 
principle of the demilitarization of the Aland Islands. The 
League of Nations was supposed to see to it that Finland car­
ried out her obligations. 
Appendix I 241 
According to the standards of international relations then in 
force, it was thought quite proper to exclude Russia from the 
convention on a question so vital to Baltic powers. The Soviet 
notes of protest remained unanswered.( On November 14, 1921, 
the Soviet government declared that since she was not con­
sulted, she did not regard herself bound by the Geneva con­
vention. 
Prompted by lessons of long experience, the Russians re­
mained apprehensive, fearing that the Aland Islands, which 
nearly control the northern part of the Baltic Sea, might be­
come a weapon in the hands of an enemy menacing the security 
of the U.S.S.R. Finnish "sovereignty" and formal demilitariza­
tion, without any real guarantees for execution, were regarded 
as extremely frail reeds to rely on for defense against the plans 
of determined aggressors. The Russians maintained that even 
if a small state wanted to remain true to the convention, it 
would, in fact, be powerless against a strong and insistent ag­
gressor. 
The Russians' views proved well founded. When the aggres­
sive Nazi Germany appeared on the world scene, the Reichswehr 
had no difficulty in using the Finnish screen to penetrate the 
Aland Islands. During the entire period from 1933 to 1939 
alarming reports about suspicious German "scientific research" 
on the islands appeared in the world press, especially in Rus­
sian and Scandinavian newspapers. 
Then, in January 1939, Finland and Sweden, with the per­
mission of all the signatories of the Geneva convention, agreed 
to refortify jointly these islands. Some foreign correspondents 
pointed out at this time that it was Germany who advised the 
Finns to fortify the Aland Islands. 
When the Finno-Swedish agreement came before the League 
of Nations in May 1939, Mr. Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador to 
Great Britain, suggested that the decision should be postponed 
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at least until Russia had time to study the question and to find 
out "what the purpose of the fortifications was, the extent of 
the proposed fortifications, against whom they were to be built 
and, above all, what guarantees there were that an aggressive 
power would not occupy and utilize these fortifications against 
the U.S.S.R." 
And Foreign Commissar Molotov added to this, on May 31, 
1939: "The Soviet Union could not stand aloof from this 
question. Armed Aland Islands could be used to close for 
the U.S.S.R. all the entrances and the outlets of the Gulf of 
Finland." 
The League Council turned down the Finno-Swedish pro­
posal. But inasmuch as Finland later became merely an ap­
pendage of the Third Reich, the Aland Islands were handed 
over to the Nazis without any fuss. 
In the present war, the Aland Islands are a very convenient 
base for the German fleet to protect the convoys from Sweden 
to Germany and Finland, to keep Stockholm under a per­
manent threat, to dominate the Gulf of Bothnia, and to block­
ade the Red fleet in the Gulf of Finland. 
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TABLE I—Area and population (1937) 
Area Density— 
(in Square Population Inhabitants per 
Miles) Square Mile 
Estonia 
/ 
18,353 1,131,000 62 
latvia 25,395 1,971,000 78 
Lithuania* 21,489 2,550,000 "9 
* Including Memel (Klaipeda). In 1939 (without Memel, but including the 
Vilna region) Lithuania had 22,958 square miles and a population of 2,879,000. 
TABLE 2—Main cities 
Estonia Population (1936) 
Tallinn (Reval) 146,500 
Tartu (Dorpat) 60,000 
Narva 24,200 
Parnu 21,500 
Latvia Population (1935) 
Riga 385> 
Liepaja (Libau) 57»ioo 
Daugavpils (Dvinsk, Dunaburg) 45,200 
Jelgava (Mitau) 34,100 
Ventspils (Windau) 15.700 
Lithuania Population (1937) 
Kaunas 106,800 
Sauliai 24,700 
Panieviezis 21,400 
Memel (Klaipeda) 38,500 
Vilna (Vilnius) 200,000 
f Sources—Information Department of the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, London: The Baltic States, 1938. Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.: 
World Economics and Politics; Bulletins of Conjuncture, Moscow, 1939 and 1940. 
Statistisches Jahrbuch fur das Deutsche Reich, Berlin, 1937 and 1938. League of 
Nations: Monthly Bulletins of Statistics. Eesti Statistika, Tallinn, 1938 and 1939. 
Latvijas Statistikas Gada Gramata, Riga, 1935-1938. Lietuvos Statistikos Metros-
tis, Kaunas, 1938 and 1939. International Year-book of Agricultural Statistics, 
Rome, 1937-38. Documentation de Statistique Sociale et Economique, Dosse No. 
130, Paris, 1939. 
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TABLE 3—Use of land (1937) 
1 
Estonia , Latvia Lithuania 
Area 
(in Thou­
sand Acres) 
%of 
Distribution 
Area 
(in Thou­
sand Acres) 
%of 
Distribution 
Area 
(in Thou­
sand Acres) 
%of 
Distribution 
Total io,793 100.0 16,257 100.0 13,756 100.0 
Arable land 2,683 
i»350 
852 
471 
4.34* 
2,298* 
i,47* 
24-9 
12.5 
8.0 
4.4 
40.2 
21.3 
13-6 
5,355 
2,533 
2,118 
704 
4,o77 
4,3 i7t 
2,508 
32.9 
15-6 
1 3 0  
4-3 
25.1 
26.6 
15-4 
6,764 
3,465 
2,279 
1,020 
2,817 
2,599+ 
977 
49-2 
25.2 
16.6 
7-4 
20.5 
18.9 
*1-4 
Cereal crops.... 
Other crops.... 
Fallow land.... 
Meadows, pastures 
Forests 
Unproductive land 
• Of these, softwoods, 63%; birch, 19%; aspen, 10%; alder and other, 8%. 
f Softwoods, 77%; birch, 15%; alder, 3%; other, 5%. 
J Softwoods, 62%; aspen, 13%; birch, 11%; alder, 4%; other, 10%. 
TABLE 4—Occupations 
Estonia* Latvia! Lithuania} 
Occupation %of %of %of 
Number Total Number Total Number Total 
Employed Employed Employed 
Total gainfully employed 666,000 100.0 1,104,700 100.0 1,372,000 100.0 
Agriculture, fishing 453,900 68.2 767,300 695 1,088,800 79-4 
Industry and handicraft.. 105,500 15.8 166,100 15.0 119,100 8.7 
Trade, transportation, 
82,000 communication 47,200 7-1 7-4 45.500 3-3 
Military forces 11,700 1.8 19,000 I-7 23,100 1-7 
Civil service, professions.. 30,800 4.6 41,400 3-8 21,800 1.6 
Domestic and personal 
16,900 services 2-5 28,900 2.6 73,700 5-3 
• 1934-
t1925-
J 1923. Memel (Klaipeda) excluded. 
TABLE 5—Industry 
Industry 
Estonia* Latvia F Lithuania^ 
Number of 
Establishments 
with 
Number of 
Workers in Es­
tablishments with 
Total 
Value 
of 
Produc­
tion (in 
Million 
Kroon) 
Number 
of 
Estab­
lish­
ments^ 
Number 
of 
Workers 
Total 
Value 
of 
Produc­
tion (in 
Million 
Lats) 
Number 
of 
Estab­
lish­
ments 5 
Number 
of 
Workers 
Total 
Value 
of 
Produc­
tion (in 
Million 
Litas) 
20 or 
More 
Work­
ers 
5 to 19 
Work­
ers 
so or 
More 
Work­
ers 
jto/p 
Work­
ers 
Total 
Extraction of minerals (including 
stone quarrying) 
Pottery, cement 
Metallurgical. 
Chemical 
Leather and leather products.... 
Textiles 
Woodworking 
Paper 
Printing 
Foodstuffs 
Apparel 
Building and construction 
372 846 44,344 8,035 140.2 5,717 111,917 636.8 1,316 28,377 405.6 
22 
21 
45** 
*5 
14 
44 
56 
14 
17 
38 
28 
48 
10 
6 
51 
105 
31 
21 
51 
121 
10 
46 
248 
86 
39 
31 
5,732 
I,9I3 
5,299 
I,97I 
579 
11,129 
4,643 
2,168 
I,342 
3,OI3 
*,390 
4,*47 
1,018 
7* 
555 
948 
314 
181 
472 
1,209 
97 
511 
1,972 
731 
734 
240 
6.0 
6.1 
15.8 
6.7 
4-9 
43-I 
io.i 
14.7 
3-6 
20.8 
4.0 
4-3 
22 
193 
733 
185 
94 
400 
1,093 
57 
148 
1,850 
364 
445 
133 
*,74I 
6,407 
18,549 
5,H4 
1,615 
17,220 
18,452 
3,470 
3,480 
17,639 
6,474 
8,954 
2,802 
3-7 
22.7 
74-3 
45-5 
20.3 
93-2 
77.6 
24.6 
13-9 
170.1 
24.4 
43-9 
22.6 
19II 
130 
97 
53 
50 
84 
238 
} 81 
347 
186 
31 
1,296 
3,212 
2,981 
1,695 
865 
4,6N 
2,864 
| 1,613 
5,925 
2,841 
474 
2-9 
9-4 
23-4 
20.7 
14-3 
40.3 
14.3 
|I7.6 
223.4 
26.7 
12.6 
• 1936. f 1937- 11939* Memel (Klaipeda) excluded. § Establishments using mechanical power or employing five 
or more workers. All establishments, fi Peat-cutting only. •• Machine construction only. 
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TABLE 6—Indices of industrial production 
(1929 = 100) 
Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Year 
Total Capital Consumption Total Capital Consumption Total Goods Goods Goods Goods 
1929-• • 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1930... 98.7 97-6 99-o 108.8 114.1 1 1 1 .6 108.3 
I93I-• • 90.8 90.6 90.4 89.2 94-7 89.4 140.7 
1932... 78.3 76.2 77.6 82.4 60.9 87.2 153-2 
*933-• • 81.9 79-3 80.7 1 1 1 .8 72.8 122.0 
166.5 1934. • • 96.4 103.8 90.6 130.4 95-° 141-7 
*935-• • 106.4 112.1 100.6 137-3 100.4 149-9 185.9 
1936... 120.0 129.8 1 1 1 .4 *43-1 118.3 154-3 244.2 
*937-•• 138.7 169.9 118.3 160.8 138.1 168.9 272.0 
1938... *45-5 *74-5 • * 309-4 
TABLE 7~Number and size of holdings* 
One hectare = 2.471 acres 
Size of Holdings (in Hectares) Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Total holdings 133.500 225,000 287,000 
Under 10 46,000 f 109,000 132,000 
10 to 20 35,000 51,000 93,000 
21 to 30 24,000 24,000 34,000 
31 to 50 22,000 21,000 21,000 
51 to 100 6,000 18,000 6,000 
Over 100 500 2,000 1,000 
• After agrarian reforms (data for 1929-1950). 
f Of these, 24400 were under 5 hectares. 
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TABLE 8—Crops 
(Annual averages in thousand quintals •) 
I9<>9-
I9I3t 
1921-
1925 
1926-
1930 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 
Estonia 
Rye 1,852 »,639 1,594 1,728 i,535 2,"5 1,840 2,280 
Wheat 182 321 617 662 718 832 855 
Barley i,348 1,190 i,i39 918 868 809 974 899 
Oats 1,234 1,380 i,273 13,44 1,113 1.391 1,697 1,498 
Potatoes... 8,340 7,014 7,57o 8,927 10,306 9,856 9,45i 8,740 
Flax 169 101 95 105 87 103 73 62 
Latvia 
Rye 3,254 2,422 2,471 3,639 2,860 4,214 3,787 4,291 
Wheat 384 388 731 i,775 i,435 1,715 1,919 1,974 
Barley 1,728 i,5i9 1,570 2,046 1,650 2,184 2,206 2,088 
Oats 2,790 2,642 2,561 3,859 2,844 4,050 4,466 4,498 
Potatoes... 6,385 6,707 8,458 14,612 10,115 17,820 i7,5H 16,559 
Flax 302 J 213 196 454 369 454 425 I92t 
Lithuania 
Rye 4,967 5,948 5,184 6,406 5,413 6,069 6,261 6,510 
Wheat 853 1,019 1,859 2,747 2,189 2,207 2,469 2,565 
Barley 1,588 2,150 2,113 2,516 2,330 2,740 2,688 2,57i 
Oats 2,659 3,3i8 3,37o 3,995 3,320 3,878 4,248 4,106 
Potatoes... 7,959 i7,!7o 15,261 17,738 21,112 25,099 20,683 23,548 
Flax* 242 312 339 319 288 313 262 289 
• One quintal is equivalent to the following United States measures: 22046 
pounds; 3.674 bushels of wheat or potatoes; 3.937 bushels of rye; 4.539 bushels 
of barley; 6.888 bushels of oats. 
f Relate to a smaller territory than that of the subsequent years. 
X Flax and hemp. 
§ Flax only. 
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TABLE 9—Livestock 
(In thousands) 
Cattle Sheep Pigs Horses 
Estonia 
I913-14* 478 518 275 165 
1930 627 467 290 204 
1938 661 650 385 219 
Latvia 
1913* 912 996 557 320 
1930 1,026 873 523 359 
1938 1,224 1,360 814 400 
Lithuania 
1913* 918 1.15a 1,358 451 
1930 1,170 !»°97 1,136 559 
1938 1,172 614 1,192 552 
• Relate to a smaller area than that of the subsequent years. 
TABLE IO—Distribution of foreign trade 
A. Exports 
(% of total) 
To 
Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
WJ 19*7 1937 1923 19*7 193a 1937 *9*3 1927 193s '937 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Germany 10.8 29.8 26.2 30.6 7.6 26.4 26.2 35-3 43-3 51.6 39'1 16.5 
United Kingdom 34-I 31.4 36-7 33-9 46.3 34*1 30.8 38.4 26.9 24.8 41.4 46.4 
Belgium 9-o 5-4 4-5 * 19-7 10.8 6.0 5-2 1.8 2.0 1.8 3-7 
France 1-5 1.2 4-7 3-2 6.6 2.2 5-5 1.8 1.2 x.i 1.6 4.7 
Estonia , . # . , . 1.4 * *•5 0.8 * * 0.1 0.4 
Latvia 8.0 '5-2 3-7 1.0 , . 15.9 8.8 2.4 0.8 
Lithuania * * * * »-7 * 4.2 0.8 # , ,. 
Sweden 10.0 4.4 2.8 3-9 1.4 1.4 0.9 1.2 * 1.6 1.0 2.2 
Norway 0.4 1.6 1.1 * * 0.4 * 1.6 * o.i * o.i 
Denmark 6.2 3-5 3.8 * 3-2 *•9 1.2 0.5 25 0.3 0.5 *•3 
U.S.S.R 6.7 6.3 0.4 4.1 3-7 *•7 14.7 2.5 * 0.5 3-5 53 
Finland 8.5 4.8 4.7 5-8 0.3 1.2 0.4 0.8 • 0.2 * 0.5 
Poland and Danzig * * 1.2 * 0.8 4.0 1.2 O-3 * 0.1 * 0.4 
United States *•3 1.2 3-6 2-7 2.4 2-5 0.9 1.1 1.8 1.8 0.6 3-3 
All others 3-5 5-2 6.6 14.8 4-9 13-4 6.5 9-7 6.6 8.1 8.0 14.4 
* Included in "All others." 
TABLE 10—Distribution of foreign trade—Continued 
B. Imports 
(% of total) 
From 
Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
1923 1927 1932 '937 1923 1927 1932 1937 1923 1927 1932 1937 
Total 100.0 100.0 i oo.o 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Germany 51.0 26.5 32.0 26.1 45-2 40.6 35-6 27.1 80.9 53-2 40-3 21.8 
United Kingdom 19-7 14-3 13.8 16.7 17.0 10.6 13-9 20.7 5-3 6.7 10.8 27-9 
Belgium 2-3 '•9 2-3 • 2.4 1.8 3-8 8.7 * 1.2 4-5 7-9 
France 0.6 3-5 2.8 2.2 1.4 2-3 4-3 1-7 0.3 i.3 3-4 2.6 
Estonia . .  . , , . 2.4 * 1.0 0.6 * * *•3 0.4 
Latvia 3-8 3-i 4.1 1.4 , , . .  33 • 4.6 1.0 
Lithuania * * * * 5-4 * 2.1 0.7 
Sweden 3-2 5-i 4-5 6.6 2.4 4.2 2.0 3-6 0.2 1-9 2.1 3-3 
Norway o.i 0.3 o.i * * o.i * 0.8 * 0.3 * 0.4 
Denmark 3-i *•7 *•3 * 3-i 6.7 1.2 2.2 0.1 1.1 1.2 3-3 
U.S.S.R 4.0 9-1 5-7 5-7 3-6 7.3 io.i 3-8 * 2.4 6.1 8.4 
Finland 3-2 2.2 3-7 4-9 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.6 * 0.5 * 0.2 
Poland and Danzig * * 3-9 * 6.0 8.0 6.0 2.0 1.0 7.8 2.1 * 
United States 3-7 14.2 10.0 8.2 2-9 2.8 3-7 6.9 2.1 5-5 3.8 35 
All others 5-3 i8.i 15.8 28.2 7.8 14-9 15-6 20.6 6.8 18.1 19.8 *9-3 
• Included in "All others." 
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TABLE 11—Exports by commodities (1936) 
Commodities 
Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Value 
in 
Million 
Kroon 
%of 
Total 
Value 
Value 
in 
Million 
Lats 
%of 
Total 
Value 
Value 
in 
Million 
Litas 
%of 
Total 
Value 
Total 83.2 100.0 138-3 100.0 I90-5 100.0 
16.6 
4-9 
10.6 
2.0 
7-9 
8.9 
7-9 
* 
24.4 
19-9 
5-9 
12.8 
3-8 
9-4 
10.8 
9-5 
27-9 
25-3 
10.1 
1.2 
51.6 
30 
20.2 
1.0 
25-9 
18.3 
7-3 
0.9 
37-3 
2.2 
14.6 
0.7 
18.7 
35-2 
20.9 
55-0 
3-7 
32.0 
* 
31.8 
* 
11.9 
18.5 
11.0 
28.9 
*•9 
16.8 
16.7 
6.2 
livestock..,. 
Other foodstuffs 
Hides and skins (including leather).... 
Paper . 
Rubber boots and shoes 
* Included in "Other." 
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TABLE 12—Exchange reserves and external value of currency 
Exchange Reserves of Central Bank 
(In Million Kroon, Lats, or Litas) External Vaku 
of Currency 
Expressed as % 
of Gold Parity Total Gold Foreign Exchange 
Estonia 
1929 27 6 21 99-8 
*930 23 7 16 99-6 
i93i 22 7 *5 99-8 
*932 20 *5 5 100.2 
1933 22 20 2 82.4 
1934 32 28 4 62.1 
1935 36 34 2 60.1 
1936 43 34 9 60.8 
1937 5* 34 *7 60.4 
Latvia* 
1929 80 24 56 99-9 
1930 65 24 4* 100.0 
1931 47 32 *5 99-9 
*932 48 36 12 100.0 
*933 48 45 3 99-2 
*934 50 46 4 98.3 
*935 53 46 7 98.7 
*936 105 77* 28 89.6f 
*937 120 77* 43 60.0 
Lithuania 
*929 **3 35 78 99-7 
*93<> *25 39 86 100.1 
*93* 83 50 33 100.2 
*932 65 49 16 100.3 
*933 67 52 *5 ioo.i 
*934 60 52 8 100.0 
*935 54 36 18 100.0 
*936 83 73 10 99-7 
*937 85 79 6 99-4 
• After revaluation and the abandonment of the gold standard. 
t Until the end of September the old parity of the Lats was maintained in 
theory. 
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TABLE 13—Railways 
Rolling Stock Carried by Railways 
Railways Passen- Ton-
in Use 
_ Passen­ Freight ger- Kilome-
(in _ . Freight gers (in Kilome- ters of 
Miles) Engines gf Cars (in Mil­ Million ters (in Freight 
\jQT5 lions) Tons) Mil­ (in Mil­
lions) lions) 
Estonia* 
1926-27 732 204 454 5,397 6.0 1-9 258 201 
1929-30 777 201 477 5,557 9-5 2.7 293 262 
1932-33 897 211 440 5,623 7-9 2.0 212 195 
1935-36 897 213 440 5,623 9-5 2-5 277 246 
1936-37 897 204 438 5,602 10.7 2.7 321 258 
Latvia! 
1920-21.... 1,580 206 338 4,260 6-3 1.4 468 161 
1925-26 1,622 330 558 5,519 11.0 3-3 546 311 
192^-30 1,639 317 697 5,456 12.5 5-2 623 591 
1932-33 1,681 306 766 5,453 10.6 3-3 453 315 
1935-36 I,9" 295 775 5>564 14.1 4.1 625 410 
1936-37- •• I,95<> 291 789 5,571 14.8 4.4 659 438 
Lithuania J: 
1923 902 196 347 3,37I 2.7 1.1 179 "3 
1925 989 242 435 4,349 5-4 1.2 
186 
• • 
1929 961 239 400 4,500 5-I 2.1 339 
1932 980 239 356 4,484 4-5 I-7 164 264 
1936 1,015 210 316 4,305 3-2 2.2 203 309 
1937- •••• V 1,015 205 \ 313 \ 4,35I 3-7 23 
1 
222 315 
•21 square miles of total territory per mile of railway in use. 
113 square miles of total territory per mile of railway in use. 
J tg square miles of total territory per mile of railway in use. 
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TABLE 14—Shipping 
(In thousand net registered tons) 
Litht t ant a Estonia (Tallinn) Latvia Memel (Klaipeda) 
Year 
Total Shipping Total Shipping Shipping 
Tonnage Entered* Tonnage Entered* Entered* 
1920 45 631 40 480 153 
1925 46 768 53 1,444 329 
*929 60 892 150 1,873 503 
1932 100 796 189 942 520 
*936 155 I»°53 170 1,084 788 
1937 168 957 185 1,856 845 
* Including coastal traffic. 
TABLE 15—Number of motor vehicles 
Estonia Latvia* Lithuania 
Cars 2,767 3,500 i,790 
Trucks 2,252 3,000 570 
Omnibuses 266 350 370 
Motorcycles 2,035 2,500 1,380 
* Estimates. 
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B  F I N L A N D *  
General characteristics: 
Population (1938) 3,834,66s 
Urban 825,848 
Rural 3,008,814 
Area 132.589 square miles 
Including water »49-943 square miles 
Forests (73.6 per cent of total land) 62,500,000 acres 
Arable land 6425,000 acres 
Total value of industrial production 21,076,000,000 Finnish Mark 
Railways (1939) 3,706 miles 
Motor vehicles (1938) 55>955 
Merchant marine 669,000 gross registered tons 
Cities: Population (1938) 
Helsinki *93-837 
Tampere 74>736 
Viipuri 73>9»7 
Turku 78>9^1 
Vaasa 32,108 
Oulu 27,224 
Lahti 25,714 
Ruokio 24,691 
Kotka 21,448 
Pori 20,974 
• Sources: Finnish Trade Review, Helsinki, August 1939. Statistisk Arsbok 
fdr Finland, Helsinki, 1938. Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.: World Eco­
nomics and Politics; Bulletin of Conjuncture No. 1, Moscow, 1940. 
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